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Executive summary 
The overall focus of this thesis is the relationship between Europe and Islam and what it 
implies to be a European Muslim. I have interviewed Muslim women in Sarajevo, the capital 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on their Muslim identity and the use of hijab (the 
Muslim headscarf). The aim was to find out how the women construct their identity when 
they belong to both Europe and the Muslim cultural tradition and how the European and 
Bosnian context influences on their understanding of Islam. As expected, what it means to be 
a Muslim woman in Bosnia varies, and I have designed four categories to describe this 
plurality of Muslim identities, whereof the categories “Bosnian Islam” and “global Islam” 
apply to my informants. Those who identify with “Bosnian Islam” stress their Bosniak 
identity and European cultural belonging, while those in favour of “global Islam” orient 
towards the global Muslim community, the umma. The women in the first category think it is 
inevitable and positive that the Bosnian/European context influences on their Islamic practice, 
the “umma-Muslims” think society’s influence on Islam should be as little as possible. The 
main focus is on the women’s choice whether to wear hijab or not, and how they regard this 
custom. The fact that many Muslim women in Europe wear hijab remains controversial 
among non-Muslim Europeans, who mostly consider this custom to be a negative feature of 
patriarchal culture. This thesis presents the opinions of Bosnian Muslim women (who are 
native Europeans) regarding this much-debated issue. The majority of Muslim women in 
Bosnia do not wear hijab. My selection of informants consists of both women with and 
without hijab, and one woman with niqab (facial veil). The women who wear hijab combine 
their headgear with either modern or conservative clothing, depending on what they consider 
appropriate. Through their clothes my informants express their understanding of Islam and 
what is involved for them to be Muslim women. Moreover, the wearing of hijab is closely 
linked to religiosity, self-identity and a Muslim collective identity. However, there is not just 
one Muslim collective; through their clothing the women can express identification with 
different Muslim orientations. For a comparative perspective I relate my informants to 
immigrated Swedish Muslim women. To highlight the different meanings my informants 
attach to the wearing of hijab I discuss how they relate to important Islamic feminine virtues 
such as modesty and decency. The wearing of hijab can also be understood as a courageous 
act of devout women who are willing to face stigmatisation in order to please God.  
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Preface 
To come to the decision to write my thesis about Bosnian Muslim women was a durable 
process. I have for a long time been interested in Islam and have included available courses on 
Islam in my University degree. I have to admit that part of my interest was based on 
fascination, the kind of fascination you have towards phenomena that you don’t understand 
and consider opposite to everything familiar. Especially the Muslim headscarf, hijab, caught 
my attention since I found it hard to comprehend why anyone would choose to wear this 
garment, especially in the Western part of the world.  
Over the last years I have noticed what seems like increasing polarisation between 
those who see themselves as representatives of Islam and those who identify with the West. It 
appears to be a conflict of values. As a European, I am concerned with the relationship 
between the Muslim minority and the mainly Christian/secular populations of Europe, and 
whether the European Muslims consider themselves as “Europeans” and are accepted as such. 
This topic was the starting point for this work.  
I had no relations with Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims before I attended a course at the 
University of Oslo called “Religious pluralism in the Balkans”, which took me on a few days 
study trip to Bosnia and Sarajevo together with other students in fall 2004. In Bosnia I was 
reminded that there are Muslims in Europe that necessarily must identify themselves as 
Europeans because they have been Europeans and Muslims for generations. I then realised the 
relevance of exploring the relationship between Europe and Islam in Bosnia. This, and the 
desire to learn more about Bosnia, made me return a year later to do fieldwork. I also 
attempted to learn their language. Before my departure from Oslo I had taken a beginner’s 
course in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language. In Sarajevo I occasionally had lessons with a 
private language teacher, but for the most part I learned the language from self-study. Back in 
Norway I continued to learn the language by taking courses at the University of Oslo.  
At my first visit in Sarajevo I noticed that there were a number of females with hijab. I 
observed how feminine and attractive many of them looked when wearing hijab combined 
with modern, fashionable clothes and make-up, and I reflected over whether this was the 
Bosnian way of dressing in accordance to Islam.1 Based on what I had already learned about 
Bosnia’s history and the Muslim population, I formed my initial research questions: Why do 
so many young women in Sarajevo wear the hijab? Had the war and the strong presence of 
foreigners (peace keepers and aid workers) contributed to increased religious observance 
                                                 
1 This style of dress is also common among Muslims in Oslo, my hometown, but I had never reflected over how 
Muslim women in Bosnia would dress. I probably expected them to dress either modern or conservative. 
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among Muslims in Bosnia? Did the contact with Middle-Eastern countries inspire the official 
interpretation of Islam moving towards a more strict line? Did the women with hijab interpret 
Islam differently from the majority which doesn’t wear hijab? Does the hijab express an 
ethnic/national Muslim identity especially directed towards the Bosnian Serbs and Croats or 
does it address a supposedly “Islamophobic” Europe?  
These initial thoughts and impressions constituted my pre-understanding of Bosnian 
Muslims. A person’s pre-understanding is that person’s comprehension about someone or 
something before having had a first hand experience of the issue at hand. This immediate 
understanding is based upon earlier acquired knowledge and experience, and manifests as the 
categories and concepts through which we analyse and comprehend the world (Rosmer 
2005:50). As I prepared for the interviews by reading about Islam in Bosnia my pre-
understanding obtained a stronger foundation, it became more based on reality and less on 
assumptions. 
During the fieldwork in Sarajevo (August – December 2005 and January – May 2006) 
I experienced that talking to real human beings is invaluable when trying to understand an 
unfamiliar phenomenon. By listening to them and learn about their perspectives, I obtained an 
understanding I could never have acquired from reading books alone. What earlier didn’t 
make that much sense, now became intelligible and reasonable. My stay in Sarajevo gave me 
a unique possibility to enrich my knowledge about Islam and to learn how being a Muslim 
involves different things for different women. 
 I have chosen to decorate the thesis with a selection of pictures. The pictures from 
Sarajevo and Mostar are my private pictures from my stay in Bosnia. The pictures of women 
with hijab-fashion clothes are found at the homepage of Taj fashion studio: 
http://www.modnistudiotaj.com/fotogalerija.html. The map of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin 
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia.html). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the last decades, the question of Islam’s compatibility with Western culture has created 
much debate. The debate takes place both among Muslims and non-Muslims.2 There are 
several questions that are characteristic of a Western, non-Muslim point of view: Is Islam 
compatible with a modern, democratic and secularised society? Is Islam in harmony with the 
human rights, especially concerning the equal rights of men and women? Lately and 
particularly after 9/11, new types of questions have come up: are the Muslim minorities living 
in Western countries a possible threat to their own societies? Can Muslims be trusted as loyal 
citizens of the Western countries in which they live?3 And finally, will the ongoing worldwide 
conflicts and what appears to be an inevitable polarisation between representatives of Islam 
and representatives of the West lead to a violent “clash of civilisations”?4 In Europe and the 
West, Islam is still viewed as something foreign, and after the terror attacks that have taken 
place on American and European soil since 2001, Muslims are increasingly seen as a possible 
threat to the security of Western countries.5  
Muslims, on the other hand, question why Islam, which they regard as a message of 
peace, is often perceived of as synonymous with terror in Western media, and why the 
Muslim majority is collectively held responsible for actions committed by a handful of 
extremists. Muslims in the West are forced to question their very existence as a minority as 
many fear they will loose their religion, culture and distinct identity. They face the ultimate 
question of how to avoid cultural colonisation and total assimilation (Ramadan 2002:207).  
This description of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims is 
discouraging. What appears to be a wall of distrust, contempt, and sometimes hatred may 
have some basis in reality, but it can also be a product of the anti-Muslim/Islam political 
                                                 
2 It is problematic to make a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims. By doing this I seem to imply that 
all Muslims are the same and therefore different from all those who are not. I did consider calling the native non-
Muslim population of Europe “Christian/secular”, but this would have indicated that Muslims in general are 
more religious than other Europeans, something I have no reason to assert. However, since my focus is on Islam 
and how the adherence to both Islam and Europe affect the identity and sense of belonging of Bosnian Muslims, 
I find it useful to contrast those who identify themselves as active Muslims with those who do not. Nevertheless, 
it should be kept in mind that these expressions are not merely descriptive, in a sense they also construct the 
reality they seek to describe.  
3 Tariq Ramadan addresses these questions in his book published in 1999: “To be a European Muslim”. He 
concludes that whether a Muslim can be both a true European citizen and a true Muslim and member of the 
Islamic umma is really a non-issue, since nationality and faith are of different natures. He also stresses that 
Muslims like all others citizens are bound by the state’s constitution and laws (Ramadan 1999:162-164). 
4 Huntington’s article “The Clash of Civilizations?” puts forth the hypotheses that future world conflicts will 
principally be between civilisations, and that a conflict between the Western and the Islamic civilisation is not an 
unlikely scenario (Huntington 1993).  
5  In a short historical perspective this is a new development. However, in the period of the expanding Islamic 
Empire, and later the Ottoman Empire, Islam was indeed an actual military threat to Europe.   
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discourse that frequently appears in Western media (and equally, the anti-Western discourse 
in Muslim media). Reasons for the increased polarisation and Western scepticism towards 
Islam and Muslims are complex and possible explanations are to be found both in the 
historical encounters between Christianity and Islam and in recent and contemporary events.  
Independent of what the causes might be; how does this polarisation affect the Muslims who 
live in European and Western countries? How does it affect the identity and sense of 
belonging of the European Muslims? The “Declaration of European Muslims”6, written by the 
head of the Bosnian Islamic Community (IC), Reis-ul-ulema7  Dr. Mustafa Cerić (and 
colleagues), is a response to the increasingly stigmatising climate felt by Muslims in Europe. 
The declaration relates these anti-Muslim sentiments directly to the terror attacks in New 
York, Madrid and London, which are described as acts of violence against humanity, which 
have been linked to Islam and referred to in Western media as Islamic terrorism. As a 
consequence “…European Muslims live under the heavy pressure of a collective guilt for 
“Islamic terrorism”” and are made to “…suffer from islamophobia due to an irresponsible 
coverage of the Muslim issues in Europe by some media” (Cerić 2005:1). Throughout the 
declaration in which the head of the Bosnian Islamic Community attempts to carve out his 
vision of Islam in Europe, the duties, rights and expectations of the Muslims living in Europe 
are accounted for. The Reis stresses several times that they are European Muslims and have 
the right, indeed the duty, to “develop their own European culture of Islam” (2005:4).  
 
Theoretical perspectives –European Muslims 
The overall topic addressed in this thesis is the relationship between Islam and Europe and 
what it implies to be both a Muslim and a European citizen. Based on qualitative method with 
half-structured interviews, my inquiry might have been conducted anywhere in Europe since 
all European countries have Muslim minorities. I have chosen to write this thesis about 
Muslim women in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina8, focusing on their identity 
as Muslim women, Bosniaks (bošnjakinje9) and Europeans.  
                                                 
6 This declaration is the opening text of the 2006 Takvim (the Islamic almanac) for the Bosnian Muslims. The 
declaration was first put forward on the conference for the Islamic Forum of Europe in London August 27, 2005, 
in relation with the then recent terror attacks in London (July 7, 2005). It was also presented to the Human rights 
tribunal in Strasbourg in spring 2006. An English translation exists on the homepage of the Bosnian Islamic 
Community, Rijaset: http://www.rijaset.ba/images/stories/deklaracija/Declaration_eng.doc.  
7 Reis ul-ulema (head of the Islamic scholars) is the leader of the Islamic Community (IC) (Islamska Zajednica, 
IZ) in Bosnia and the highest spiritual leader of the Bosnian Muslims. 
8 Hereafter I will use the term Bosnia instead of the full name Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina). 
Bosnia is the regional term for most of the country, Bosnia proper, while Herzegovina refers to the south-western 
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While the term Bosnian refers to all the inhabitants of Bosnia, regardless of national 
and religious identity, Bosniak is the national name the Bosnian Muslims employ for 
themselves, distinguishing their national identity from the two other major national groups in 
Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.10 However, not all Bosniaks are believing/practising 
Muslims. In the following I will use the term Bosniak in the sense of nationality, regardless of 
religious observance and conviction, and Bosnian Muslim when I refer to those who are 
Muslims in the religious sense.  
The present work seeks to examine how the different components of the informants’ 
identity (i.e. being a Muslim, Bosniak and European) influence their understanding of Islam, 
and to examine in concrete terms what is involved for them to be Muslim women, particularly 
the choice whether to wear hijab or not. In my opinion it is especially interesting to focus on 
the relationship between Islam and Europe in Bosnia since the Bosnian Muslims are part of 
the traditional European population, as opposed to the Muslim immigrants of Western 
Europe. Ethnically speaking, Bosnian Muslims are South-Slavs who converted to Islam 
during the Ottoman period (1463-1878). They are also the largest group of native European 
Muslims.  
By presenting the relationship between Islam and Europe and between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in Europe as a problematic matter I am not implying that relations are doomed 
to remain so, or that Muslims can never become an integrated part of Europe. An increasing 
number of Muslims are born in Europe and to many of them there may be nothing conflicting 
in their religious affiliation and their national and cultural adherence. For the Bosnian 
Muslims, who have been Europeans and Muslims for generations, this dichotomisation 
between Islam and Europe might even seem absurd, though not unfamiliar. However, Western 
meta-narratives about Islam, placing Islam and the West in permanent opposition and 
portraying Muslims as religiously, culturally and politically foreign, influence on how the 
European Muslims experience and define their identity (Cesari 2007). These narratives about 
Islam have shaped how people in the West comprehend a number of recent events; events 
which have had negative implications on Muslim-European relations. The outcome might be 
that it becomes even more difficult to uphold a coherent and harmonic identity as a Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                        
part surrounding Mostar. In some instances, when it seems more appropriate, I might use the official name 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
9 Bosnian language has a masculine and feminine form of animate nouns. When I refer to the interview-material 
in the analysis I will therefore use the Bosnian words for Bosniak, which are: bošnjakinja (bošnjakinje pl.) for a 
female and bošnjak for a male. The same goes for Bosnian, a female is called bosanka and a male bosanac. 
10. What distinguishes the Bosniaks from the Serbs and Croats, whom they otherwise share a common South-
Slavic descent and language with, is their Muslim religious and cultural heritage.  
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and an inhabitant of a European country. The primary event I have in mind is the still ongoing 
“war on terror”. Other incidents which may have led to a stigmatising climate for Muslims 
and tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe lately are the French ban on the 
use of hijab11 and the controversy over the cartoons of the prophet Muhammed, which was a 
burning issue during spring 200612. The strong Muslim reaction to these caricatures, in the 
form of rage or the expression of offence and hurt feelings, could be understood as expressing 
a deeper dissatisfaction and resentment, but it also became clear that there is a real 
disagreement about values. For non-Muslim Europeans the right to freedom of speech was at 
stake, for the Muslims the issue concerned lack of respect for Islam.  
So what about the Bosnian Muslims who take pride in being both Muslim and 
European, how do they handle the “divide” between Europe and Islam and how does the 
polarised situation worldwide affect their identity and sense of belonging? Do they stress their 
connection with Europe or the wider Muslim world, or do they simply see themselves as 
Bosnian Muslims with their own Bosnian Islamic tradition? They have recently been through 
a malicious war13 (1992-1995) in which they were the victims of war crimes committed by 
their Serb and Croat neighbours.14 With this experience fresh in mind they certainly do not 
have an unequivocal positive image of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
Europe. To many Bosniaks the ethnic cleansing and belated intervention of the international 
community to put a stop to the atrocities happened exactly because they are Muslims instead 
of Christian Europeans.  
In spite of the recent war with its human suffering and far reaching consequences, 
which are hard to comprehend, Bosnia is a place where Islam and Christian/European cultural 
traditions have existed peacefully together, side-by-side for centuries. However, Bosnia is not 
like any other European country: situated in the Balkans it is often referred to as “a bridge 
between East and West” and a meeting ground where the Christian Catholic West and the 
Muslim and Christian Orthodox East have had their encounters throughout history. Especially 
                                                 
11 February 10, 2004, the French National Assembly passed a legislation that banned the wearing of conspicuous 
religious symbols and garments in the school. The French legislation led to discussions about the wearing of 
hijab in many other Western-European countries.   
12 Two years after, in 2008, this is still an issue, and more caricatures have been printed. The Muslim reaction is 
not as strong as it initially was, but it is clear that this is still a source of conflict and hostility. 
13  Or “aggression”, as almost every Bosniak I have spoken to about this topic would call it. Also Christian Moe 
mentions that it is common among Bosniaks to interpret what happened as “aggression”, an illegal attack by 
Serbia and Croatia (Moe 2005:18). Albeit I sympathise with their interpretation, I will use the more common 
term war.  
14 All three parties were found among the victims and among those who made themselves guilty of war crimes. 
However, the majority of the victims were Bosniaks and an overwhelming majority of the perpetrators were 
Serbs. 
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Sarajevo has become a symbol of Bosnia’s cultural and religious pluralism. On several 
occasions inhabitants of Sarajevo would proudly point out to me that a mosque, a synagogue, 
a Catholic Cathedral and an Orthodox church exist within few square metres of the city 
centre. For the Bosniaks the co-existence of churches and mosques throughout the country is a 
testimony of the religious tolerance that was exercised during the Ottoman period (Moe 
2003:5). 
As a result of globalisation, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the devastating war which 
brought foreigners to Bosnia and scattered Bosnians all over the world, Bosnia has become a 
much more open country. This has resulted in increased contact with the rest of the Muslim 
world and foreign Islamic influence in Bosnia in the form of charities, NGOs, mosques and 
cultural centres. Today, Bosnia, like all the other Eastern-European countries, is aiming at 
membership in the European Union - a name which in Bosnian public discourse seems to 
have become a synonym with Europe, a Europe they are not yet included in.  
 
The research focus 
To explore the relationship between Islam and Europe in a Bosnian context and how the 
informants perceive of their identity and sense of belonging I have decided to focus on the 
way Muslim women dress: whether they choose to cover their hair or not, different ways of 
wearing the hijab, choice of colours, shape of dress, make-up, and so forth. The reason why I 
focus on dress and appearance is because it implies a choice of how we present ourselves to 
others and which signals we give regarding who we are and what we stand for. Clothes and 
everything regarding our physical appearance is a way to express identity, or more correctly, 
to stress certain parts of it. In Sarajevo you can find Muslim women dressing in a variety of 
ways: in Western fashion, Western fashion combined with hijab, hijab and wide clothes 
typical for the Middle East, and a minority of women who are “totally covered”, meaning that 
they have a piece of clothe called niqab (a veil) covering the face but usually leaving the eyes 
free. Some of these women also wear gloves. Most important, for Muslim women the way of 
dressing reflects their understanding of Islam and what it involves for them to be a Muslim 
woman. Bosnian Muslims disagree about whether it is obligatory or not for Muslim women to 
cover their hair, what the exact reasons for this practice are, and, what is the appropriate way 
of covering. While some will stress that to cover the hair is obligatory for women and 
necessary in all societies, others say that this is not obligatory in contemporary Bosnia and 
Europe where it has lost its original purpose. Independent of whether they see hijab as 
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obligatory or not, all my informants agree that to wear it or not is a decision every woman 
must make for herself. This seems to be the general opinion among Bosnian Muslims.  
The Arabic word hijab derives from hajaba, which means to ”conceal” or “hide”, and 
can be employed for all kinds of veils or curtains that conceal a person or an object. In the 
Quran, hijab is employed in relation to segregation and separation. In recent times, hijab is 
now used to refer to headdress and the overall prescribed Islamic dress for women (Vogt 
2004:26-27). Hijab refers in this thesis to the piece of cloth that Muslim women use to cover 
their hair, whether that is a tight scarf that covers only the hair or a wide shawl that covers 
hair, neck, shoulders and most of the upper-body. The covering of the face with niqab is 
understood to be something worn in addition to hijab. The Islamic sources my informants 
referred to in order to explain why Muslim women must cover their hair and bodies will be 
accounted for in Chapter 5. My informants mostly use the words marama (headscarf), šal 
(shawl) or simply pokrivene žene (covered women) to refer to what I call hijab. Most of them 
were familiar with the term hijab, which is common in English books about Islam, but they 
underlined that they did not use this expression themselves. Some of the women associated 
the word hijab with the veiling of the face, which is actually closer to the original meaning of 
the word according to surah 33:53 (see Chapter 5). I will nevertheless use hijab to describe 
the headdress of Muslim women. This is to highlight that the Islamic headdress is not merely 
a piece of cloth, but the fulfilment of a religious obligation, the aim of which is to regulate 
male-female relations in society. Hijab involves both dress and conduct, and it is connected to 
central female virtues. Whether to refer to the Islamic headdress with the words my 
informants employ, like “covered women” or scarf (they mostly used English terms in the 
interviews), or to use the term hijab, relates to the dilemma of grounded theory. The idea of 
grounded theory is to apply analytical categories that are close to the material and situation in 
question, and to not simply interpret phenomena in one religion by referring to similar 
phenomena in other religions, especially since the concepts employed in the study of religion 
often have a Western-Christian connotation (Stensvold 2007:58-59). Hijab is certainly not a 
word with Western origin, but it is possible that Western scholars are particularly keen to 
employ the term because it mystifies the Islamic headdress and sets it apart as a phenomenon 
that must be understood on completely different terms than female clothing and veiling in 
general. I still consider the term hijab functional, because it grasps the essential meaning most 
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of my informants attach to the headdress. Nevertheless, when I refer to the interview-material 
I will always use the words they themselves applied for what I call hijab.15 
Muslim women with hijab are a minority in Sarajevo, as in Bosnia and Europe in 
general. Through their dress they signalise that they are women who have taken a conscious 
choice to dress in a way that they see to be in accordance with Islam. This involves going 
against the dominant trend of Western fashion, a way of dressing preferred by the majority of 
Muslim women in Bosnia. Most Bosniaks see the covering of hair, and especially the 
covering of face and hands as well, as something “new” and against what is considered 
normal.16 According to some of my informants, this widespread understanding is a 
consequence of the secularised lifestyle adopted through decades of communism, a period 
when religious practice was restricted to the private sphere. In the Ottoman period Bosnian 
Muslim women did practise a way of dressing which also involved niqab, but this was 
forbidden by the Communists in 1950 (Donia 2006:220), and to cover one’s hair was frowned 
upon, though not formally forbidden. So due to restriction, secularisation and the increased 
cultural identification with modern Europe, wearing hijab is today the exception and not the 
norm.       
By focusing on my informants’ way of dressing and how they understand the Islamic 
rules and argumentation about this matter, I want to say something about their identity and 
sense of belonging. The Islamic precept that women should cover their hair and body cannot 
be understood without seeing it in relation to the Islamic understanding of gender roles. 
Islamic and Western ideals and practices represent divergent views on these matters, and 
separate Western and Muslim discourses have developed in which Western and Muslim 
women are compared to each other. Western discourse has from colonial times presented the 
condition of Muslim women as downtrodden, and the hijab and the veil have been understood 
as a sign for the oppression of Muslim women. A common view is that Muslim women are 
forced to wear these clothes. This depiction of Muslim women has naturally created resistance 
and is being disputed. A Muslim strategy is to present Western women in the same simplistic 
manner: Western women are portrayed as lonely sex objects who have chosen a career instead 
of a family life and thereby betrayed their femininity. They have no dignity, and are therefore 
neither loved nor respected by those around them. Compared to Muslim women, Western 
women are naked (not covered), and their lack of clothes is symbolic for their unfortunate 
                                                 
15 Sometimes the informants too said hijab, but I think this most often was because I used that word in my 
questions, and it was therefore natural for them to employ the same word in their answer. 
16 This claim is based on the experiences of many of my informants and others I have talked to about this topic.  
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existence. While people in the West talk about free women and suppressed women, the 
Muslim discourse is about women with and without dignity. These debates have made the 
woman, and whether she is covered or not, into a symbol of the difference between the West 
and the Muslim world (Thorbjørnsrud 2004:49-51). In this perspective it is clear that my 
informants’ opinions about the hijab and the role of woman reflect their cultural belonging, 
i.e. which cultural tradition that exercises most influence over them. However, as will become 
clear, not all Muslim women understand the hijab within a traditional Islamic framework. The 
hijab might be linked to an “East-West dichotomy” and a collective Muslim identity in 
opposition to the West, but most of all the wearing of hijab is connected to individual 
religiosity and identity. 
In order to shed light on how my informants understand their role as Muslim women, I 
have chosen to structure my analysis as a parallel to Pia Karlsson Minganti’s PhD in 
ethnology called Muslima (2007). Muslima is based on fieldwork conducted with nine young 
Muslim women who are active in the new Islamic revival movement in Sweden. The women, 
who have different national backgrounds, all came to Sweden as refugees during their 
childhood. Minganti has a feminist approach which she combines with postcolonial theory17. 
The book focuses on the women’s possibilities for agency by examining how they negotiate 
over gender roles: “That is: how did the women understand descriptions of masculinity and 
femininity, the norms for distribution of resources between men and women, their relations 
and plights in life? How did they accommodate, challenge, and resist such norms and ideals?” 
(2007:286). Minganti discusses how the women relate to the virtues they as Muslim women 
are encouraged to achieve, such as modesty, patience and piety, and the common perception 
of femininity as shy, dependent and in need of protection. She found that on the one hand the 
women strived to fulfil these virtues and accepted men as patrons and providers. However, 
this one-dimensional understanding of the Muslim woman was challenged by the women’s 
own experiences as actors. Through their dawa-activity (missionary-work) they developed an 
understanding of the Muslim woman as strong, courageous and capable of action. Three of 
the chapters in Minganti’s book are built around the ideal roles the women associate 
themselves with, i.e. the modest ambassador for Islam, the protected woman within the family 
sphere, and the al-mujahida, the female activist fighting for Islam involved in dawa. I will 
                                                 
17 Postcolonial theory claims that the knowledge which legitimated colonisation by systematically looking at the 
colonised people as different, and ultimately ”the other”, is still prevailing when Western scholars attempt to 
understand people from other cultures (Minganti 2007:14). The foremost proponent of this theory is Edward 
Said. In Orientalism (2003) he explains how the European production of knowledge about the Orient was most 
of all a means to define Europe (as a contrast to the Orient).     
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analyse my material in relation to these Muslim feminine ideals, “the modest one”, “the 
protected one” and “the combative one”, because they all highlight the different meanings my 
informants attach to the wearing of hijab. Moreover, since it is my objective to shed light on 
what it involves to be a European Muslim woman, i.e. to live in an environment in which you 
experiences that your “truth” is different from, and at times opposite of, the majority’s “truth”, 
it is interesting to compare Bosnian Muslim women with immigrant Swedish Muslim women. 
However, while Minganti focuses on gender negotiations, my main focus is on identity.              
 
Islam as identity –theoretical approaches 
Being a Bosnian Muslim does not just have religious implications. During communism the 
Muslims gained status as one of Yugoslavia’s six nationalities under the name Musliman18, 
thereby making what was mainly a religious community into a political one, and creating a 
national identity out of a religiously/ethnically based identity. In 1993 the Bosnian Muslims 
replaced Musliman, which many considered to be a communist artefact, with Bosniak 
(Bošnjak), a name still in use and still largely based upon their shared religious affiliation. I 
will go into detail about the relationship between religious and national identity in Chapter 3. 
The point I wish to make here is that being Muslim in Bosnia is not necessarily connected 
with being religious. Islam is the foundation of the Bosniaks’ cultural and national identity.  
 Opposed to certain culturalist-based approaches, which view Islam and Muslims in 
terms of an individual or group essence (Cesari 2008:49), I understand Muslim identity as a 
process. This refers to the fact that identity continuously has to be created and maintained in 
interaction with others. Muslim identity involves a multiplicity of cultural and social contexts 
and individual experiences resulting in a plurality of Muslim identities. The focus of this 
thesis is on how Bosnian Muslim women construct their identity in relation to Islam, other 
Muslims and the Bosnian and European context. For some women Islam is understood as one 
of several components of their identity; others find in Islam an all-encompassing identity. My 
approach to identity relies mainly on the sociological theorisation of Anthony Giddens (1991) 
and Richard Jenkins (2004). Giddens focuses on identity as a reflexive endeavour: in a 
globalised world the individual must construct her/his identity, choosing from a diversity of 
                                                 
18Musliman is in fact the Bosnian word for Muslim, but written with an initial capital letter the word 
distinguishes itself from the term musliman, meaning a Muslim in the religious sense. The term Musliman was 
an invention of the socialist regime, intended to be a national identity only. So in theory one could be Musliman 
and at the same time belong to the Catholic or Christian Orthodox faith. However, in reality this was very 
unlikely. 
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options and possibilities. Jenkins’ main point is that individual and collective identities are 
part of the same process (not different kinds of phenomena), and that both emerge out of the 
interplay of internal and external identification; i.e., identity is socially constructed. In 
Chapter 4 I will account for central aspects of Giddens’ and Jenkins’ identity-theory which 
illuminate why Bosnian Muslim women construct and express their identity differently.  
 
Different ways of relating to Islam –research categories  
While most Bosnian women who use hijab try to blend into society by combining their 
headgear with modern clothing, others are less willing to make compromises. Women who 
dress entirely in black and cover their face, and men with long beards and short trousers, are 
often referred to as “Wahhabis” (Vehabija), i.e. Muslims who identify with the official 
interpretation of Islam in Saudi-Arabia. Whether these Bosnian Muslims follow a Wahhabi-
understanding of Islam is questionable and I will discuss this in Chapter 3, under the heading 
“Current Islamic trends”. However, because most Bosniaks refer to these Muslims as 
“Wahhabis”, so will I. I did not interview anyone who called herself a “Wahhabi”. However, I 
did ask my informants about their opinion on a more literalist way of practising Islam in 
comparison with the less stringent Bosnian Islamic tradition preached by IC, and I asked them 
how they felt about foreign Islamic influence in Bosnia. My informants’ attitudes varied from 
sympathy to aversion towards a more literalist way of interpreting Islam.  
It is normal for people to disagree about the right understanding of a religion, and this 
is no less true for Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims received Islam from Turkey during the 
Ottoman period, and as a result they follow the Hanafi School of law, which was the official 
law-school in the Ottoman Empire. They have been a quite homogenous group regarding 
religious practice and interpretation, something which was also true during the communist 
period, when most Bosnian Muslims seemed to adapt to a secular outlook and accepted the 
fact that religion had been banished to the private sphere of society.  
In order to describe Bosnian Muslims’ somewhat different understanding of Islam and 
their Muslim identity I have designed four categories. On the one hand there is the large group 
of Muslims that I will refer to as “secularised/cultural Muslims”. While some of them may 
follow a few of the Islamic prescriptions, like fasting during Ramadan, praying occasionally 
and abstain from drinking alcohol, others practise religion to an absolute minimum, for 
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example abstain from drinking alcohol during Ramadan only19. Nevertheless, they still 
consider themselves as Muslims, both in the cultural and religious sense. For them, Islam is a 
private and individual matter. This way of relating to Islam is in sharp contrast to how those 
popularly referred to as “Wahhabis”, a second group of Muslims, practice Islam. The third 
group consists of committed Muslims who observe Islam but focus on the Bosnian Islamic 
tradition and stress their Bosniak identity and European cultural belonging. They distance 
themselves from foreign Islamic influence, notably the “Wahhabis”, whose way of practising 
Islam they see as improper for Bosnia and mostly a negative and disturbing influence. The 
fourth group consists of those who are committed to what I will refer to as “global Islam”, 
because their understanding of Islam appears to be quite independent of any specific cultural 
or normative tradition, i.e. country or Islamic school of law. They read the Quran and try to 
understand the Islamic message independent of local customs and cultural circumstances. 
They stress the importance of Muslims adjusting themselves to the law of God instead of 
adjusting God’s law to society, whether that society is Bosnia, Norway, Morocco, Indonesia 
or any other country. However, this does not indicate that they are unwilling to adjust 
themselves to the laws of the society where they live. The best name for them might be 
“umma-Muslims”, insofar as the idea of a supranational umma, a global Muslim community, 
seems to be at the core of their identity.  
These categories are an analytical device. They should not be understood as a 
continuum consisting of strict categories, i.e. the separation between them is fluid. In practice, 
of course, people are not just one thing or the other, but normally a mix resulting from 
different influences in their lives.  
A distinction can be made between a group and a category. While the members of a 
group recognise each other as members of the same community, membership in a category is 
an analytical decision and does not necessarily correspond to the members’ own 
understanding. However, when the members of a category recognise their categorisation, they 
might eventually begin to see themselves as a distinct group (Jenkins 2004:85). The 
categories I have constructed to describe the different manners Bosnian Muslims relate to 
Islam are probably familiar to my informants, at least the categories “secularised/cultural 
Muslims”, “Bosnian Islam” and “Wahhabis”. While members of the two first categories are 
likely to recognise their membership in these categories, those who are labelled “Wahhabis” 
                                                 
19 To not drink alcohol during Ramadan, Islam’s holy month, seems to be a prescription observed by all 
Bosniaks, even if they don’t consider themselves religious. However, at bajram (id al-fitr), the three-day long 
feast at the end of Ramadan, some celebrate by going out and drinking alcohol (based on my own observations 
during Ramadan 2005).  
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will surely agree that they are different from the Bosnian Muslim majority, but instead of 
calling themselves “Wahhabis”, they will almost certainly argue that they only follow true 
Islam (and are therefore merely Muslims). It is questionable whether the category “global 
Islam” is known to those of my informants it applies to. Yet, I think they will acknowledge 
what this term is intended to convey: to downplay differences between Muslims and focus on 
Islam as a universal religion independent of local culture. 
Roughly speaking the categories “cultural/secular Muslims” and “Bosnian Islam” 
agree with what Christian Moe and Ahmet Alibašić (2006) call “mainstream”, while “global 
Islam” and “Wahhabis” are consistent with the category “fringe” (see Chapter 3). In order to 
highlight the identity-dimension and to better describe nuances among Bosnian Muslims I 
find it useful to apply these four categories. Out of these four, I found that my informants 
belonged to “Bosnian Islam” and “global Islam”. The difference between these two categories 
does not relate to degree of religiosity; i.e. the umma-Muslims are not more religious than the 
“Bosnian Muslims”, or opposite. Where their relationship to the sources, the Quran and the 
sunna (the Prophet’s tradition) is concerned, a distinction can be made between the two 
categories: those in favour of “global Islam” are more reluctant to adjust Islam to local culture 
(in fear of altering the original message), and can therefore be described as literalist compared 
to those who follow “Bosnian Islam”. It is quite common to differentiate between Muslims 
based on how they relate to the Islamic sources and to what degree they think Islamic law 
(sharia) should be the foundation of social, political and legal institutions. The Bosnian expert 
on Islamic law, professor Fikret Karčić, for example, distinguishes between secularists, 
traditionalists, Islamic modernists and revivalists (cf. Bougarel 2007:103). I did not ask my 
informants about what role they think sharia should play in Bosnia today (it is a widespread 
opinion among Bosnian Muslims that Islamic law cannot be applied unless the Muslims are 
an absolute majority). However, how they relate to the Islamic sources and to what degree 
they follow sharia in their own lives, will be discussed in relation to clothing and gender-
relations.  
 
The foundation of the inquiry; the informants 
The interviews this thesis is based on were carried out during my stay in Sarajevo, which 
lasted for three and a half months in fall 2005 and four months in spring 2006. I found my 
informants through various channels, mostly by contacting NGOs and the Islamic faculty at 
the University of Sarajevo (see chapter 2). What characterises most of the women I have 
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interviewed is that they are active in society through their job and/or organisational work. The 
majority have or are undergoing higher education and were fluent in English in order to make 
communication possible. However, as my Bosnian language skills improved, I was also able 
to interview some women without such good knowledge of English. I made sure to interview 
both women with and without hijab. The women with hijab dressed in different types of 
clothes, and I tried to find out how that corresponded with their understanding of Islam and 
their Muslim identity. I will go into detail about the fieldwork process and the interviews in 
Chapter 2. The appendix contains a list of informants (they are all given pseudonyms to 
preserve their anonymity). All my informants agreed to take part in this survey. At this point I 
wish to emphasise that the focus of this thesis is not on the individual story of each person. 
Therefore I have collected valuable information not only through the long interviews but also 
through every informal conversation and every tit bit of relevant information I came across 
that could shed some light to the issue at hand. Living in Sarajevo for several months also 
helped me to get a sense of the bigger picture and helped me to develop a deeper 
understanding of Islam in Bosnia. While the interview-data constitute the concrete material 
for my analysis, everything else I learned about Bosnian Muslims will function as a valuable 
background.
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The square of Baščaršija, the bazaar built in Ottoman time. In the middle of the picture is 
one of Sarajevo’s most popular landmarks; Sebilj, a public water fountain. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Islamic faculty (Fakultet Islamskih nauka), established in 1977. 
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Chapter 2: The research process 
The methodological perspective of this thesis is situated within a post-modern constructivist 
tradition, i.e. it acknowledges the constructivist character of all knowledge. Regarding 
qualitative interview as a method for attaining information, the constructivist view implies 
that the interview data is considered as something which is created through the interaction 
between the interviewer and the person interviewed. The data relate to the real world and give 
valuable information about how the person interviewed comprehends events in her life but is, 
nevertheless, a result of the interview. This means the interview data must be seen in relation 
to the perspective of the researcher, the focus of the inquiry, the concrete questions asked, 
how the informant perceives the interviewer and the overall dynamic between the participants 
in the interview (Öhlander 1999:20). 
 
Qualitative research interview  
The qualitative research interview is based on everyday conversation, but distinguishes itself 
from an informal conversation because of a certain structure and the scientific purpose of the 
conversation (Kvale 2006:21). In order to achieve the advantages of the informal everyday 
conversation – that is, a relaxed atmosphere where the participants feel free to speak openly – 
I tried to avoid asking interview questions in a fixed order. This represented a methodological 
dilemma: on the one hand, I needed to create an informal atmosphere; yet, at the same time, I 
also had to ask those questions which the informant could perceive as critical and sensitive.  
With one exception, I made arrangements for the interviews in advance. The meetings 
took place in the informant’s home, workplace or a café, depending on what the person in 
question preferred. Altogether I conducted 22 interviews, out of which 15 were recorded. 
Four of the interviews took place in a group setting, while the rest was carried out with only 
one respondent at the time. Five of the informants I interviewed two or more times, but with 
the majority I was only able to conduct one interview. This indicates that I developed a better 
understanding of, and relationship with, some of my informants than others. The total number 
of informants who have contributed to this thesis is 18. Out of these 18, I made in-depth 
interviews with 12. The youngest of my informants is 18 and the oldest is 70-years-old. The 
majority is in their 20s and 30s.  
I made use of a standard interview-guide that covered the topics I wanted to talk about. 
The guide consisted of different themes with suggestions for concrete questions. I usually 
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started asking the informants why they had decided to cover their hair or not, and what their 
concrete personal experiences were. As my understanding of the field increased, I realised 
that not all of my initial questions were equally relevant. Inevitably, the interview-guide 
changed along with my understanding of the field – since, of course, qualitative research is a 
cyclic process. The different aspects of the research, such as the forming of the research 
questions, the collection of the material, the interpretation and the analysis, take place 
simultaneously and influence each other mutually (Thagaard 1998:25).   
The interview-guide made me able to systematise the data and to maintain a 
comparative perspective throughout the fieldwork and later in the analysis. A tactical move in 
this respect was to “let the informants converse with each other.” In conversation with one 
person, I would present the statements of others (anonymously) and ask what her opinions 
about that particular issue were. I found this to be an especially useful method to find in what 
matters my informants actually disagree, and in which cases different ways of expressing 
oneself made it seem my informants held divergent opinions. 
I used a recorder and taped the interviews, which I later transcribed. Even though all 
the informants gave me permission to record our conversation, I sometimes had the 
impression that the permission was given reluctantly and, as a result, that the presence of the 
recorder made some of them more restrained and self-conscious about how they expressed 
themselves. I still chose to use a recorder because I considered it even more disturbing for the 
communication if I were to take notes for every answer given. Besides, a recorder is an 
invaluable tool in order to avoid selective memory and gives authenticity to the material. 
Because I explained this to my informants and stressed that no one other than I would listen to 
the interviews, they all agreed. Apparently, what seemed to be the biggest concern for many 
was that they would be misconstrued in a foreign language (English). 
An additional method for obtaining information from an interview is observation. The 
use of body language and other non-verbal communication can underline or contradict what is 
being said, and is therefore a useful corrective to the oral interview data (1998:85). In my 
case, observation also had another purpose: namely, to observe what the informant was 
wearing. I observed how those with their hair covered framed their hijab, what kind of colours 
they made use of, length and width of clothes, whether they used make-up, jewellery, high-
heels, and the overall impression of their physical appearance (which is a matter of my 
comprehension).    
In my attempt to understand my informants and their point-of-view, I asked them to 
recommend me relevant literature about Islam. My idea was that this would not only help me 
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to learn more about Islam, but also find out what they considered to be important and correct 
information about their religion. The recommended literature I have made use of is marked 
with an asterisk (*) in the Bibliography. 
 
Recruitment of informants 
The strategy for recruitment of informants was to apply the “snowball method.” This method 
consists in first establishing contact with a couple of informants and then let those initial 
contacts lead you to new ones by asking them to suggest friends or acquaintances who might 
be interested in taking part in the survey. To prevent the selection of informants from being 
one-sided, i.e. consisting of people who belong to the same circle of acquaintances and are 
more likely to hold similar attitudes towards certain phenomena and share the same 
experiences, it is important to establish contact within different networks (Thagaard 1998:54-
55). I had this in mind when I started the recruitment-process, especially since it was in my 
interest to interview women who represent the different Islamic orientations (cf. the categories 
I use, described in Chapter 1) present in Sarajevo. I therefore made sure that my contacts did 
not all know each other. 
I started looking for informants by contacting a Muslim woman I knew was working 
in a NGO and a lecturer at the Islamic faculty and, as it happened, these two initial contacts 
would lead to the majority of the informants who have contributed to this work. My 
preliminary assumption, which was a likely correlation between choice of dress and religious 
orientation, proved to be correct in the majority of cases. Therefore, by making sure that my 
informants consisted of both women with and without hijab, and also women who dress quite 
differently with hijab (both modern/fashionable and conservative), I provided for the 
necessary variation in the selection of informants.  
It is always important to reflect over why someone is willing to take part in a research 
and others are not. And because I applied the “snowball method” and gave already existing 
informants the task and opportunity to find new informants for me, I had to reflect over what 
the reasons could be when this or that specific informant was recommended. When I asked 
my informants if they knew anyone who would be willing to take part in my research, I gave 
two criteria: one, the person had to be serious about religion and consider herself a 
believing/practising Muslim. I stressed this point to avoid informants who are “Muslim by 
name only”, i.e. the large group that I, per my Introduction, refer to as secularised/cultural 
Muslims. Criterion number two was that the person had to be able to speak English. 
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It is reasonable to assume that a person is more likely to recommend someone who 
holds similar attitudes as themselves and who they, therefore, expect to give a correct picture 
of Islam. In one instance an informant was recommended to me because the person who 
recommended her thought she would challenge what she assumed to be my prejudices about 
Islam. Because the recommended informant does not wear hijab and is a feminist, she 
challenges the Western stereotypic image of the Muslim woman. However, in most of the 
cases, recommended informants seemed to be chosen on mere practical considerations, e.g., 
people who might have the time and desire to talk to me and, most important, who had 
sufficient English skills. The total number of possible informants was considerably narrowed 
down by the fact that I was not able to communicate adequately in their language. On many 
occasions, informants had several potential informants in mind, but when they realised that 
they had to be able to speak English, they could not think of any.  
All my informants speak English (though not everyone speaks it fluently), and that 
reflects the fact that most of them have or are undergoing higher education20. This entails that 
my selection of informants is not representative for the entire female Muslim population in 
Sarajevo, but has an overrepresentation of women with higher education. Since this is 
qualitative research, this does not represent a weakness in the material, but it should still be 
kept in mind. To be able to communicate in a manner adequate enough to reach the sought-
after understanding and appropriate the informants’ perspective was obviously my highest 
priority, since this is the criterion upon which the qualitative research interview rests. What 
was important for my purpose was to have informants who dressed in different styles, a goal I 
accomplished. That I only interviewed one woman who wears niqab can be considered a 
disadvantage because that makes me unable to compare her motivation for wearing the niqab 
with someone else’s. I only interviewed one woman with niqab because I did not get in touch 
with anyone else. Informants told me that women with niqab are normally not easily 
accessible because many of them lead a more secluded, family-centric way of life. Probably 
they would be sceptical of my motives. However, my interest regarding niqab was first of all 
what Muslim women think about this practice. 
What characterises most of my informants is that they are conscious about their 
opinions and have confidence in their interpretation of Islam. They did not mind sharing their 
understanding of Islam with me because they are certain about the validity of it. Some also 
considered the interview to be an opportunity to let people know the truth about Islam and to 
                                                 
20 During the communist era many learned Russian, not English, in school.  
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hopefully contribute to lesser prejudices towards women with hijab. However, not everyone 
wanted to share their views with me, and I can only speculate about what the reasons might 
have been. I completely failed to get access to one Muslim female organisation, despite 
sending e-mails to two of the leaders and introducing myself to a third at a lecture held by one 
of my informants. This particular member was very positive towards me; however, since she 
did not speak English, she was going to ask the organisation's director if they could meet with 
me. I never heard anything from the director. It is likely they were sceptical, doubting my 
motives for focusing on this topic. They probably considered the risks by taking part in the 
research greater than the possible benefits.   
 
My part in “creating” the material  
In order for people to be willing to share their opinions, thoughts and details about their lives 
with someone they have never met before, that person has to achieve a sufficient amount of 
trust. If an informant does not have confidence in the interviewer and has doubts about the 
purpose for the research, that will have serious implications on the communication. Answers 
can be given reluctantly, information will probably be omitted because the informant fears it 
might be used in a wrong way, and the interview might never take place.  
I expected that my informants would be somewhat critical and leery of me, a non-
Muslim and a stranger, as well as my choice of topic. I also feared that I might be viewed as 
“just another foreigner wanting to have a piece of their post-war misery,” and that they 
probably were “sick and tired” of outsiders wanting to describe and analyse their reality. That 
my informants would have prejudices against me, just as I held prejudices against them, I took 
as a matter of fact. Much of this scepticism I expected to be found in public discourse and the 
official debates we all become part of as members of society. These official debates were 
present in the interview-situation in the form of an invisible third instance the informants 
related to in conversation with me (Pripp 1999:43). The polarised post-9/11 discourse is a 
good example of this third instance present. For example, when someone would stress that 
Islam has nothing to do with terrorism, they would also, without my prompting, refer to the 
Western media-created discourse that often depicts Islam as a terrorist-religion.  
In the first months of 2006, the media was dominated by the controversy over the 
caricatures of the Prophet Muhammed, an episode that had a negative impact on Muslim-
European relations. Muslims worldwide asserted these caricatures reinforce an image of a 
Europe that is hostile towards Islam. On the other hand, for many non-Muslim Europeans, the 
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Muslims’ fierce reactions worldwide, which included flag-burnings and setting fire to 
embassies, underpinned a widespread comprehension of Muslims as primitive people who 
easily resort to violence. Because one of the newspapers that printed these insulting cartoons 
was Norwegian, Muslim demonstrators in Sarajevo and elsewhere reacted by burning the 
Norwegian flag. As a result of this, I anticipated some negative reactions against me, a 
Norwegian, but this did not occur; rather, most of my informants expressed embarrassment on 
behalf of the demonstrators. Some further stressed that a man from Zenica (a city north of 
Sarajevo), and therefore an outsider, had been responsible for the demonstration, and that Reis 
Cerić and the Islamic Community had advised against taking part in any demonstration. My 
informants certainly did not approve of the caricatures, but they chose to rise above it.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are separate Western and Muslim discourses about 
women. Since I asked critical questions about the hijab and wanted to discuss gender roles in 
Islam, I feared that my informants would see me as a representative of the prejudiced Western 
discourse, depicting Muslim women as oppressed and without self-determination. My 
uncovered blond hair, my modern way of dressing and the fact that I come from Western-
Europe might have led them into assuming this even before having had the chance to talk to 
me. With this in mind, I tried to make a good impression. I concluded that I could not do so 
much about my physical appearance, except from dressing modestly (according to my 
standards). Besides, Muslim women in Sarajevo dress in different styles, as did my 
informants. As I have made a focal point of this thesis, they are both Western and Muslim. 
Some dress similarly to me; others find such style inappropriate. Some are inspired by 
Western feminism, while others distance themselves from it. Nevertheless, my origin and how 
I look probably had influence on how some of my informants chose to express themselves. 
For instance, those informants who dress conservatively and consider it improper for a 
woman to show her hair and wear tight clothes (as I do) obviously had to find a balance 
between expressing their views and, at the same time, avoid insulting me. In a few instances I 
could sense that informants did not express themselves as freely as they probably would have 
if I too were a conservatively dressed Muslim woman; but for the most part, I found my 
informants to be very open and honest. 
What I found to be most crucial in order to gain trust was to present my project in a 
convincing way and to be able to answer their questions. It was very challenging to explain 
what direction my thesis would take since, at that time, I was uncertain what the main focus 
would eventually be. I could, however, assure those who feared that I would present Islam 
from a negative point of view, because I knew that I had nothing but good intentions. I 
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therefore stressed that my thesis could only contribute to a better understanding of Islam and 
hopefully also to increased acceptance of women with hijab. 
  My religious identity rarely became an issue. Some informants assumed that I was 
Christian (and Protestant if they had knowledge about the dominant Church in Scandinavia); 
since I am, in fact, a member of the Norwegian State Church, I did not consider it necessary to 
correct them and account for my religious views unless they specifically asked. On one 
occasion, two informants wanted to know where I stood religiously. I did my best to explain 
that I had been a devout Christian earlier in my life but was now more of an agnostic, and that 
I viewed Islam as a possible alternative on level with other religions. I had the impression that 
they could not really comprehend my unsettled position, but at least they were relieved when I 
answered negative to the question about whether I was an atheist. In conversation with other 
informants it also became clear that, from a Muslim point-of-view, any religiosity is 
preferable to atheism. The reason why these two informants were glad to hear that I was not 
an atheist could, of course, also have been because they doubted that an atheist could 
understand the Islamic faith. Nevertheless, if I had been an atheist it is not unlikely that it 
would have made some informants disapprovingly inclined towards me.   
Language-problems clearly had negative implications on the communication. English-
skills varied, and it was occasionally difficult for my informants and me to understand each 
other. Meaning was not always clear. Language can both be a barrier and a means to bond. 
When I contacted informants by telephone I often spoke Bosnian, hoping my informants 
would appreciate my effort. My eagerness to speak their language actually had some negative 
consequences, however: I inadvertently led some of my informants to believe that I mastered 
their language better than I actually did. A few were therefore reluctant to speak English 
because they believed that my Bosnian-skills might be as good as their English-skills.    
 
The ethical dimension 
The relationship between researcher and informant is not based on equality. The researcher 
has a concrete agenda with the relationship: to understand and later to analyse the information 
given by the informant. When the informant agrees to open up and answer the researcher’s 
questions, the informant gives the researcher the power to use this information in a way that 
can either be positive or destructive for her/him. The confidence the informant has in the 
researcher places a huge moral responsibility upon the researcher and obliges her/him to 
protect the informant from all possibly negative consequences from taking part in the 
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research. There are some ethical guidelines which all researchers must follow, such as making 
sure that the informants’ participation is voluntary and based on informed consent, and that 
informants who give sensitive information are granted anonymity; but in the end, it is each 
researcher’s individual decision how to handle the ethical dimension of the research. What 
can prove particularly challenging is to present the informant in a manner that she/he will 
recognise. Because the researcher does not just reproduce the informant’s own understanding, 
but analyses it by using relevant theoretical perspectives and concepts, there is always a risk 
that the informant will react negatively to how she/he is presented, and perceive of certain 
interpretations as wrong and offensive (Aukrust 2005).    
During the interview, the researcher and informant collaborate; the distribution of 
power, then, is more equal. The researcher is the one who defines the situation by asking the 
questions, but the person interviewed is in position to choose what kind of information to 
share with the interviewer (Thagaard 1998:101-102). Indeed, sometimes the person 
interviewed can be the one in charge of the situation. I experienced that some informants held 
a monologue, so to speak, and I had to really interrupt them to ask my questions. They 
seemed to have an agenda, and looked at the interview as an opportunity to convey their 
message.  
The informant will constantly evaluate the researcher’s behaviour, and decide whether 
the researcher is trustworthy and someone she/he wants to open up to. This implies that the 
researcher is dependent on the informant’s goodwill in order to acquire information, and the 
researcher will therefore strive to develop close contact with the informant. To establish close 
contact with an informant has moral implications. If the relationship becomes “too close,” the 
informant can be led into being more open than she/he initially intended and possibly say 
things later regretted. To avoid this, the researcher should maintain some distance and also 
remind the informant of the purpose of the relationship (1998:100-102).  
Since I normally used a recorder and interviewed most informants only once, the 
intention with the conversation could not be mistaken. However, I got to know two of the 
informants especially well. They both invited me to their homes and we also went out to drink 
coffee a couple of times. At these coffee-appointments the roles were not clearly defined: 
were we two friends drinking coffee or were we still interviewer and interviewee? In the 
midst of such an informal setting, I told one of them that I would not use anything that came 
up during that conversation in my thesis; nonetheless, the informant in question replied that 
she did not mind if I did. With the other woman I looked at these coffee-appointments as a 
mere continuation of the interview, but, in retrospect, I realise that she might not have. It has 
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therefore become clear to me that, when dealing with informants, it is impossible to leave the 
role of the researcher behind. Everything the informants say and do influences on my 
understanding of them as informants. My better understanding of them is, of course, positive; 
still, it remains my responsibility to be particularly cautious if I choose to refer to information 
that has been given to me in an informal setting. 
When the collection of the material is finished and the researcher starts to work on the 
analysis, the informant is no longer in an influential position: the initial relationship between 
researcher and informant becomes one between researcher and text. The researcher must, 
therefore, avoid regarding informants as objects (1998:102). To present my informants as the 
complex individuals they are and, at the same time, to describe tendencies and draw some 
conclusions, is almost an impossible task. I have tried to avoid stereotyping my informants, 
but since I don’t describe 18 different informants (only very superficially in the Appendix), 
but instead present their experiences and statements to illustrate points, it is inevitable that 
some will feel that I have not given a true picture of them (because I have not presented the 
whole picture). Since the informants probably can identify themselves as individuals in the 
thesis, I fear that some might be disappointed. I have also chosen to categorise my informants, 
and it is questionable whether they will agree with my categorisation. The categories were not 
designed prior to the research, but came into being as a result of the understanding I obtained 
from the interviews, and were therefore not to my informants’ knowledge. As I have stressed, 
the categories are only an analytical tool, and in Chapter 4 I will discuss what categories 
might be appropriate for the different informants and on what basis. 
The main reason why I chose to write this thesis in English was to diminish the 
negative consequences of the unequal power-relation between the informants and myself. I 
have also agreed to send my thesis to three of my informants (who are in position to make it 
available to most informants), something that ensures that I constantly reflect on how my 
interpretations will be apprehended by them.  
 
Informed consent 
In accordance with research ethics in practice, an individual must give explicit and voluntary 
consent before becoming the “object” of research. Moreover, the person asked to participate 
should be in position to make the decision based on relevant information about the overall 
purpose of the research. This is out of respect for the integrity and autonomy of every 
individual and in recognition of the fact that the research can have negative consequences for 
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those who participate. However, in reality these ideals often prove difficult to fulfil one 
hundred percent (Alver & Øyen 1997:102-110).    
Over the course of the fieldwork, I often reflected over to what degree my informants’ 
consent was based on a sufficient amount of information. Were they aware of the aim of the 
research? Further, did they understand how the information they gave me would be used and 
what their role in the final analysis would be? I have concluded that they could not have been 
fully aware of this; after all, I myself did not know what the result would eventually look like. 
As previously mentioned, the different aspects of the research process influence each other. 
This involves that the focus of the thesis has developed in-step with the interviews. And since 
this is the first time I have conducted this sort of inquiry, it was very difficult for me to 
foresee how my theoretical perspectives and their answers would transform into the final 
analysis.  
It is also debatable whether the informants' participation was always entirely 
voluntary. It was usually first when I met informants face-to-face that they had the 
opportunity to grasp what it was all about. I then tried to explain the purpose of the interview 
as best as I could, and I also gave them the opportunity to ask me questions before I started to 
interview them. Those who then might have decided that they did not want to be a part of the 
research most likely found it very difficult to reject at that point; further, if already existing 
informants had arranged the meeting, this must have contributed further to a feeling of 
obligation on their behalf. This clearly represented an ethical dilemma.   
 
Anonymity 
Given the possibly negative consequences from being identified in a research analysis, those 
who participate are normally provided with an anonymous identity. This is particularly 
important if the information concerns delicate or controversial topics such as politics or 
religion. Changing names and altering information about age, profession, place of residence, 
etc. permit anonymity. The demand of anonymity is not unproblematic: by altering 
information in order to make the informants unrecognisable, they can also become bereft of 
their authenticity. If the omitted information is decisive for the results of the study, this will 
adversely affect the credibility of the entire research (Alver & Øyen 1997:119-120).  
 In this case it has been a challenge to provide the informants with complete anonymity 
because some of them are friends, and because people connected to NGOs and, in particular, 
Muslim organisations, probably are acquainted with each other. What concerns those of my 
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informants who are friends (as mentioned I applied the “snowball-method”) I don’t consider it 
to be very problematic if they recognise each other in the text; they probably will do so if they 
try. This is because, as friends, they are most likely aware of each other’s views. However, I 
hope I have been able to preserve the informants’ anonymity for others, including people who 
might know them personally but do not know that they have taken part in this research. To 
achieve this, I have not given information about their education and profession (except from a 
few cases), correct age and number of children, etc. 
 I could of course have chosen not to describe the informants individually at all since I, 
for the most part, use their statements and experiences to present different opinions and to 
illustrate tendencies. The reason why I have decided to connect the data with each individual 
informant is because I identify them with different manners of conceptualising a Muslim 
identity (“Bosnian Islam” and “global Islam”). In order to find out whether there is any 
connection between their identity, manner of dressing and their opinions about different 
religious issues such as the wearing of hijab and gender-roles I decided to keep the unity 
between informant and interview data and refer to names and persons. 
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Chapter 3: Bosnian Muslims, past and present 
The course of history has provided the Bosnian Muslims with several points of reference for 
their identity. Bosnian Muslims have a bond with the remaining Muslim world, yet they also 
belong to the European cultural tradition.21 Their collective identity is significantly shaped by 
the relationship they have with the other major national groups that constitute Bosnia: the 
Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats. Developments in the 19th and 20th century have made 
the different groups focus more on their own nation’s history at the expense of a common 
Bosnian history and tradition.22 As a result of the 1992-1995 war, Bosnian Muslims had 
special reason to establish their own nation’s history and origin: their status as a distinct 
ethnic/national group with a natural tie to Bosnia was called in question by Serb and Croat 
nationalist extremists, who attempted to assimilate Bosnian territory into their respective 
fatherlands.  
Religion was and remains a constitutive part of West-Balkan nationalisms (Perica 
2002). The link between nation and religious community is so close in Bosnia that people’s 
national and religious identities completely overlap: A Muslim is always a Bosniak, a 
Catholic Christian a Croat, and an Orthodox Christian is without exception a Serb.23 For the 
Muslims this indicates that Islam is not only their religion, it is also a source of their nation’s 
history, tradition and identity. This fusion of nation with religious community has influenced 
their religious practice and their Muslim identity. However, not all Bosnian Muslims are 
equally concerned with the Bosnian dimension of their religious identity. Toward the end of 
this chapter, I will describe the major religious trends present in Bosnia and identify their 
origin. This presentation will shed light on the different manners my informants relate to 
Islam and explain why there is disagreement among Bosnian Muslims about the hijab issue. 
 
                                                 
21 As Muslims they are naturally excluded from the Christian cultural tradition, which has been, and still is, an 
important basis for a common European identity. 
22 The authors of “Bosnia and Hercegovina, a tradition betrayed” (Donia & Fine 1994) argue that Bosnia has 
most of all been characterised by a tradition of tolerance and coexistence and a common Bosnian identity that 
included all the different ethnic/religious groups in Bosnia. The Bosnian war is understood as a break with this 
tradition. The authors strongly oppose the widespread understanding that the war was an inevitable result of age-
old hatred between the different national groups.  
23 Except from the few cases of religious conversion.  
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Bosnia, facts and figures 
Bosnia’s population is approximately four million. The inhabitants are mainly Bosniaks, 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, whereof the Bosniaks are in majority.24 Unlike other 
former Yugoslavian states, each of which has a nationally-dominant religion, Bosnia is 
divided between Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians. Many believe Bosnian 
religious diversity is an insolvable problem, while others consider the religiously-mixed 
population to be a treasure and what makes Bosnia the peculiar thing it is: a Muslim-Christian 
European country.    
Bosnia today is a product of the Dayton peace agreement which, in November 1995, 
ended the war that had ravaged the country since spring 1992, when Bosnia declared 
independence from the dissolving Yugoslavia. The Dayton agreement acknowledged the outer 
territorial borders as they existed when Bosnia was a Yugoslav republic. However, the 
agreement divides the inner territories into two entities: a federation of Bosniaks and Croats, 
Federacija, and a Serb dominated entity, Rebublika Srpska (see map). The government 
structure is designed to prevent the ascendancy of any of the three national groups; to this end, 
the head of state is a three-member rotating presidency with one Bosniak, one Bosnian Serb 
and one Bosnian Croat member. The two entities enjoy a high degree of autonomy and have 
their own constitutions, governments, legislative assemblies, police forces and court systems 
(Burkey 2006:2-3). Since 1995, Bosnia has been administered by the Office of the High 
Representative and a NATO peacekeeping force (SFOR, replaced by the European EUFOR in 
late 2004).   
The three dominant national groups in Bosnia do not only inhabit the same state, they 
also share a South-Slavic heritage and language25. Religion is the primary means of 
distinguishing between people. However, many Bosnians are not necessarily religious, but 
lead a secular lifestyle in a cultural environment that is shared by all inhabitants.  
Nationalists on all three sides have searched for ethnic divisions in early Slav history 
that can correspond with their current nationalistic aspirations. This has proved to be a futile 
project; the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks all 
                                                 
24 In the 1991 census Muslimani (Bosniaks) made up 43.7 percent of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbs accounted for 31.3 percent and Croats 17.3 percent (Bringa 1995:26). 
25 The language used to be called Serbo-Croatian (srpskohrvatski/hrvatskosrpski) from 1960 onwards, but after 
the division of Yugoslavia it has differentiated into three national-languages: Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian (and 
with time possibly also a fourth; Montenegrin language). The differences between the three languages mostly 
concern vocabulary and pronunciation and the use of the Cyrillic alphabet among the Serbs and the Latin 
alphabet among the Croats and Bosniaks (Mønnesland 2002:24-25).  
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descend from the same Slavic base: a people who moved down the Balkan Peninsula in the 
late 6th century (Malcolm 1996:6-8).  
 
The Islamicisation of Bosnia 
When the Ottomans subdued Bosnia in 1463, the inhabitants were Christians. After “the Great 
Schism” between the Roman and the Orthodox Church in 1054, Bosnia was formally under 
the jurisdiction of Rome. In reality, though, Bosnia was never won over by either of the 
competing Churches (Donia & Fine 1994:17).  
How a significant portion of Bosnia’s population came to embrace Islam has been the 
focus of much debate and speculation. Apart from Albania, no other Ottoman-occupied 
Balkan territory saw so many locals convert to Islam. The existence of a little documented 
schismatic Bosnian Church is considered a key to understand why and how this happened. 
Many of the theories about the conversion to Islam and the nature of the Bosnian Church are 
not well founded; rather, the theories have been – and remain – contributions to a nationalistic 
discourse concerning which ethnic group has the longest historical continuity in Bosnia 
(Malcolm 2002:27-29).  
Many leading scholars in Bosnia support a theory which claims that the schismatic 
Bosnian Church was an offshoot of the Bogomils, a Bulgarian heretical movement which 
preached a Manichean dualist theology. The Bogomil theory has been particularly popular 
with 20th century Bosniaks, who have been accused of being renegades from Catholicism or 
Orthodoxy. Since the Bogomil-theory depicts the conversion to Islam as a mass-conversion of 
Bogomils who, for centuries, had endured the persecution of the Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches, the Bosniaks can, according to this theory, claim that their forefathers never were 
Catholic or Orthodox, but the members of an autonomous Bosnian Bogomil Church. This 
would mean that the Bosniaks have historical continuity as a distinct group in Bosnia, well 
beyond the arrival of the Ottoman Turks (Malcolm 2002:27-29).26 
 By examining the Ottoman tax-registers which recorded property ownership and 
categorised people by their religion, the British historian Malcolm concludes that the 
conversion to Islam happened gradually, voluntarily, and that members of all three churches – 
the Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church and the – then nearly extinct Bosnian church – 
                                                 
26 Both Fine and Malcolm argue against the Bogomil theory, citing research that proves the theory doubtful. Fine 
finds it most likely that the Bosnian Church was a Catholic church accused of heresy (Donia & Fine 1994:18-
19). Malcolm, on the other hand, convincingly argues that the Bosnian Church was a monastic order based on 
the rule of St. Basil, the founder of the monastic tradition in Eastern Christianity (Malcolm 2002:34-36). 
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converted to Islam. The Muslim population also increased because Muslims immigrated to 
Bosnia, mainly from other Balkan countries. The Muslims first became a majority after 
approximately 150 years. According to Malcolm, the reason why Bosnia was more receptive 
to Islam than other Balkan states is due to the religious situation prior to the Ottoman 
conquest (though not in a Bogomil Church): Since Bosnia had three Churches competing for 
members, it did not present a united Christian “front”. Moreover, given that none of the three 
Churches were supported by state policy or a proper system of parish churches and priests, it 
is logical to conclude that the loyalty of the church members was not particularly strong.  
The competition between the Catholic and the Orthodox Church also continued during 
the Ottoman period. While members of both Churches were becoming Muslims, they also 
switched allegiance between Catholicism and the Orthodox Church – the latter, which the 
Ottomans preferred, gaining the greatest number of new members in this period (Malcolm 
2002:52-58) (Donia & Fine 1994:39-44).  
Malcolm notes that conversion to Islam did not necessarily involve a severe religious 
transformation. In areas poorly served by priests, Christianity was probably little more than a 
set of folk practices and ceremonies, he claims. When people converted to Islam, they could 
continue the same practices, only now in Muslim wrapping. Moreover, many of the folk-
religious practices, like believing in the protective powers of amulets (a belief that has 
survived to the present day) were common for both Muslims and Christians. They also shared 
many of the same festivals and holy days, like the Orthodox Jurjevdan (St. George’s Day).27 
Muslims and Christians also made use of each other’s religious expertise, especially in order 
to cure diseases28 (Malcolm 2002:58-59).  
 
Bosnia under the Ottomans 
Apart from its strategic position as a frontier region to the Habsburg Empire, Bosnia was 
peripheral to the Ottoman government. Bosnians did not have any influence over the 
                                                 
27 The Norwegian social anthropologist Tone Bringa, who did research in a central-Bosnian village in the late 
1980s, discovered that the village Muslims celebrated Jurjevdan, which they considered to be part of their 
Muslim tradition. She also noticed that the most common form of help Muslims in the village sought in times of 
personal stress was an amulet with Quranic phrases written by a hodža (imam) (Bringa 1995). Also Sorabji, who 
committed fieldwork in Sarajevo in approximately the same period, mentions that the use of protective amulets 
was considered an acknowledged Muslim custom (Sorabji 1989:105). 
28 One of my informants told me a story which demonstrates that when in despair, people also today seek 
religious expertise outside of their own religious community: a Serbian Orthodox young woman became ill with 
symptoms nobody could explain the cause of. Her Muslim boyfriend suggested that she might be possessed by 
djinns (spirits, mentioned in the Quran, which can be good or evil and possess humans). The girl was then put in 
contact with my informant, who brought her to an imam who cured her by reciting prayers from the Quran. 
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decisions that concerned them, and although some Bosnians reached high positions in the 
central government through the child-levy, they considered themselves Ottomans. After the 
conquest, Bosnia was divided into three sandžaks (districts). In 1554, Bosnia was upgraded to 
a province with its own governor, beglerbeg, who came to be called vizier, appointed by the 
Sultan (Donia & Fine 1994:45, 48-49).   
The governor made Sarajevo his residence and the town blossomed under the rule of 
Gazi Husrev-beg in the first half of the 16th century. He built a mosque, a medresa 
(theological school), a library, a hamam (Turkish bath), two hans (inns) and an important 
bezistan (cloth-market). A type of religious-charitable foundation called vakuf, was vital to 
the development of all Ottoman towns. The Gazi-Husrev beg’s vakuf was the richest of all 
and existed until the 20th century. Sarajevo’s population was almost entirely Muslim by 1530; 
at the end of the 16th century the city also included a number of Christians and a small 
community of Jews. The city had more than a hundred mosques (Malcolm 2002:67-68) 
(Donia & Fine 1994:50-52).  
 The Ottomans categorised people according to religion. The Christian and Jewish 
religious communities, known as millets, were self-governed and organised their own courts 
and schools. This arrangement provided the religious institutions with important political 
functions and the local religious authority became leaders in the community. In this way, the 
Ottoman millet-system made religious affiliation into the principal criterion for group 
membership in Bosnia (1994:82).  
It is no doubt that it was advantageous to be a Muslim in Ottoman Bosnia. This left a 
negative legacy and dislike of Turks and Islam among the Christians, who recall the Ottoman 
period “the centuries under the Turkish yoke.” The Christian and Jewish populations were 
free to exercise their religion as long as they accepted Muslim rule. However, as non-Muslim 
subjects they had to pay higher taxes than the Muslims and they were discriminated against in 
different ways. The Ottoman feudal system ensured that only Muslims could become 
members of the land-owning elite, while most of the peasants who worked their land were 
Christians.  
In the 19th century the Ottoman state began a program of reforms which reduced the 
dominance of Muslims in society, and were naturally opposed by leading Muslims who would 
loose their local privileges. In order not to alienate Muslim landholders any further, the 
government did not address the widespread problem of corrupted landholders exploiting their 
peasants. This, in combination with increased taxation made the situation unbearable and after
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1850 a number of peasant uprisings against local landlords and officials took place (1994:59-
64).  
It was eventually the Christian peasant uprisings, the last and largest lasting from 1875 
to 1878, which brought about the end of Ottoman rule. The Ottoman Empire refused to take 
the necessary measures to improve the peasants’ situation and Serbia and Montenegro 
declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1876. The Serbs were defeated, but the year after, 
Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 gave the Habsburg 
monarchy the right to “occupy and administer” Bosnia (1994:91-92).  
 
Austro-Hungarian rule, 1878-1914 
The troops of the Habsburg monarchy invaded Bosnia in late July 1878. The Muslims resisted 
the occupation with armed struggle, but were defeated within three months. Legally speaking, 
Bosnia remained Ottoman land, and the occupation was only supposed to be temporary. In 
practice, however, Bosnia became an integrated part of the Habsburg Empire from the outset. 
In 1908 Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia.  
For devout Muslims, a relevant question was: were they allowed to live within a non-
Muslim polity? The ulema disagreed about whether the Muslims should stay in Bosnia or 
emigrate. While some found it unacceptable to live in what was now regarded as dar al-harb 
(the abode of war), and emigration to be obligatory, others concluded that since Muslims 
could still practice their religion and apply Islamic law to personal matters, Bosnia was to be 
considered dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam), and emigration was discouraged since it would 
only weaken the Muslim community in Bosnia.29 The mufti of Sarajevo issued a fatwa calling 
the Muslims to obey Habsburg military law and participate in the institutions of the new 
regime in order not to weaken the Muslims’ political, social and economic status (Karčić 
1999:109-119). 
Elsewhere in the Balkans, members of the Muslim elite were normally expelled when 
Ottoman rule ended. In Bosnia, however, the Austrians recognised much of the existing legal 
code and the Ottoman landholding system, implementing only small reforms to improve the 
situation of the peasants. Therefore, the Muslims continued to dominate economic, political 
and cultural life also after 1878 (Donia & Fine 1994:64, 88). 
The new regime sought to modernise Bosnia according to European standards by 
introducing the Habsburg legal, political, economic and cultural system. They set off 
                                                 
29 From 1878 to 1908 around 150.000 Bosnian Muslims migrated to the Ottoman Empire (Karčić 1999:110). 
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industrialisation and made important changes in communication and transport. The urban 
population increased and public buildings in Central-European style were erected next to 
Ottoman-Bosnian architecture. The Austro-Hungarians preserved certain types of traditional 
Muslim schools, such as mekteb (informal religious elementary school) and medresa (high 
school), while they modernised others and also established new schools.  
The developments in education caused a split within the Muslim educated class: on the 
one hand, there were Muslims who graduated from traditional Muslim institutions and 
continued their studies abroad in Muslim countries; on the other, there were graduates from 
Austrian schools in Bosnia who headed for universities in Central-Europe. This resulted in 
development of a Muslim intelligentsia independent from the traditional ulema (Karčić 
1999:92-95). 
 In Ottoman time, the highest religious authority of the Bosnian Muslims had been the 
shaikh al-Islam in Istanbul. To separate the Bosnian Muslims from Ottoman influence, the 
Habsburg administration in 1882 established a Bosnian Islamic institution headed by the Reis 
ul-ulema. The Reis and a council of ulema were now responsible for appointing imams, 
supervising Islamic education and authorising sharia judges. The 5.000 vakufs that existed in 
Bosnia came under Habsburg control after the occupation. The Muslims were not satisfied 
with this arrangement and organised a movement working for religious and cultural 
autonomy. In 1909 the movement succeeded, and the Austro-Hungarian monarch then gave 
the Muslims the right to administer their religious affairs, including vakufs and religious 
education (1999:124-132). 
When the Habsburg Empire occupied Bosnia, the Catholic and Orthodox Christians of 
Bosnia came to associate their identity and existence with Croatia and Serbia. To undermine 
Croatian and Serbian nationalism in Bosnia, the Austrians promoted the concept of bošnjaštvo 
(“Bosnianism”). By romanticising Bosnia’s shared cultural traditions and unique history, they 
hoped to encourage patriotism and loyalty towards Bosnia. However, at this point, separate 
ethnic identities were firmly established in people’s minds and could not easily be replaced by 
regional patriotism. In 1903, Austrian policies changed: the different groups were now 
allowed to publish newspapers, to publicly use their ethnic/national names and to form 
ethnically-based political parties. The Muslim landowners were the first to create a formal 
political party in 1906, when they established the Muslim National Organisation. Serbian and 
Croatian nationalists also formed their respective political parties, both with political 
programs claiming that Bosnia was Serbian/Croatian land and that the Bosnian Muslims were 
ethnic Serbs/Croats (Donia & Fine 1994). 
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In the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, Serbia nearly doubled its territory at the expense 
of the Ottoman Empire, and Serbia was considered an increasing threat by the Habsburg 
monarchy. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 
28, 1914, which was committed by Bosnians with ties to the Serbian secret service, caused the 
Austrians to declare war on Serbia, an event that escalated into the First World War 
(1994:113-118).   
 
Royal Yugoslavia (1918-1941) and the Second World War 
The end of the First World War was also the end of the Habsburg Empire. Many Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes hoped for South Slav unification and many Muslim leaders were also 
enthusiastic about the idea of a Yugoslav state. The Serbian Prince Regent Alexander 
established the ”Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” on December 1, 1918. It soon 
became clear that the Serbs wanted to realise their dream of a Greater Serbia. The outcome 
was a centralistic and Serb-dominated Yugoslavia characterised by political chaos. In 1929, 
royal parliamentarianism was replaced by dictatorship as King Alexander proclaimed himself 
the sole source of all authority in the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia.” On October 9, 1934, the king 
was assassinated by Croatian fascists, Ustaše, who worked for the destruction of Yugoslavia 
and an independent Croatia (Donia & Fine 1994:120-132).         
A widely discussed topic among Muslims in this period was female veiling and the 
role of woman in Islam. Enes Karić (2004) refers to a polemic between Islamic traditionalists 
and reformists/modernists which took place in the 1920-30s. While conservative ulama 
argued that there was no need for change and that the veiling of women was obligatory 
according to Islam, the modernising Muslim intelligentsia considered the veil an un-Islamic 
custom and argued for women’s participation in society. This view was also held by Reis 
Čaušević, who spoke out against veiling. This made some of his opponents refer to him as a 
“Bosnian Kemal Atatürk” (Karić 2004).  
When Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had become allies of Germany and Italy, the 
Yugoslav government capitulated and signed the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941. When 
military officers who opposed an alliance with Hitler replaced the government in a coup, the 
Germans decided to invade (Donia & Fine 1994:133-135).   
 The Second World War in Yugoslavia unfolded as many wars taking place 
simultaneously: the two major resistance movements not only fought the German and Italian 
occupiers, they also fought each other. One of the resistance movements, the Četniks, was set 
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up by a Serb, Draža Mihailović, a Yugoslav Army colonel and royalist. The aim of his 
movement was to restore a Serb-dominated royal Yugoslavia. The Partisan movement, under 
the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, sought to transform the Yugoslav society according to 
revolutionary communist ideology. The “Independent state of Croatia” (NDH) launched a war 
against its Serb population. NDH was a fascist German puppet state led by the Croatian 
Ustaša Ante Pavelić. The state incorporated the territory of Bosnia and was divided into a 
German and an Italian zone. The genocidal-politic of the Ustaša-regime was not only to 
exterminate the Jews and Gypsies, but also the Serb minority-population. The Ustaša-regime 
tolerated the Muslim population, which they regarded as Croats of the Islamic faith. 
Throughout the inter-war period, the general political sympathies of the Muslims had been 
with Zagreb rather than Belgrade. Ante Pavelić, who wanted the Muslims’ benevolent 
attitudes towards Croatia to continue, guaranteed the Muslims freedom of religion and safety 
(Malcolm 2002:174-185).  
 The Bosnian Muslims fought on all sides during the Second World War. However, 
because of the violence committed by Serbs against Muslim villagers, especially in 
Herzegovina, Muslims were nevertheless more likely to join Ustaša militia than the Serb-
dominated resistance forces. The Bosnian imams and muftis were sceptical to the Partisan 
cause – the creation of an atheistic communist society. However, Muslims also joined Tito’s 
army. Some Muslims even joined the Četniks, while others joined a Muslim SS-division set 
up in Bosnia by the Germans (2002:186-191).   
At least one million people died in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, and 
according to historians, the majority was probably killed by other Yugoslavs (2002:174). The 
war resulted in division, hatred and bitterness. Only Tito and the Partisans had the ability to 
gather people around one cause. This, coupled with the Allies’ support, ensured a Partisan 
victory in April 1945.  
 
Muslims in a Socialist state 
Socialist Yugoslavia was established as a federation of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. The Constitution recognised five Yugoslav narodi (nations): Slovenes, Croats, 
Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians, who had constitutional right to equal political 
representation. The Bosnian Muslims were initially considered a distinct entity (but not a 
separate nation), before they obtained narod-status in 1968. The Communist Party of 
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Yugoslavia (CPY (from 1952 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, LCY)) sought to 
socialise the economy and strengthen the working class, and in 1945, CPY introduced an 
agrarian reform that ended the Muslim landlord privilege. In 1948, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia 
from the Cominform, and Tito and the Communist Party had to spell out a new course 
independent from the Soviets. The new course, popularly called “Titoism” by Western 
scholars, entailed non-alignment in foreign affairs and self-management in the domestic 
economy. Self-management involved creating workers’ councils for factories and enterprises, 
and decentralisation of economic decisions (Donia & Fine 1994:161-172). 
 Oppression of religious communities and individuals was a prominent feature of 
socialist Yugoslavia. There was no room for religion in the official Yugoslav sphere, which 
included politics, workplaces, the school and the army. The Islamic courts were suppressed in 
1946. In 1950, laws were passed that made it illegal to give children religious education, and 
Muslim women were forbidden to wear the veil. In 1952, the dervish orders were outlawed. 
Only one Islamic association was permitted, the Islamic Muslim Community (later renamed 
Islamic Community, IC), which became state-controlled in 1947 (Malcolm 2002:194-195).  
 Bringa (1995) and Sorabji (1989) point out that women were the chief carriers of a 
Muslim religious identity during communism. In the village where Bringa performed her 
fieldwork, women were key performers of religious rituals, and it was considered particularly 
important that the girls were brought up according to Islam (Bringa 1995:9-10). Sorabji 
distinguishes between Sarajevo’s residential areas and the secular mixed city centre, which 
was not a place to display one’s religious identity. The local neighbourhoods, on the other 
hand, were the realm of women. It was a world apart from the centre, something that was 
reflected in different styles of dress, behaviour and speech. For instance, in the city centre, 
Muslims would use the standard greetings dobar dan (good-day) and do viñenja (good-bye); 
contrarily, they preferred to say merhaba and alahemanet30, greetings from Turkish Ottoman 
time, in the neighbourhoods (Sorabji 1989:66-71). 
In the late 1950s, the Muslims’ religious conditions improved as Tito realised that the 
Yugoslav Muslims could serve important functions in the foreign policy. A Muslim 
background now became beneficial for anyone aspiring to become a diplomat, and members 
of IC were sent round the world to appear as token Muslims. To not lose the goodwill of 
Muslim countries, the socialist regime also had to be careful not to openly offend the religious 
rights of the Muslim population (Malcolm 2002:196-197). In the 1970s, after the Muslims 
                                                 
30 Today many Bosnian Muslims use the Arabic greeting “selam alejkum” (Bosnian transcription), which is 
exclusive to Muslims because of its religious signification. 
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had been granted status as a nation, a narod (see below), Islam blossomed: In 1970, IC started 
to publish its own Islamic newspaper, Preporod; and in 1977, the Islamic Theological Faculty 
was opened in Sarajevo. Muslims were granted more religious liberty also for another reason: 
almost all the leaders of IC were recruited from Partisan veterans who were loyal to Tito and 
the regime’s socialist policy. While the Catholic and Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia were 
vehicles of Croat and Serb nationalism throughout the socialist era, IC was the most patriotic 
Yugoslav religious organisation, supporting the concept of Bosnia as a federated republic 
within socialist Yugoslavia (Perica 2002 74-78). Leading Muslims argued for the 
compatibility of Islam and socialism (Islam taught “tolerance and co-existence” just as 
socialism taught “brotherhood and unity”). Not all Muslims were satisfied with the secular 
line of IC, but most of them kept quiet until the late 1980s when Yugoslavia liberalised (Moe 
1997:82-84).   
The organisation Mladi Muslimani (Young Muslims) was in opposition to the socialist 
regime from the outset. Many of the members were arrested an executed in 1946-47 for 
opposing communist rule, and the organisation was outlawed. One of the arrested was Alija 
Izetbegović, later to become president of Bosnia. In 1970, Izetbegović outlined his ideology 
in a document entitled “The Islamic Declaration”. This declaration was used against 
Izetbegović and his companions in a trial in Sarajevo during 1983, when they were sentenced 
to prison for “hostile and counter-revolutionary acts derived from Muslim nationalism”. 
According to the prosecution, the declaration, which had no reference to Bosnia or 
Yugoslavia, was a manifesto for the creation of an ethnically pure Muslim Bosnian state 
(Malcolm 2002:208). Khomeini’s revolution in 1979 had alerted people about the explosive 
force of political Islam, and the Bosnian Muslims were now regularly accused of being 
aggressive Islamic fundamentalists. 
 
The question of the Bosnian Muslims’ national status 
Ever since Bosnia’s Catholic and Orthodox population started to see themselves as Croats and 
Serbs and identify with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, the question of the Bosnian 
Muslims’ national identity has been discussed. The national status of the Bosnian Muslims 
was still unresolved when socialist Yugoslavia was formed. In the 1948 census, when the 
Bosnian Muslims were in position to choose between the categories “Muslim Serb”, “Muslim 
Croat” or “Muslim, nationally undeclared”, an overwhelming majority registered as 
“undeclared”. In the 1950s, the regime started to promote a spirit of “Yugoslavism”, hoping 
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that the Bosnian Muslims would become bearers of a common Yugoslav identity. In the 1953 
census, the category “Yugoslav, nationally undeclared” was introduced, and the category 
“Muslim, nationally undeclared” was removed. Most Bosnian Muslims chose to register 
under the new category, but this was hardly an expression of their Yugoslav identity. In the 
1960s the official policy began to change and the regime decided to drop the policy of 
“integral Yugoslavism” and strengthen the republican identities instead. In the 1961 census, 
the Muslims could register as “ethnic Muslim” and, in 1968 they were finally recognised as a 
distinct nation. Exactly why this was decided is not clear, but it might have been to counter 
the Serb dominance in Bosnia by strengthening the position of the Muslims, who were 
politically under-represented in the republic's communist administration. According to the 
Yugoslav political system, any governmental body, council, or committee had to be made up 
of an equal number of representatives from the different narodi. This meant that the Bosnian 
Muslims could represent themselves as a group on equal terms with the Bosnian Serbs and 
Croats once they were recognised as a Bosnian narod (Malcolm 2002:197-201).  
 Despite the fact that the Muslim nationality had been given the name Musliman 
(Muslim), the Yugoslav state considered this to be an identity based on ethnicity, not religion. 
Hence, in official discourse, there were two kinds of Muslims: a Muslim in the ethnic/national 
sense (Musliman) and a Muslim in the religious sense (musliman). However, in many 
people’s minds, religious and ethnic identities were inextricably linked. Bringa found that in 
rural Bosnia most people identified themselves according to nacija (in stead of narod). In the 
literal sense nacija is translated with “nation,” but the villagers understood nacija to refer to 
religious community. This group consciousness based on religious affiliation must be seen in 
relation to the legacy of the millet-system, which made religious identity into a social and 
cultural identity. The fact that people normally inherited their religious identity also 
contributed to this (Bringa 1995:20-22).   
Since the establishment of a Bosnian Muslim narod in 1968, there has been 
disagreement about what role Islam should play in the construction of national identity. The 
dominant secular nationalism was challenged from the beginning by a small Islamic 
movement (represented by Izetbegović) which was more concerned with strengthening the 
position of Muslims worldwide and considered nationality and ethnicity to be irrelevant for 
Islam. Between these two extremes one can find the position that Islam was not only 
fundamental to the origin of a Bosnian Muslim narod, but also for its continued existence 
(Moe 1997:72). Moe and Alibasić (2006) point out that, since the Tito regime recognised the 
Bosnian Muslims as a nation, a national resurgence has gone hand in hand with a religious 
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one. These processes accelerated upon the fall of socialism. In 1993, Bosnian Muslim 
intellectuals decided to change the Muslims’ national name into Bosniak (bošnjak), a name 
that would facilitate a distinction between religious and ethnic identity, an understanding 
which is supported by the ethnically based party Stranka demokratske akcije (SDA). SDA 
was founded by Alija Izetbegović in 1990 and started out as a mass movement for the defence 
of Muslim interests. Among Muslim voters SDA won the elections in 1990, 1996, 2002 and 
2006. However, the leader of IC, Reis Cerić, has on several occasions underlined the 
connection between nation and religion, and IC insists that Islam is an essential component of 
the Bosniaks’ national identity. This symbiosis of Islam and the Bosniak nation has resulted 
in an “Islamic secularism” that can appeal to the great majority (Moe & Alibasić 2006:7-9). 
However, a religiously-defined Bosniak identity remains potentially problematic: Bosniak 
non-believers are likely to disapprove of the Islamic dimension, while Muslims who focus on 
Islam as a universal religion most probably resent that Islam has become mixed up in a 
nationalistic cause.  
 
Bosnia’s destruction    
The last years of Yugoslavia were characterised by economic crisis and escalation of 
chauvinistic nationalisms. The new leader of the Serbian Communists, Slobodan Milošvić, 
managed to get control over four of the eight votes in the federal government. It soon became 
clear that his final goal was to unite the Serbs of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia. Milošević and 
the Croatian President Franjo Tuñman met in March 1992 to discuss possible ways of 
dividing Bosnia. In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia had declared independence from Yugoslavia, 
which resulted in a brief war in Slovenia and a far worse one in Croatia when the Serb-
dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) intervened on behalf of the Serb minority 
population. The Bosnian government, whose Muslim members rightly feared the 
consequences of being left in a Yugoslavia under Serbian control, declared independence in 
March 1992. When the international community recognised Bosnian independence on April 6, 
the carve-up of Bosnia began. The Serbs declared autonomous provinces. Paramilitaries 
supported by the JNA immediately began their ethnical cleansing of Bosniaks and Croats in 
Bosnia (Malcolm 2002). 
 The war in Bosnia lasted for three and a half years and saw the worst atrocities 
committed in Europe since 1945. More than 100.000 people died, approximately 75% thereof 
Bosniaks, and more than two million people were forcibly displaced. Only half of these have
  
 
View over Mostar and the famous bridge (most) across the Neretva River. The original 
bridge, built in Ottoman time (1556), was destroyed by Croat artillery on November 9, 
1993.  
 
 
 
 
A different side of Mostar. A part of the city is still nearly in ruins after the 1992-1995 
war, and buildings like these are a constant reminder of the atrocities which took place. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
View over Sarajevo from the Yellow garrison (Žuta tabija). Below is 
the cemetery at Kovači, one of Sarajevo’s oldest cemeteries. It was 
taken out of use in 1878, but had to be re-opened during the 
Sarajevo-siege, 1992-1995. From then on the cemetery has been 
called the Šehids’ Cemetery (šehid = martyr). Alija Izetbegović was 
buried there in 2003.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarajevo hosted the 1984 Winter Olympic Games. The supporting 
football fields of the Koševo stadium, the opening site for the 1984 
Winter Olympic Games, were turned into a cemetery during the 
Sarajevo-siege, 1992-1995. 
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returned to their homes. People were sent to concentration camps, whole villages were 
massacred and women were systematically raped (Moe 2002:17). Part of the strategy of 
ethnic cleansing was to target historical, cultural and religious heritage: nearly 1.200 out of a 
pre-war total of 1.700 mosques were destroyed and damaged (Moe & Alibašić 2006: 2).  
Serbian nationalistic propaganda claimed that Bosnian Muslim fundamentalists intended to 
create an Islamic state in Bosnia. Thus, when the fighting started, many Bosnian Serbs were 
willing to do whatever it took to “defend” themselves.31 However, Serbs were also 
represented in the Izetbegović-led wartime government of Bosnia, which represented those 
who wanted to keep Bosnia intact. Malcolm argues that the war in Bosnia was predominantly 
an invasion planned and directed from Serbia (Malcolm 2002:236-238).  
The military forces of the Bosnian government were totally unprepared, numbering 
only 3.500 when the Serbs launched their attack in April 1992. The UN had introduced an 
arms embargo against Yugoslavia in 1991. Since Bosnia has no border with countries other 
than Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, the embargo disproportionately affected the Bosniaks. 
Western governments proved incapable to comprehend what was going on in Bosnia. Instead 
of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia so that the Bosniaks could exercise their right to self-
defence, leading statesmen in the West insisted that more weaponry would only prolong what 
was considered to be a “civil war” (Malcolm 2002).  
The course of events in the Bosnian war is too complex to be properly accounted for 
here. In retrospect, outsiders agree that the war in Bosnia was not an ethnic civil war resulting 
from “age-old hatreds,” but a war of aggression initiated by Serbia. The Dayton peace 
agreement, signed December 14, 1995, ultimately rewarded the claims of those who wanted 
Bosnia to be divided along ethnic lines. 
 
Current Islamic trends  
The largest Islamic organisation in Bosnia is the Islamic Community (IC). IC is a non-
governmental organisation in charge of Islamic affairs, such as maintaining the mosques, 
educating and employing the imams, organising the pilgrimage and collecting the alms-tax. 
IC became an all-Yugoslav organisation in Royal Yugoslavia, which it remained until the 
war-year 1993, when the Bosnian Muslims re-established it as a Bosnian organisation under 
                                                 
31 Not all Bosnian Serbs joined the aggressors. When Serb paramilitary forces had surrounded Sarajevo in the 
beginning of April 1992, Bosnians of all nationalities went out into the streets to demonstrate for Bosnian unity 
(Malcolm 2002:235). 
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the leadership of Dr. Mustafa Cerić. Today there exist a range of Muslim organisations in 
Bosnia, but IC is still the largest and the most important due to its near-monopoly on focal 
Islamic tasks and functions. 
The contemporary Islamic scene in Bosnia is characterised by religious pluralism. IC 
is no longer the only organisation that can claim to speak on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims, 
and the “traditional Bosnian Islam” that IC promotes, is not the only orientation among the 
Muslim leaders within IC. The following presentation of Islamic tendencies in Bosnia is 
based on an unpublished article by Christian Moe and Ahmet Alibašić called “Current Islamic 
trends in Bosnia: A critical survey” (revised April 2006) and Christian Moe’s report “The war 
on terror and Muslim opinion-making in Bosnia” (2005)32. Moe and Alibašić divide 
contemporary Islam in Bosnia into two main tendencies, which they term “mainstream” and 
“new fringe” (hereafter fringe). While the mainstream Bosnian Islam focuses on the Bosnian 
Muslim tradition and is influenced by Islamic modernist/reformist thought, the fringe is 
critical of local customs and modernism, and orientates towards the Arab world. As the term 
mainstream implies, this category includes the majority of Bosnian Muslims, who see Islam 
as their cultural tradition and seeks to accommodate Islam to a modern European way of life. 
The origin of the fringe is associated with Bosnian Muslims who, from the mid-1980s, 
returned from Islamic studies abroad and became noted for their beards, short trousers and 
rejection of what they considered to be un-Islamic local customs. After the outbreak of war in 
1992, personnel from the Muslim world arrived in Bosnia as volunteer fighters (mujahedin), 
aid workers, missionaries and arms dealers. They brought with them Salafi literature, 
established missionary centres, and distributed aid to the impoverished population. The 
biggest donors were probably Saudi Arabia, Iran33, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, and 
Kuwait. The High Saudi Committee for Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina (HSC) may 
have been the largest single Islamic donor to Bosnia. HSC translated and mass-distributed 
some 30 books in Bosnia, mostly by Salafi authors and has rebuilt around 200 mosques and 
built many new, often huge mosques with cultural centres attached (such as the King Fahd 
Mosque and Cultural Centre in Sarajevo). It was first in the war-years that Salafi and 
                                                 
32 The report is part of the project “Religion and Nationalism in the Western Balkans” and is published in Anne 
Stensvold (ed.) Western Balkans: the religious dimension (2008). However, all my references to this report are to 
the unpublished version, and I therefore refer to the report as Moe 2005. 
33 Iran has been very active in cultural and academic exchange in Bosnia. However, Iran does not appeal to the 
fringe, but to mainstream Bosnian Muslim intellectuals. It is unknown how many Bosnian Muslims who have 
studied in Iran have converted to Shia-Islam. A dozen books with Shia-idology have so far been printed in 
Bosnia. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▲ A model of King Fahd’s Mosque and Cultural Centre (Kralj Fahd Džamija i Culturni 
Centar). The facilities, concluded in 2000, were built by The High Saudi Committee for  
assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina (HSC). The model is located inside the cultural 
centre, in a room displaying models of the different projects HSC has funded in Bosnia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
◄ Interior of King Fahd’s Mosque. 
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Wahhabi ideas surfaced on a wider scale. Most of the foreigners have now been expelled 
under Western pressures, but the foreign ideology has taken root in some of the local 
population.  
The Bosnian mainstream refers to the fringe as “Arabised”, “Wahhabis” or “Salafis”, a 
terminology Moe and Alibašić consider misleading. The term Salafi refers to the first Muslim 
generations, the al-salaf al-salih, and applies to two very different groups of Muslims: Salafi 
can be employed for modernist reformists who seek to rethink Islam by returning to the 
practice of the “forefathers” and ignoring later Islamic scholarly tradition. The term also 
refers to Muslims who consider most developments after the first three Muslim generations as 
reprehensible innovations (bida). They therefore reject all Islamic schools of law and are 
known for interpreting the scripture literally and focusing on individual orthopraxy. Salafis in 
this sense, which is currently the most common usage of the term, is a culturally defensive 
and anti-modernist Islamic movement.  
Wahhabism started as an 18th century Saudi-Arabian puritan-movement. The founder, 
Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, followed the Hanbali-school of law (Saudi-Arabia’s official 
law-school), which is considered to be the strictest of the Sunni schools. He attacked Sufism 
and popular expressions of Islam, and deemed all phenomena that did not have their origin in 
the Quran or sunna as bida. The religious regime he introduced can be compared to the 
Taliban-regime in Afghanistan. Today Wahhabism is the puritan state creed of Saudi-Arabia 
(Roald 2004). Moe and Alibašić point out that the relationship between Salafis and Wahhabis 
is disputed. While some consider Wahhabism an early form of Salafism, others emphasise 
their separate origin. Nevertheless, Bosnian fringe is not Salafi or Wahhabi in any strict sense. 
Even though they do emphasise a literalist interpretation of the sources and focus much on 
detailed precepts of Islamic law, especially concerning appearance (men’s short trousers and 
bushy beards and niqab for women), they do not (as the Salafis) disregard later Muslim 
scholars. They also do not seek to introduce a foreign school of law, notably the Hanbali. 
Therefore, Moe and Alibašić (2006) argue that the Wahhabi-label should be reserved for 
those on the fringe who follow the teachings of (Saudi) Wahhabi scholars, and that fringe is 
the most suitable term for most of them. 
A few Islamic scholars who belong to the fringe are employed by the IC, but the fringe 
has also established separate organisations and publications. The most enduring have been 
Salafi or Wahhabi associations with foreign funding. There are also mainstream organisations 
that are independent of IC, such as the Dervish orders (Sufis), the lay activist movement 
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Mladi Muslimani and different women’s organisations (some of my informants are active in 
Muslim women’s organisations).  
Moe and Alibašić point out that gender relations is an area where there are substantial 
differences between Bosnian mainstream and fringe. Both mainstream and fringe emphasise 
that women and men are different by nature – that men are meant to be breadwinners while 
women’s primary roles are wives and mothers. However, while the mainstream accept and 
encourage women’s employment, the fringe either allows it – provided the work does not 
involve being alone with a non-relative male and the work does not come in the way of a 
woman’s primary duties – or argues that women should stay at home unless there is a good 
reason for them to go out. This view is not upheld at the Islamic faculty, which represents 
Bosnian mainstream; their classes are gender-mixed, and the students intermingle on most 
occasions. Concerning women’s dress, the fringe is divided: some consider the wearing of 
niqab to be a religious duty, while others hold that both covering and not covering the face 
finds support in Islam. IC, on the other hand, does not have a dress-policy for its employees 
apart from the medresas, where teachers and pupils are obliged to wear hijab (2006:25-26).  
The mainstream is, in general, very critical towards the use of niqab, and some are also 
dismayed that an increasing number of Bosnian Muslim women wear hijab. This plurality 
within the Islamic scene in Bosnia, with different Islamic scholarly traditions making their 
influence, explains why there are divergent views on what is proper clothing for Muslim 
women. 
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Chapter 4: Identity and belonging 
Some of my informants stressed that they are European. I interpreted this as a wish to 
underline that they are not only Muslims, but also a part of Europe. Simultaneously they could 
express ambivalent feelings towards Europe.34 Sometimes they spoke about themselves as 
Europeans, other times they talked about Europe as if they were only geographically a part of 
it. Two of the informants described Bosnia as “a bridge between East and West”; a popular 
saying that catches the ambivalence related to being both a Muslim and a European people.  
 
Identity, a complex concept 
Identity is a term frequently used in both academia and everyday talk. For most people, 
identity is probably a puzzle because it seems to refer to different phenomena: identity is 
something personal and unique, referring to the individual’s sense of self and understanding 
of whom she or he is. At the same time, however, identity also applies to large groups of 
people, such as nations and religious communities. Identity distinguishes between people – 
you and me, Bosniak and Serb, Muslim and Christian – and unites people in collectives: e.g. 
Bosnian Muslims, the Islamic umma, Europeans (Jenkins 2004). 
Richard Jenkins refers to identity as a meta-concept which makes as much sense 
individually as collectively. His approach to identity is to consider the individually unique and 
collectively shared as entangled with each other and parts of the same process. A better term 
to express how identity works is therefore identification (2004:5). Jenkins argues that 
individual and collective identification only come into being within interaction and they are 
both produced and reproduced as analogous processes. Therefore theorisation about 
identification should include the individual and collective in equal measure. The most 
significant contrast between individual and collective identification is that individual identity 
emphasises difference (individuality) and collective identity emphasises similarity (shared 
identity). Nevertheless, both individual and collective identities emerge out of the interplay of 
similarity and difference (2004:15-16).  
An important point in Jenkins’ argument is that all identities are socially constructed. 
How this happens is described as the internal-external dialectic of identification. This 
involves that identity is a synthesis of self-definition and the definitions of us offered by 
                                                 
34 Exactly what informants referred to when they said Europe was not always clear. Sometimes it was used as a 
synonym for the European Union, Western Europe, the powerful European countries which could have 
interfered in the Bosnian war, but didn’t, or it referred to the European, secular and modern way of life. 
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others. He points out that an identity cannot be taken on before it is validated by significant 
others, and identification is therefore an encounter between internal and external (2004:18-
22). An illustrative example of this is the Bosnian Muslims’ struggle to be recognised as a 
narod. Until they were formally recognised as a separate nation (first by the communist 
regime, then by the international community), the Bosniaks tended to look at themselves as a 
distinctive group in terms of religious affiliation and ethnicity (nacija), but not as a separate 
nation. At the end of this chapter I will discuss how the universal labelling of Muslims as 
terrorists has affected the identity of Bosnian Muslims.  
A distinction can be made between a collectivity which identifies and defines itself (as 
a group) and a collectivity which is identified and defined by others (a category) (2004:21). 
The processes of group identification and categorisation are likely to feed back upon each 
other: by defining ‘us’ we are also defining a range of “thems”, and by saying something 
about others we are also saying something about ourselves and who we are and are not 
(2004:79).  
Nominal and virtual identity refers to the distinction between the name and the 
experience of an identity. Individuals can share the same nominal identity (Muslim), but how 
they experience this identity will vary (2004:22). Both Western stereotypes and a Muslim 
literalist interpretation expect the Muslim identity to involve a specific conduct, appearance 
and way of thinking. In practice, however, people live out their Muslim identity in a range of 
different ways (as demonstrated by the informants of this thesis). The Muslim identity is per 
definition a community-based identity. Islam defines the rights and duties of the individual 
and her/his role within the family and the community of believers. Both provide the individual 
believer with meaning as well as protection from dangers (Kurtz 1995:110-111). However, 
the Muslim identity is unavoidably also an individual identity. Due to modern society’s stress 
on individualism and pluralism, Muslims in Europe may very well choose to relate to Islam as 
individual faith and consider their Muslim identity to be a strictly personal matter. 
The categories I have constructed to describe Islam in Bosnia (“secularised/cultural 
Muslims”, “Wahhabis”, “Bosnian Islam” and “global Islam”, cf. Chapter 1) are in danger of 
becoming mere stereotypes. One the one hand the different categories illustrate that the 
nominal identity “Bosnian Muslim” is not a homogenous term. But again, there are also 
differences among the informants I have placed within the same category. I will return to the 
issue of categorisation later in this chapter, as I discuss the classification of my informants 
according to “Bosnian Islam” and “global Islam”.   
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Anthony Giddens (1991) focuses on how the institutions of modernity have created 
new mechanisms for identity-formation. The contemporary world, which Giddens calls 
“high” or “late” modernity, is characterised by the separation of time and space (social 
relations take place across wide spans of time-space) and the disembedding of social 
institutions (abstract systems separate interaction from the particularities of locales).These 
processes radicalise and globalise pre-established institutional traits and transform the nature 
of day-to-day social life (1991:2-3). Another feature at the core of modernity is “institutional 
reflexivity”, which undermines the certainty of knowledge. A prominent characteristic of 
modernity is therefore methodological doubt and the existence of multiple sources of 
authority (1991:20-21). 
In late modernity the individual has become a reflexive project. In traditional cultures 
changes in individuals’ lives were shaped by rites de passage, and the new identity was 
clearly staked out. In modern society self-identity has to be explored and constructed 
reflexively. Giddens defines self-identity as: 
 
…what the individual is conscious ‘of’ in the term of ‘self-consciousness’. Self-identity, in other words, 
is not something that is just given, as a result of the continuities of the individual’s action-system, but 
something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual 
(1991:52). 
 
Central for the creation and maintenance of self-identity is choice of lifestyle. The 
small decisions a person makes every day, like what do eat, what to wear, who to spend time 
with, how to conduct yourself etc., are decisions that constitute a lifestyle. These routinised 
practices do not only fulfil utilitarian needs; they also “give material form to a particular 
narrative of self-identity” (1991:81). They concern the very core of self-identity; who we are. 
In modern society choice of lifestyle has to be made among a diversity of options. A lifestyle 
is not “handed down”; it has to be “adopted”, and individuals are forced to make an active 
choice (Giddens 1991:81-82). 
So, how can Giddens’ theorisation relate to Muslim women in Sarajevo? As already 
indicated; there are several ways to be a Muslim woman. Because of globalisation different 
Islamic authorities are available to Muslims all over the world. Muslims today can choose 
whether to follow a fatwa given by an online mufti or listen to the advice of the local imam. 
They can choose whether to base their understanding of Islam on a specific authority, such as 
a particular Islamic school of law or Islamic scholar, or to interpret the sources themselves. 
An important question in contemporary Bosnia is “what does it involve to be a Muslim”. 
While many consider “being a Muslim” as a cultural and religious identity that embraces all 
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Bosniaks regardless of religious observance, others are concerned with providing the Bosnian 
Muslim identity with genuine Islamic substance.  
 In the following chapters I focus on the informants’ concrete choices: their decision to 
wear hijab or not, how to wear it, who they associate with, how they behave in their daily 
lives, and which Islamic norms they follow or ignore. Their preferences on these areas imply 
a choice of lifestyle. A lifestyle normally follows a certain pattern, involving a cluster of 
habits and orientations. People are therefore likely to avoid things that are “out of character” 
with the given lifestyle they are committed to (1991:82). Since most of my informants follow 
a religious lifestyle, i.e. Islamic norms are decisive for how they live their life, their lifestyle 
is likely to form a coherent pattern. For example, someone who wears hijab is very unlikely to 
go to the disco Saturday night. A woman’s lifestyle is fundamental for the construction of her 
Muslim identity, hence the relevance of focusing on lifestyle choices. 
 
Religious identity and orientation 
 
Bosnian Muslim identity or Islamic identity? 
Islam provides Bosnian Muslims with “membership” in two symbolic communities; on the 
one hand a community of Bosnian Muslims based on shared cultural heritage, historical 
legacy, a set of practices and moral values, and on the other hand a community of  Muslims 
worldwide. The social anthropologist Tone Bringa (1995) found that it was the community of 
Bosnian Muslims that was the primary identification of people in the village she studied, and 
that they defined their Muslim identity in contrast to the non Muslim-group, their Catholic 
neighbours, who they interacted with on a daily basis. This illustrates Jenkins’ claim that 
group identification is constructed in interaction with others (Jenkins 2004:22). Identification 
with the umma was made by the small urban-oriented economic and religious elite, the 
Islamic establishment. However, Bringa argues that the war made many Bosnian Muslims 
redefine both the content and function of their Muslim identity, and to identify more than 
before with the Islamic umma (Bringa 1995:197-198). 
Sorabji (1989) identified a new religious orientation emerging in Sarajevo and some 
other Bosnian towns in the late 1980s, which stressed the association of Bosnian Muslims 
with the outside Muslim world. She refers to them as “the new mystics”, an Islamic tendency 
both literalist and mystically inclined. Their source of inspiration was found in the Arab world 
(Sorabji 1989:7). While religious and national affiliation was closely linked for most Bosnian 
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Muslims, for “the new mystics”, being a Muslim was less a matter of nationality than one of 
personal choice. To be a true Muslim one had to actively choose Islam. For them the two way 
divide between those who had chosen Islam and therefore were part of the true Islamic 
community (the umma), and those who had not, was more important than the three way divide 
between Muslim, Serb and Catholic (1989:186-187).  
As I have pointed out earlier, the Bosniaks’ status as a distinct narod is recent (as is 
the Bosniak name), and Islam is an important foundation for the Bosniak national identity. 
However, it can also be claimed that the Bosnian war has provided the Bosniak identity with 
further meaning; it is now given who is a Bosniak, and who is not. What is not quite as 
obvious is whether a Bosniak is a Muslim in the religious sense and what this should involve. 
Bosnian Muslims must therefore define their Muslim identity. As mentioned in the Chapter 1; 
my informants put different emphasis on the specific Bosniak dimension of their Muslim 
identity. Meliha for example, does not connect her Islamic identity (she pointed out that her 
identity is Islamic, not Muslim) with Bosnia. When I asked her whether she calls herself 
bošnjakinja (Bosniak) or bosanka (Bosnian), she hesitated to answer. I then asked if this was 
important to her. She replied: “Not so much important, we are usually by nationality; my 
nationality is bošnjakinja because they call it like that.” She then said that she likes the 
country she was born in and that she wants to live in Bosnia, but she is more concerned with 
her Islamic identity: “My Islamic identity is always the first, and I think that with that identity 
I can be useful for all, for Bosniaks, for Bosnians, and for any other state I am living in.” As 
Christian Moe points out, when Islam is understood as a universal religion stressing the unity 
of all Muslims, it does not agree very well with particularistic identities such as nationality 
and race. Therefore it is not surprising that not all Bosnian Muslims are at ease with the 
Muslim identity defined not only a religious but also a national identity (Moe 1997:13).  
The young Muslim women in Sweden who Minganti (2007) studied also stressed that 
their identity was Islamic, and independent of their ethnic and national origins. In stead of 
joining ethnically/nationally based Muslim organisations (which is not uncommon for ethnic 
and religious minorities), they were engaged in organisations that focused on the unity of all 
Muslims, and which aimed to strengthen a universal Islamic identity and consciousness. This 
distinction between religion and culture is characteristic for the Islamic revival movements. A 
specific Islamic identity probably appear attractive to the young women also for another 
reason: as religious and ethnic minorities in Sweden Minganti found that Muslim women 
were often drawn between the Swedish culture and their own families’ ethnic culture and 
cultural understanding of Islam (Minganti 2007:137-142).  
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However, several of my informants take pride in their identity as principally Bosnian 
Muslims. Dženana, for instance, mentioned that the Bosnian Muslims are different from 
Muslims from the East, something she considers to be positive:  
 
And the only difference is that we understand others, that’s the big difference. It is not the difference the 
way we pray, what we do, the way we live life, that is not the difference. The difference is that we are 
ready for dialogue. 
 
While Meliha considers her Islamic identity to be all-embracing and always must 
come first, Ajla sees it very differently. She said that Islam is only a part of her identity, and 
that it is her education, her name, her origin etc., which first of all give her a distinct identity. 
Ajla’s reflections about identity are more in accordance with how Amin Maalouf understands 
identity. In an essay called “Identitet som dreper” 35 (1999) Maalouf opposes the widespread 
tendency of simply defining one’s identity as Arab, Serb, black or Muslim. According to him, 
every individual has a unique and complex identity, because a person’s identity consists of all 
the different and at times contrasting elements which have shaped it. He uses himself as an 
example, and declares that some of the characteristics that apply to him are Arab, Christian, 
Lebanese, and French. All these specificities do not cause him an identity crisis; rather, they 
give him his particular identity. A person’s identity is not constant; it is shaped and reshaped 
throughout life, and it also varies in different contexts; depending on the context a person will 
stress different parts of her/his identity. According to Maalouf people are particularly inclined 
to emphasise that part of their identity which they feel is threatened. He argues that when the 
Bosniaks were under attack because of their religious affiliation during the 1992-1995 war, 
Islam had the potential to become a complete identity. Today, when the Bosniaks are 
recognised as one of the three nations within Bosnia and can openly practice their religion, 
other characteristics of people’s identities might be just as important as religion (Maalouf 
1999:13-22).  
Maalouf claims that it is a “sign of the times” to regard one’s religious affiliation as 
the most important and extensive source of identity. He connects this phenomenon with the 
end of communism, what he calls the crisis of Western society, and in particular globalisation 
and the dissolution of familiar structures for identity. A religious identity is so appealing to 
people because it not only satisfies a spiritual need; it is also a universal identity that exceeds 
ethnic, national and social identities. However, there is not one universal religious identity, he 
                                                 
35 I have used a Norwegian version of the book, and all references are to the Norwegian edition. The original 
version is called Les identities meurtrières (1998). 
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says; instead the religious communities have become “global tribes”. Just like tribal, ethnic 
and national identities corresponded with conflict-lines in the past, so can a religious identity 
(when regarded as an all-encompassing identity) be a source of conflict in the future. Maalouf 
thinks the only solution for humankind is to distinguish between spiritual needs and the need 
for belonging; between religion and identity (1999:77-85).  
 
Bosnian Islam 
“Being Muslim the Bosnian way” (Bringa 1995) describes Islam as it was practiced at the end 
of the 1980s by Muslims without comprehensive knowledge of the Islamic sources. What 
they considered Muslim customs was as a symbiosis of Islam and the Bosnian cultural 
tradition, which may also include Christian customs, Bringa concludes. “Bosnian Islam” in 
this thesis does not refer to a lack of scriptural religious knowledge. It rather describes the 
religious ideas and practices of those Moe and Alibašić (2006) name “mainstream”, i.e. 
Muslims who prefer a modern Islam of the Bosnian tradition. These Muslims put emphasis on 
the Bosnian cultural context, both as a valuable element in their religious practice and as 
something that must be taken into consideration in the cases where scriptural Islam and local 
culture and tradition might disagree. Let me give one example: Bosnians love their own 
music, and singing is an important part of Balkan culture. Dženana, one of my informants, 
told me about a rock musician who had converted from Serbian Orthodoxy to Islam. He had 
complained to his imam that he felt sorry about having to quit playing music to be a good 
Muslim. The imam had advised him to not give up on music; by being a Muslim and an artist 
he could rather be a positive role model. Amra, another of my informants disagrees; she 
thinks that most music is destructive and something that ought to be avoided. Therefore she 
hardly listens to music, except from religious music without text. Her musical choice is 
undoubtedly religiously influenced; she mentioned that not all instruments are forbidden in 
Islam; drums for example, are allowed. Amra also insisted that everybody can manage 
without music if they just put their minds to it, and mentioned Yusuf Islam (formerly called 
Cat Stevens), who stopped singing when he converted to Islam, as an example to be 
followed.36 Another area where individuals can choose whether or not to take local customs 
into consideration is in their manner of dressing. This will be examined in the next chapter. 
When I asked informants if they use the expression Bosnian Islam, many began their 
answer by stressing that Islam is one, which is an important Islamic doctrine. Then, when this 
                                                 
36 Yusuf Islam has recently started singing again. 
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undisputable fact was established, many would explain to me that of course there is always a 
cultural element to how Islam is practiced. Ajla explained it like this: 
 
Culture is different, Islam is the same. (…) Like it or not; we have to separate those two, and we have to 
know that those two things do mix together. You can’t have the same religion in Bosnia, in Saudi-
Arabia, in France. If I’m born and raised like this, it’s not easy to change. And why should I change? 
I’m not doing anything wrong.  
 
Ajla does not mind using the term Bosnian Islam. She thinks it has become more common to 
use this phrase in order to distinguish their local Muslim tradition from Arabic influence. For 
Emira, Bosnian Islam is a natural phrase, just like Bosnian cooking or Bosnian Music, she 
said. Islam in Bosnia has some specific qualities, and according to her that gives it a particular 
value. “What is Islam? Islam has five pillars, that is what is most important. And the other 
things, the other things we can make, we can organise in different ways in connection with 
our cultural tradition.”    
Those who have a more literalist understanding of Islam will not use the term Bosnian 
Islam, because they consider culture-specific norms and practices as something which can 
easily be done “at the expense of Islam”. Bosnian Islam, no matter what that expression 
conveys, will for them necessarily involve an element of ignorance of the true Islamic 
message. Amra, for example, criticises the worldwide tendency to adjust Islam to time and 
place by saying that “people are always trying, in many nations all over the world, to 
accommodate God’s law to the time they live. Does that mean that God didn’t know what is 
going to happen in 2006?”   
 
European Islam 
Western scholars of religion and sociology have lately started to apply the term “European 
Islam” in order to describe the religious practice and culture of the European Muslims, which 
inevitably is (or they think should be) a symbiosis of Muslim and European/Western ways of 
organising religion and manners of thinking about individual-community relations and the 
boundaries of religious life (cf. Hunter 2002:271-276). Muslims themselves seem more 
reluctant to use the term “European Islam”, presumably because the formulation contradicts 
the undisputable oneness of Islam and the umma. Tariq Ramadan, the author of the book “To 
be a European Muslim” (1999) is an exception, and in an article from 2002 titled 
“Europeanization of Islam or Islamization of Europe?” Ramadan states: “I am a European 
Muslim, and there is no contradiction in this situation. If one can think of African Islam or 
  53 
Asian Islam, then why not also think of European Islam?” (Ramadan 2002:210). He claims 
that this has not yet happened because of fear and ignorance among Muslims of some basic 
tenets of Islam. In order to be true European Muslims, Europe’s Muslims must promote a new 
culture that fits the new European environment while being respectful to the Islamic values 
(2002:210-211). The Bosnian Reis and his colleagues chose the formulation “European 
tradition of Islam”, as they in the “Declaration of European Muslims” describe what the 
European Muslims must strive to develop (Cerić 2005:4). In an interview with the Norwegian 
newspaper Aftenposten Reis Cerić points out that living in Europe and the West might be the 
perfect opportunity for the Muslims to adopt a universal Islam. In order for that to happen the 
Muslims in Europe first have to integrate with each other (Aftenposten’s A-magasin 2007). 
The Bosnian Muslims have become a symbol of European Islam. Xavier Bougarel 
argues that the religious identity of the Bosnian Muslims and their position in the complex 
relations between Europe and Islam cannot be properly understood by insisting on the 
European dimension of Bosnian Islam. The Bosnian Muslims are surely Europeans, just like 
their Croat and Serb neighbours, but the realities of Bosnian Muslims, such as heterodox 
practices, rules for peaceful religious coexistence and processes of secularisation, are not 
unique for the Bosnian Muslims, Bougarel says. Moreover, Bosnian Muslims disagree about 
an issue that is central for European Islam: the relationship between Islam and Western 
modernity. Bougarel identifies three dominant trends among Bosnian Muslims: Islam defined 
as an individual faith, as a common culture, and as a discriminatory political ideology. This 
contradicts the description of Bosnian Islam as homogenous and particularly European. And 
because Islam in Bosnia is so firmly linked to the Bosniaks’ nationalist project, Bougarel 
finds it more likely that a European Islam will develop among the new Muslim generations 
born in Western-Europe. The waning of inherited ethnic and national identities among the 
new generations facilitates the emergence of a new Muslim community, centred on religious 
institutions and demands that concern all European Muslims. Bougarel concludes that there 
are many Islams in Europe, but that a European Islam does not yet exist (Bougarel 2007:96-
121).    
My informants were not familiar with the term European Islam. Nejra pointed out that 
the Bosnian Muslims and the Muslims in Western Europe do not know each other. This is 
because the Muslims in Western Europe mainly are immigrants, and therefore culturally 
different from the Bosnian Muslims, who in many ways have more in common with the 
native European population than the immigrated Muslims. Though some informants 
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emphasised that they are European and that the European context influences on Islam, they 
did not seem to link their Muslim identity with a community of European Muslims. 
 
Foreign Islamic influence in Bosnia 
To determine whether my informants oriented themselves towards a more universal Islam or 
treasure their local tradition, I found it useful to ask how they regard the foreign Islamic 
influence in Bosnia, notably the “Wahhabis”, the use of niqab, and the unfamiliar mosques. 
Many of those who I understand to be in favour of “Bosnian Islam” were very pragmatic and 
did not want to say anything negative about other Muslims and their way of practising Islam. 
Instead they embraced diversity, and underlined that there are many ways to be Muslim. It is a 
dilemma though, that the “Wahhabis” don’t seem willing to accept the way most Bosnian 
Muslims practice Islam. Enisa considers it problematic that many Muslims think there is only 
one way to be Muslim. Her opinion is quite opposite: “Islam is very rich, if you are from Iran, 
from America, or from anywhere, you can be Muslim, in your own way.” When I asked 
Dženana what she thought about the “Wahhabis” and the use of niqab, she was not sure how 
to answer: “I don’t know what to say, that is very, for me personally, like I said, I don’t mind, 
I’m not a person who would judge somebody, so I can’t say my way is correct and your is not 
correct.” But she was also aware of the fact that the “Wahhabis” don’t approve of the way she 
is Muslim: “In a sense they don’t even like us, they don’t see wider.”  
Although not all express their opinions so directly, those who focus on their local 
Islamic tradition seem to agree that the Arabic Islamic influence is troubling, and not fit for 
Bosnia. Nermina articulated this view with precision: 
 
Unfortunately there is some strange influence from the Arabic world. (…) In a way I’m unhappy 
because of this number of people, because they make life difficult for themselves and for others, you 
know. Because I think we can not copy anybody’s way of life. Especially we can not copy Arabic way 
of life. Because those people in Arabic world, I think that they don’t understand our way of life, our 
situation, complete situation. They can respect every Quranic guidance, ok, we have to try to do it in our 
life, but we are, we have to find some ways, our own way, to respect Quran, to be Muslim, but to 
respect also the European way of life. We have to find some compromise. The copying is wrong way. 
Especially it is wrong way to get some influence, to adopt some strange way of life and to change ours. 
You know, the generations of Bosnians were Muslims, more than 500 of years. (…) We were Muslims 
and we lived in Islamic way of life. But this way of life was different from the way of life of the 
Arabians, in Saudi-Arabia, in other countries, in Iran for example. (…) And today, some young men 
who spent some time in Arabic world, or they were companions to some Arabic young men here during 
the war, and now they come and say; “anything you have been doing during these 500 years is wrong. 
You have to be Muslim, but in this way”. The beard, the short pants, it looks very strange here. It is not 
necessary. 
(…) 
I would never agree with niqab in our condition. I think it is a kind of obstacle for this way of life. For 
example, you have the ID; you can’t cross the border between two countries without showing your face.  
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Of course, I would let anyone make his own choice, and I would never attack anyone because of his 
choice, but I wouldn’t ever accept this way of wearing, covering my face. 
 
Some of my informants are more positively inclined towards the Arabic influence. In a 
conversation I had with Medina and Amra they emphasised that the variations within Islam 
are minimal, and said that they cannot be negative towards everything that come from one 
country (Saudi-Arabia); they should accept what is positive. Where niqab is concerned, they 
told me that to cover the face is not only a cultural tradition but a custom which has its origin 
in Islam. While some religious scholars consider it to be recommended, others don’t. 
Therefore it is up to the woman herself to choose whether to wear this garment or not.     
 What mosque people prefer can reflect their religious preferences. The centre of 
Sarajevo is dotted with small mosques, and ideally every mahala (neighbourhood) should 
have its own mosque. Many of the mosques that were destroyed during the war have been 
rebuilt, and there have also appeared some new mosques that stand out because of their size 
and architecture. These are mosques built with foreign funding, such as the Indonesian Istiqlal 
Mosque and the King Fahd Mosque, which Christian Moe calls “a gathering point for Islamic 
fringe youths” (Moe 2005:53). The King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre came up in some 
of the conversations. The cultural centre which is attached to the mosque has conference 
rooms that can be used free of charge, and Medina and Amra utilise these facilities to hold 
lectures and courses. Amra also prays daily in the King Fahd Mosque. She said that many 
people think that the cultural centre is Islamic only because it is called King Fahd and 
connected to the mosque, and that they therefore are sceptical to come there. However, it is a 
cultural centre like any other, she said, but because of prejudiced journalists many have been 
given a wrong impression.  
When I mentioned to Ajla that I had been in the King Fahd Cultural Centre, she 
immediately connected this place with the “Wahhabis”. She said that if she had children she 
would never let them attend a language course there, because she could not know if they 
would be exposed to Wahhabi-ideology before or after the session. Ajla does not like the 
architecture of the King Fahd Mosque. She finds it is cold, and prefers the small traditional 
mosques, which she thinks have something warm about them. Ajla said that she knows some 
people who always go to the small mosques because they know that the “Wahhabis” will not 
come there.  
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Categorisation of informants 
Some of my informants are quite easy to identify with either “Bosnian Islam” or “global 
Islam”. This is because they have strong and precise opinions, which they did not mind 
sharing with me.37 A few of the informants I have not been able to categorise adequately. This 
refers to the fact that people are complex (something which of course is true for all the women 
I have interviewed). The informants I am unable to categorise seemed to me to on the one 
hand be in favour of “Bosnian Islam”, and on the other hand to belong to the category “global 
Islam”. My difficulties with categorising concerns a general problem, namely: which criterion 
to base categorisation on.  
So far I have focused on how the informants conceptualise their Muslim identity, i.e. 
whether they stress the Bosniak or Islamic dimension of their Muslim identity, whether they 
deem it is possible to adjust Islam to time and place, and how they feel about foreign Islamic 
influence in Bosnia. In the following chapters I will focus on dress (modern or conservative) 
and discuss to what degree their understanding of the Muslim female role and gender relations 
are inspired by Islam and/or Western feminist ideals. These criteria taken together with my 
general comprehension of whom they are, form the basis of my categorisation of the 
informants as either belonging to “Bosnian Islam” or “global Islam”. It should be kept in 
mind, though, that people often do one thing, say another and think a third, while the 
interviewer only has access to one or two of these levels (Bringa 1995:xvi). 
The category “Bosnian Islam” is applicable to the following informants: Enisa, Emira, 
Ajla, Nermina, Dženana, Nejra, Elvira, Selma and Edina. The category “global Islam” I find 
appropriate for: Meliha, Medina, Amra and Azra. Those I am not in position to appropriately 
categorise are: Fadila, Raifa, Amila, Jasmina and Lejla. 
Lejla can function as an example of the difficulty of categorising. Since she wears 
niqab many probably assume that she is a “Wahhabi”. But despite her conservative way of 
dressing and her insistence on following strict rules of gender-segregation, she also embraces 
diversity and puts great value on her Bosniak heritage and European belonging. This makes 
me unable to fit her into one category.  
All the women I understand to be in favour of “global Islam” have spent a period of 
their life in another country. Meliha, Medina and Azra have studied in a Muslim country, 
while Amra comes from Montenegro. Medina has actually lived most of her life outside of 
Bosnia, mainly in another European country. She said that she does not really have a 
connection with Bosnia. This can explain why she does not connect her identity as a Muslim 
                                                 
37 For that very same reason these informants are referred to or quoted disproportionately frequent. 
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with Bosnia. She is not even sure about whether to call herself bošnjakinja or bosanka; 
nationality for her is just a designation in her passport. However, to explain why “Bosnian 
Islam” appeals to some of the informants, and “global Islam” to others, is outside the scope of 
this thesis (that is a topic for psychology). 
 
Rejecting the terrorist-label 
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Bosniaks, regardless of whether they are secular or 
observant Muslims, tend to feel that they, like Muslims worldwide, are held responsible for 
atrocities committed by a handful of extremists. Bosnian Muslims condemned the 9/11 
attacks, but they are strongly critical to how the “war on terror” has been carried out in 
Bosnia, with searches, raids, seizures, confiscations, detentions and interrogations. It is the 
presence of foreign mujahedin in the Bosnian war that has connected Bosnia with “Islamic 
terrorism”. However, no Bosnian Muslim had been implicated in international terrorism when 
the report “The war on terror and Muslim opinion-Making in Bosnia” was written38 (Moe 
2005:5).  
A consequence of the al-Qaida-linked bombings around the world is that the world’s 
Muslims have been given the unpleasant choice of being with America or being with the 
terrorists. Moreover, the widespread Muslim perception that the war against terrorism is in 
fact a war against Muslims has heightened the idea of the Muslim umma (2005:14).  
Many Muslim people view the United States and American military actions abroad 
with mistrust. The “war on terror” is by most Muslims understood to be a cover-up for what 
are the US’s real intentions; increased influence in the Muslim world and access to the 
Middle-Eastern oil reservoirs. The Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, have had a positive 
image of the USA. The US under Bill Clinton’s leadership intervened to stop the genocide 
against Muslims in Bosnia and to prevent one in Kosovo (2005:11). However, Christian 
Moe’s report shows that the US-led “war on terror” have changed the unreserved positive 
attitude the Bosniaks had towards the US (2005:76-82). 
The fact that it was the Americans, and not the Europeans who came to their rescue, 
may contribute to a more restrained relationship towards Europe. For one of my informants, 
                                                 
38 The report analyses Muslim mainstream and fringe discourses about the “war on terror” in Bosnian, mainly 
Islamic, press. Moe found that the discourse has reinforced the image of a hostile non-Muslim bloc attacking 
Muslims. Since the report was written a couple of Bosniaks have been convicted for terrorism in Sarajevo 2007 
(one of them a Swedish citizen of Bosnian origin), and in November 2008 five of “the Algerian six” (see below) 
were released from Guantánamo. 
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Ajla, the statement made by an Austrian politician at the beginning of the war; “I will not 
allow a Muslim country near Austria”, sums it up for her. Ajla has no doubt that the European 
countries did not help them because of Europe’s prejudices against Muslims. According to 
Moe this understanding is common among Bosniaks (2005:18). 
The Bosniaks see a resemblance between the allegations of Islamic fundamentalism 
which served as anti-Muslim propaganda before the Bosnian war and the accusations of 
“Islamic terrorism” after 9/11. Bosnian Muslims are provoked by the eagerness to hunt down 
alleged Islamic terrorists in Bosnia, while Bosnian Serb war criminals responsible for 
atrocities in Srebenica are still not brought to justice. A parallel has been drawn between 9/11 
and the Srebenica massacre, where twice as many people died in one day as in New York. 
However, while 9/11 led to the universal labelling of Muslims as terrorists, the massacre in 
Srebenica was addressed on the level of individual responsibility (war criminals) (2005:41).    
Amra connects the media writings about the terror-attacks with her own experiences 
from Bosnia, and in particular what she referred to as “the Algerian group”: 
 
They found somehow five or six people who are working here in humanitarian organisations and they 
arrested them. They were never accused by our court, there were no proofs. Listen to this, it started 
from this news: “Algerian group wanted to bomb American Embassy”, without proof. People consume 
this news, and they don’t think themselves. Because of this news, the propaganda, they were arrested. 
The wife of one of them came to me for help. We had to wait for a court-decision, and court-decision 
was that these people are clean. At the end, the court believes they are innocent, but America wanted 
them to go to Guantánamo. And the person in government wanted America as partner, to cooperate. 
There was a demonstration. I was there, to demonstrate and to write an article. My sister was there, she 
is not covered, there were some other girls there who are not covered, but do you know what was the 
media report? They had always a group of men with longer beards and women with niqab or scarf, but 
they never showed someone without scarf. And I remember they were saying “Allahu akhbar, these are 
our brothers, we shall protect them, do not let America take them to Guantánamo”, but we were not 
saying “let’s kill them, let’s bomb them”. We were just sitting there and standing there. Then in the 
morning the police came, with dogs, one woman was beaten, I was hospitalised, and someone who went 
through that knows what propaganda really is. They can make the stories the way they want. It was in 
someone’s interest to make terrorists here in Bosnia. This woman, the wife, Nadia, is represented by an 
American lawyer who is going against his own government. That shows that America is not black and 
white. This case shows how we can be manipulated, and that’s why, Evelyn, I doubt everything that is 
going on.  
 
 
Moe’s report also refers to the case of “the Algerian six” and his version is in line with 
Amra’s: despite the Supreme Court’s decision to release the six men they were handed over to 
American forces and flown to Guantánamo. Moe concludes that this is the most appalling 
case of human rights violation in Bosnia resulting form the “war on terror” (2005:51-59).  
This branding of Muslims as terrorists must necessarily inflict on how the Muslims 
perceive of themselves. The labelling perspective in sociology of deviance explains how 
others’ definition of us affects our definition of ourselves: when people are labelled as deviant 
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within an appropriate institutional setting they come to identify themselves as deviant. By 
internalising the identity offered to them by others (society, the court system) they are in fact 
likely to become (or remain) deviant. The labelling model is also relevant in other contexts 
and for positive as well as negative labels (Jenkins 2004:20-21). The effect of labelling can be 
internalisation or resistance. Whether we internalise or resist the labels other people put on us 
depends on which definitions have factual consequences and who we consider as significant 
others. The sociology of deviance tells us that our identity is not only perceived by others; the 
others actively construct our identity in terms of categorising and naming, and how they treat 
us and respond to us (2002:73-76).  
Due to how the “war on terror” has been carried out, Muslims tend to feel that the 
terrorist-label is applied to all of them. This idea can be reinforced or weakened by the 
concrete interaction of Muslims with non-Muslims. Nermina, for example, thinks that 
prejudices against Muslims have become more apparent after 9/11. She has noticed that 
airport staff has become more suspicious: “If you show up as a Muslim you are potential 
terrorist”. Nermina connects this with the fact that she wears hijab and that she is from 
Bosnia, two features which she thinks add up to the picture of her as a potential threat. 
  
I’m very unhappy because of this. Islam in general, in its’ core, is not a terrorist-religion; it is a religion 
of peace. (…) But the problem is that most of European people put sign of equality between Islam and 
terrorism, like a threat to European way of life. But the truth is, the most of Muslim people do not want 
to force European people to live in our way of life, we just want to have the opportunity to live in our 
way of life (Nermina).  
 
So, how can the terrorist label affect the identity of Muslims? Do they internalise it as 
part of their individual/collective identity? Do they come to see themselves as deviant because 
non-Muslims categorise them as such? The answer to this question is definitely negative. My 
Muslim informants strongly resist the terrorist-label on behalf of themselves and the entire 
umma. Some also resist it on behalf of Muslims who have committed acts of terrorism, by 
claiming that the terrorist label is a tool for de-legitimising one’s enemies. To be labelled 
“Islamic terrorist” certainly counts in the sense it may have severe consequences (such as 
being arrested and sent to Guantánamo), but the significant others whose definition really 
counts is the community of co-believers. The “war on terror” contributes to an “us versus 
them” mentality which implies that the “others’” definitions can only be resisted. This means 
that those who are accused of terrorism don’t perceive of themselves as deviants, but as the 
victims of a war against Islam and all Muslims. 
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According to Moe (2005) is the insistence on the Bosnian Muslims’ victimhood and 
continued victimisation a prominent feature of Bosniak discourse which can be linked to the 
“war on terror”. However, this rhetoric has its roots in the Bosnian history and especially the 
1992-1995 war, but is reinforced by the Bosnian Muslims‘ identification with Muslims 
worldwide and the sense that all Muslims are under attack and victims of global violence 
(Moe 2005:75).  
  The feeling of being misunderstood and under attack can also result in resistance and 
determination. Enisa told me that it upsets her that the whole world seems to think that Islam 
is terrorism, but this can only strengthen her conviction: “You become even stronger if you 
have a lot of people in the world who think that Islam is something not so good, you become 
even stronger in your belief.” 
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Chapter 5: The modest one 
The hijab is not just a piece of cloth. It has become a symbol with many different meanings 
attached to it. For non-Muslim Europeans the hijab is often understood as a symbol of female 
oppression, and the wearing of hijab among the Muslim minorities in Western-Europe is seen 
as expressing a lack of integration and internalisation of the values of democracy and gender-
equality (Larsen 2004:52). Some consider the hijab an emblem of political Islam. It is 
understood as inexorably linked to the political project of the Islamists and the hijab-bearer is 
thus inevitably seen as an Islamist (Storhaug 2007).39 For Muslim women, wearing hijab 
represents the fulfilment of a religious duty, but it can also express moral purity, piety, 
Islamic conformity, protest, resistance and feminism. For many Muslims in Europe, the hijab 
has become the very symbol of Islam and is closely linked to their Muslim identity (Larsen 
2004:52). In this chapter and the two subsequent, I will discuss what meaning Muslim women 
in Sarajevo find in wearing hijab. 
 
A short story of the veil 
The veiling of women is a tradition with deep roots in Middle-Eastern societies. In the second 
millennium B.C., veiling was a sign of social status and modesty; Assyrian law demanded that 
married women veiled, while female slaves and prostitutes were forbidden to do so. The holy 
texts of Judaism, Christianity and Islam all refer to the veiling of women. In fact, the New 
Testament contains the most unambiguous demand that women should cover their hair: 
according to 1. Corinth 11:6-10, women must cover their heads as a sign of subordination 
(Vogt 2004:23-24). A strict form of gender-segregation was practiced in the Middle East until 
the 20th century, especially in the cities and among the upper classes which could afford the 
seclusion and veiling of women. The veil was a sign of social prestige. This changed when the 
practice of veiling became increasingly criticised from the end of the 19th century. Criticism 
                                                 
39 In her book ”Tilslørt. Avslørt. Et oppgjør med norsk naivisme” (Storhaug 2007) Hege Storhaug argues that 
today’s widely used hijab is designed by the Islamists. Her argumentation is based on how “the new veil” 
evolved, and how it has rapidly spread and ousted many Muslims’ traditional garments like the Pakistani 
shalwar-khamis, which is not considered proper Islamic dress by the Islamists. However, Storhaug does not 
consider the possibility that the widespread use of hijab might be connected to the fact that people all over the 
world dress more similarly today, because of globalisation in general and a much globalised fashion industry. 
There is no reason why this should not also be valid for Islamic dress. Storhaug also ignores the fact that Muslim 
women frame their hijab individually, with elements from both national culture and Western fashion. Maybe the 
traditional Islamic clothes are simply regarded as unfashionable by the younger generations? Young women in 
the West don’t wear what their grandmothers did, so why should Muslim women? The hijab is functional 
because it can easily be combined with both traditional and modern clothing. 
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came from colonial authorities, but also from Muslims who searched for explanations to why 
the European powers had been able to dominate them. Those Muslims came to view the veil 
as a symbol – specifically, of the strict gender-segregation and women’s lack of opportunities 
to education and participation in society – one which helped account for their own societies’ 
relative underdevelopment. Outside the Arabian Peninsula, the facial-veil, niqab, rapidly 
disappeared in this period and educated women disposed of the hijab. Veiling, which earlier 
was associated with prosperity, had now come to symbolise a lack of enlightenment 
(Thorbjørnsrud 2004:42-45).  
Whereas veiling previously was a phenomenon shared by Christian, Muslim and 
Jewish women alike, a new type of “veil” exclusive to Islam developed in the Middle East in 
the 1970s. “The new veil” evolved among female students who sympathised with the new 
Islamist movements that had an Islamic society as their goal (2004:46). The new Islamic dress 
hid everything but face and hands and was made out of inexpensive material in discrete 
colours. A minority also started to wear the traditional niqab. By wearing these clothes, the 
bearer communicated resistance against materialism and the pressure to be fashionable. They 
wanted to create a more just society – something for which their Islamic dress became 
symbolic. With time, this variant of the Islamic dress became popular and was no longer 
necessarily worn out of ideological motives (2004:46-47). 
The hijab Muslim women wear today is a continuation of what is called “the new veil” 
in the sense that it does not express the bearer’s cultural and social background. Instead, it 
communicates a specific Islamic identity that is shared by all members of the umma (Minganti 
2007:257). The choice of what type of clothes to wear in combination with hijab – e.g., wide 
garments similar to the traditional clothes or modern clothes – reflects what the individual 
woman considers proper Islamic dress and whether she deems it possible to mix Islam and 
modern culture. However, the clothes Muslim women wear is not merely based on 
considerations of what is appropriate: like women all over the world, Muslim women are also 
inspired by fashion trends and develop individual styles in their manner of dressing. A 
growing phenomenon is fashion collections for women with hijab.  
In many Middle-Eastern countries, women’s traditional clothes are now replaced by 
hijab in combination with trousers and a long shirt/tunica. There is a polarisation between this 
way of dressing, which has become most common, and the traditional clothes. The salafi-
trend of conservative clothing and niqab is also present, but in minority (Roald 2005:203). 
The same tendencies can be observed in the West, Bosnia included: while most women 
combine hijab with modern, but still modest, clothing, a smaller number of women wear
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fatima Kadić-Žutić is the designer behind a line of clothes for women called Taj. On the 
homepage (http://www.modnistudiotaj.com/aboutus.html) she explains that the fashion 
studio was set up to meet a powerful desire and need among Bosnian women to be 
different and original. The clothes are for “the woman who cares for values and dignity”, 
regardless of whether she wears headscarf. The philosophy seems to be that Muslim 
women in Europe ideally should combine Islamic norms and modern clothing in their 
manner of dressing, so that they are not only different from women who slavishly follow 
the fashion trends, but also different from Muslim women elsewhere: “We have taken 
this bold step forward so that, as an indigenous European yet Muslim people, we may be  
a bridge between East and 
West in the way we dress, 
also”. The fashion studio was 
established in 2007, and in 
2008 Fatima Kadić-Žutić was 
the first designer to show 
models with hijab on the 
catwalk during Sarajevo 
fashion week. The two pictures 
above show models on the 
catwalk during Sarajevo 
fashion week 2008. The 
picture below is from a fashion 
show at the Centre for Islamic 
studies in Zagreb. The woman 
in the middle is Fatima Kadić-
Žutić. 
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clothes similar to the traditional ones, and a clear minority uses niqab and one-coloured, 
preferably black, clothes that conceal all body-contours. 
 
Interpreting the Islamic sources  
Few of the women I spoke to referred to concrete Quranic verses or hadiths (the Prophet’s 
tradition) to explain why they consider it to be obligatory for Muslim women to cover their 
hair and dress modestly. For the women with hijab, this seemed to be an obvious and 
established truth. There are three Quranic scriptures that emphasise modest dress for women: 
surah 33:59, 24:60 and 24:30-31.  Surah 24:31-31 is especially conclusive in the ruling all 
Islamic schools of law agree upon; that Muslim women are obliged to cover their hair (Roald 
2005:184-189, Larsen 2004:53-55):  
 
Surah 24:30-31 
Say to the believers that they should restrain their eyes and guard their modesty. That will be purer for 
them. Allah is well aware of what they do. 
And say to the believing women that they should restrain their eyes, and guard their modesty (virtue), 
and that they display not their ornaments except what appears of them. And that they draw their veils 
over their bosoms and display not their ornaments except to their husbands, or their fathers, or their 
husbands fathers, or their sons, or their husband’s sons, or their brothers, or their brother’s sons, or their 
sister’s sons, or their women, or their slaves, or male domestics who have no natural sexual force, or 
children who know nothing of women’s nakedness. And let them not strike their feet together so as to 
reveal their hidden ornaments. And repent you all to Allah, O you believers, that you may succeed. 
 
It is the statement “that they draw their veils over their bosoms” that most Muslims interpret 
as a clear command that Muslim women must cover their hair and upper-body. The 
explanation for this is that the Arabic word for veil (khimar) signifies a piece of cloth that 
covers a woman’s hair (Larsen 2004:54). Medina explained to me that this is the reason why 
Allah did not mention hair; it was already covered. But, she said, the women had become too 
free in their way of dressing; the veils hung loosely over their heads without covering their 
chest properly, and that is why this verse was revealed. Meliha also agrees with this 
understanding and cited the Prophet-biography to underline how final this rule is: “The day 
when this rule was revealed, the same day the streets of Medina became black40”. Her point is 
that because all the women covered at the same time, we know that this rule is definite. Emira 
                                                 
40 The streets became black because all women immediately covered their bare skin with the garments they 
already had on. 
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also referred to surah 24, but she sees it differently: Because it is not explicitly mentioned that 
women must cover their hair, she does not consider it to be obligatory. “In short, I don’t think 
it is so important rule for women”, Emira said. To substantiate her claim, she mentioned 
surah 7:26, specifically, “the best clothes are the clothes of piety”, as a vague guide for how 
to dress.   
Only one place in the Quran is hijab (the Arabic word for veil/curtain) mentioned in 
relation to women: 
 
Surah 33:53 
O you who believe! Enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal without waiting for the proper 
time, unless permission be granted you. (…) And when you ask for them (the wives of the Prophet) 
anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. (…)  
  
The majority of Islamic scholars understand this verse to refer to the Prophet’s wives 
exclusively, who have a special status in the Islamic tradition (Roald 2005:186, Larsen 
2004:55). Nermina agreed: “It was obligatory only for Prophet’s wife, not for others’ wives, 
even in his (the Prophet’s) time.”  
The Quran does not specify in detail how women should dress. The interpretations of 
Islamic scholars are therefore based on both the Quran and the Prophet’s sunna (hadiths). The 
hadith most frequently referred to in this context is the one about Esma, who was the sister of 
Aisha, the Prophet’s wife. Esma once visited her sister dressed in transparent clothes. The 
Prophet then said that “when a woman reaches puberty she must only show this”, pointing at 
the face and hands (Roald 2005:190, Abu Dawud, the chapter about clothing, nr. 3580). 
   Not all Muslims are equally concerned with the Prophet’s sunna, and I will present the 
divergent views of Meliha and Emira to illustrate this. For Meliha, it is clear that the hadiths 
are necessary to understand the Quranic message: “The Quran can not be understood without 
the text of sunna, it is not clear in the Quran how to cover.” Emira, on the other hand, said 
that there are some sentences about dressing in the hadiths, but the real sentences are in the 
Quran. She considers the hadiths to be authentic and the second source of Islam, but 
underlined that “these sentences need interpretation, really truly interpretation, and this 
interpretation must be in connection with this time, this period and this area of the world.”  
Both Meliha and Emira have undergone religious education and have detailed knowledge 
about the Islamic sources. Still, only one of them wears hijab and considers it to be a religious 
duty. This difference between their interpretations can be seen in relation to their different 
understanding of how religion and society should interact. Emira holds the view that wearing 
hijab has lost its original function in modern societies: “I don’t understand that we in this 
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area, in this part of the world, in this part of Europe, which is bridge between East and West, 
must be with covered hair.” Meliha’s opinion is quite the opposite: “I see that God’s law can 
not be adjusted to our societies. We should adjust ourselves to the law of God, not to adjust 
God’s law to our societies and our way of life.” Her fear is that by “changing God’s law to 
our wish, we will slowly change it into something else”.   
There are two central aspects of faith that concern the wearing of hijab: it is a part of 
the relationship between the individual and God, and it has a regulatory function in society 
(Larsen 2004:58). All my informants consider the first aspect to be the principal reason for 
wearing hijab. However, not all my informants acknowledge that the hijab is intended to 
regulate male-female relations. Ajla and Nejra hold the opinion that wearing hijab only 
concerns the believer’s relationship with God. Ajla underlined that the only reason why she 
might some day decide to cover her hair (which she finds unlikely) would be out of the love 
and respect she has for her religion. Since Ajla understands hijab to merely be an act of 
devotion, I asked her what she thought might have been the reason for this rule when it was 
first revealed. Did it have any function then? Ajla pointed out that she would have to be in 
God’s place to know this, but the reason might have been that a lot of bad things happened to 
women at the Prophet’s time, and that it was considered easier to cover women than to 
educate men. Nejra, who wears hijab and considers it to be obligatory religious practice, also 
stressed that scarf-wearing only concerns the individual woman’s relationship with God and 
that women should not cover because of men and their needs. 
Van Koningsveld and Shadid classify modest dress for women and hijab-wearing as 
an Islamic core-value (Shadid & van Koningsveld 1995:86), which they define as: 
 
 …specific aspects of the Islamic normative system which are of fundamental religious significance to 
all Muslims, viz. the adherence to the Islamic faith and the performance of the rules related directly or 
indirectly to the “acts of devotion” (ibadat) (1995:77). 
 
Following Shadid and van Koningsveld, I asked those informants who regarded the wearing 
of hijab as obligatory whether they see it as an Islamic core-value. To clarify what I meant, I 
said “something like the five pillars, a part of ibadat”. As expected, the women held different 
opinions. For Amra, it is clear that covering is a part of ibadat and, therefore, an important 
part of the Islamic faith: “Everything that is fard (obligatory) is not a detail, what is not fard 
but only recommended, may be a detail”. Nejra, on the other hand, does not consider hijab to 
be an Islamic core-value. She said that compared to the five pillars, which are valid at all 
times, the wearing of hijab can depend on context. According to her it is a problem that many 
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Muslims misuse the hijab and claim that it is essential for Islam. By making the hijab into 
something more than it really is they contribute to making it compulsory, she said.  
This presentation of different opinions show that Muslim women disagree about 
whether the wearing of hijab is obligatory or not, and what is its function in society. Their 
different views reflect how they relate to the Islamic sources. Most of the women I spoke to 
are in-line with the conventional Islamic view that a woman should cover her hair and body to 
preserve her modesty and protect herself, her family and society in general. However, it is 
also clear that not all Muslim women agree with this interpretation. Many see themselves as 
capable of interpreting the Islamic sources and drawing their own conclusions.   
 
The importance of your intentions 
The women in Minganti’s study often used the expression niya (intention) to call attention to 
the importance of the believer’s conscious intent regarding religious practice. Every religious 
ritual should involve the believer’s declaration of niya and reflections on how the action is a 
means to fulfil God’s will and strengthen the faith. The concept of niya distinguishes between 
what are merely cultural habits and what is conscious religious practice. Another condition 
that is required for religious actions to be morally valid, is free will; i.e., the conscious choice 
to practice Islam (Minanti 2007:65-66). 
This attitude is reflected in my informants who emphasised that it must be an 
individual choice whether to wear hijab or not. They do not approve of any kind of pressure 
against women regarding this issue, whether that pressure comes from family, husband or 
society. (Meliha, who has travelled a lot in the Middle East, said Muslims there are also 
starting to realise this: “Parents are now becoming aware, they can not force it. By forcing 
they lose in both sides, because then it is not sincerely between her and God.”) Selma told me 
that the two daughters of Reis Cerić don’t wear hijab, something she considered to be 
positive. This is because it shows that the Reis has not put pressure on his daughters regarding 
this issue, and that he is aware that wearing hijab always must be a conscious choice 
committed by the woman alone.  
Nermina is the only woman I talked to who wears hijab but would not give a clear yes 
or no to the question about whether hijab is obligatory: “I think it is a question of your 
intentions”, she said. She went on to explain that the Islamic reason why a Muslim woman 
should cover is to be recognised as a Muslim, to avoid inappropriate attention and to not be 
desirable to other men than her husband. Her point is that, even if she does not cover, she will 
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still be recognised as a Muslim and she will not risk her marriage, because she dresses 
decently and has the right intention. She also added that, in a country where all women wear 
hijab, it would be out of the question not to wear it; but in Bosnia, one will be recognised as a 
Muslim without necessarily wearing hijab.  
My informants with hijab stressed that the hijab does not mean that they are better 
than the women who don’t wear it. However, since many of these women consider the 
wearing of hijab to be a religious duty, to be fard, that argument can appear self-
contradicting. There is clearly a risk that women without hijab can feel morally inferior 
compared to women who wear it. Fadila expressed this feeling of not being “good enough.” 
She told me that she felt embarrassed when she was out drinking coffee with girlfriends and 
she was the only one at the table who was not covered. The hijab gives a sense of belonging 
for those who wear it, but it can seem exclusive for those who don’t wear it, both Muslims 
and non-Muslims (cf. Minganti 2007:242).  
My informants with hijab have close female family members and friends who are not 
covered. It would obviously be difficult to maintain good relations if the women with hijab 
regarded themselves as superior Muslims. The logic of niya – that is, believers’ true intentions 
are more important than the external manifestations of Islam (though inner conviction and 
outer practice ideally should come together) – facilitates a benevolent attitude towards those 
who are not so strict in religious practice. That they all are aware of the difficulties of wearing 
hijab, and that one has to be strong to wear it, also contributes to this positive attitude. As 
Enisa said: “I don’t understand that topic (of hijab) so rigid. If it is hard to wear that because 
of your job-situation, you can still be a good Muslim”, even though she herself wears it 
because she understands it to be obligatory. She also believes that the Muslim women who 
don’t wear hijab will at some point in time put it on, they just don’t have the strength yet: “It 
will happen between her and God some day.”  Besides, the women with hijab have often 
made the decision to cover after a long period of contemplating. Naturally they cannot so 
easily judge those who have not yet come to the same decision.  
Nermina expressed doubts about whether all women with hijab really have the right 
intention but, at the same time, she emphasised the importance of not judging: 
 
I respect some Muslim women who don’t wear hijab; they are hard-working, raise their children very 
well, contribute to the society-life very much. I appreciate them (more) than some other girls who wear 
hijab, but do nothing. (…) In one moment wearing hijab became very popular. During the war and after 
the war a lot of girls started wearing hijab. When we are talking about intentions, we mustn’t put 
ourselves in position of judging. That’s why I say the reason is between man and God. But when you 
see someone performing some kind of behaviour, (…) you see the appearance, you see the hijab on one 
side and on the other very inappropriate behaviour, you have to ask yourself; what is going on?  
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The women in Sweden interviewed by Minganti had formed an ethic around the 
concept niya that enabled them to meet women without hijab in a tolerant and respectful 
manner: 1) the hijab is no proof of piety; 2) only God knows what the believer has in her 
heart, whether she has the intention of submitting to Islam; and 3) because no other human 
being knows what is in someone’s heart, she should leave it up to God to judge (Minganti 
2007:242-243). This ethic is descriptive for how my informants relate to women without hijab 
and to people in general who are lax about religious practice, including women who wear 
hijab but “behave as if they don’t”. 
 
Different ways of dressing 
The Quranic sources do not mention anything about the colour, shape or texture of women’s 
dress. Therefore, Islamic dress has come to involve both cultural and religious aspects. Not 
surprisingly, different regions have developed their distinct clothes for women (and men).  
Examples include the Iranian chador, a piece of cloth that hangs from the head and is being 
draped around the body. The jilbab, a long coat with a hood, often embroidered, worn with 
hijab and sometimes niqab, is widespread in North Africa and the Middle East. On the 
Arabian Peninsula, women wear a similar garment called abaya. The South-Asian shalwar-
khamis, Pakistan’s national-dress, consists of trousers, a long shirt that reaches down to the 
knees and a shawl that hangs loosely over the head or the shoulders (Larsen 2004:56-57) 
(Storhaug 2007:20-21).  
All the women I interviewed take the Bosnian context into consideration in their 
choice of dress, although this means completely different things for different women: Emira 
and Ajla wear modern clothes and consider hijab to be unnecessary; Enisa and Dženana find 
it acceptable and positive to look attractive with hijab, combining Islam with modern fashion; 
Amra and Azra strive not to look attractive, but they nevertheless avoid wearing only black-
coloured clothing and niqab, which is not very common in Bosnia.  
It is interesting that even Lejla, who wears niqab and really stands out in the crowd, 
adjusts to the Bosnian society (Lejla’s motives for wearing niqab will be accounted for in 
Chapter 7). When I met her she was dressed in white hijab and niqab, and a light brown 
jilbab. Lejla covers her face, but she does not identify this feature with Saudi-Arabia:  
 
I wear this kind of niqab, in Saudi-Arabia they don’t wear this kind of niqab. (…) 
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Maybe you have seen here in Bosnia women who wear only black. (…) But in Islam it is not a demand 
to only wear black. And maybe women in Bosnia who wear only black think that is Islam, but it is only 
a custom in Saudi-Arabia.41  
   
 Meliha told me that God did not explain the details of dressing because he knew that 
there would be different cultures, different times and different climates. But the general rule is 
to not be attractive, she explained, and people should try to fit that rule into society: “She can 
at least maybe try to make it more similar to her culture. Sure she will not wear here the same 
as in Saudi-Arabia, to cover whole face, to wear only black.” 
 My informants seemed to agree that women can use the colours they prefer. Meliha 
referred to a Prophet’s saying to support this view: “It is allowed for men to use any 
perfumes, and it is allowed for women to use any colours.”  However, the point is to not 
attract attention; therefore, a woman should be careful not to use colours that are very glaring 
or colours that nobody else wears.  
What a woman understands to be the Islamic reason for covering is decisive for what 
kind of clothes she finds suitable. As mentioned earlier, the majority holds that the intention 
behind hijab is to make a woman less attractive, but exactly how “unattractive” a woman 
must be to fulfil the ideal of modesty is a matter of interpretation. Amra and Enisa represent 
two dominant trends in Islamic clothing. While Amra represents an “arabising trend,” where 
women in Europe have started to combine hijab with jilbab (Larsen 2004:62), Enisa wears 
what can be called “hijab-fashion”.   
In Amra's view, it is obvious that the purpose of covering is to make a woman less 
attractive when she goes out, and the clothes she herself wears reflect this. The four times I 
met her, she wore jilbab, and her hijab covered her neck completely and hung loosely over 
her upper-body. The colours were mellow – grey-blue or brown, for example. She did not 
wear make-up. Amra made it clear that she does not approve of those who want to look 
attractive with hijab: 
 
As you mentioned, in Sarajevo you have different ways of covering. And I don’t consider it proper 
covering if someone covers her hair and have make-up, completely, perfume, and her shoes are high-
heeled, and the way of walk and talk and everything. (…)These kinds of girls, I think they are not just 
sure what they want. They like being religious, they like being modern, they like being like anyone else. 
I don’t approve of that, I don’t think it is right, since these verses are clear, because covering is about 
being less attractive, not more attractive.   
                                                 
41 My translation from Bosnian: Ja nosim ovakav nikab, u Saudijskoj Arabiji ne nose ovakav nikab. (…) 
Možda si vidjela ovdje u Bosni, žene nose samo crno. (…) Ali u Islamu to nije naredno da bude samo crno. I 
možda žene u Bosni koje nose nikab može samo crno, misli da je to Islama, ali je to običaj samo u Saudijskoj 
Arabiji. 
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Enisa understands it differently. According to her, it is positive to look a little bit 
attractive with marama and to blend into society, because a woman with a headscarf 
nonetheless stands out and the attention she receives is simply another form of attraction. 
“You don’t have to look like invisible person”, Enisa said, and explained that the scarf brings 
out the woman’s personality. I met Enisa three times and her outfits were always matching, 
layer on layer, with cute details like a row of small diamonds across the forehead or beautiful 
hair-pins attached to the fabric. She made it clear that she prefers the middle-way, “not too 
big, not too tight”: 
 
My little daughter, she is very beautiful, and if she chooses to wear marama, at some young age, maybe 
15-17, I think that it will be very good for her to wear modern clothes, not modern bad, you know, it is 
very big topic if you say modern. Anything what other children her age is wearing, but if you have tight 
pants you have to have something (wider and longer, like a tunica) on top, but I think it is easier. If you 
have a child at 15 who has to wear mantle... I don’t want to wear mantle, I’m 34 and I don’t want to. I 
want to wear everything women my age wear, and I compare my religion and I find some middle-way. 
But also, I think that if you choose to wear scarf on your head you have to watch not to wear so tight 
clothes, not to wear so tiny clothes, and I think that is important to.  
 
The young Muslim women Minganti interviewed in Sweden dressed similarly to 
Enisa. They strived to wear clothes that were within the borders of decency from an Islamic 
point of view but, at the same time, to look fresh and nice, which is an important ideal in 
Swedish society. They would, for the most part, tie their hijabs in a correct manner, hiding 
the hair, neck and shoulders, and wear long sleeves and long dresses; but at the same time, 
they could wear all sorts of colours, make-up and accessories, and do their best to create a 
matching and beautiful outfit. There were norms, though, and if one of them had put on too 
much make-up, she might face a negative reaction from the others. In general, they found it 
acceptable to look nice as long as the intention was to feel good, and not to attract the 
opposite sex (Minganti 2007:252-258).     
Regardless of their different considerations about proper clothing styles for Muslim 
women in Bosnia, both Amra and Enisa are convinced that female hair is so attractive that it 
should be covered. My argument that female hair is so normal in the West that nobody even 
notices it was not convincing to them:  
 
For me as a woman it is so normal to wear scarf because I understand hair to be part of our body, our 
physical appearance and something that is attractive. And why do we go to hairdresser, to be more 
attractive. Why do we change our hairstyle? To feel better and to look better. When we feel better we 
look better (Amra). 
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Hair is decoration of women. In Islam hair is same like your breasts. All is decoration of you. You have 
to cover your decoration (Enisa). 
 
Hijab and identity 
It is an acknowledged fact that human beings express their identity through their dress, 
appearance and demeanour. Giddens points out that while bodily appearance in pre-modern 
cultures mostly designated social identity, in late modernity appearance has come to 
increasingly express personal identity and the body plays a crucial part in the reflexive 
construction of the self (Giddens 1991:99-100). Also Jenkins stresses the importance of the 
body in identification: 
 
The human body is simultaneously a referent of individual continuity, an index of collective similarity 
and differentiation, and a canvas upon which identification can play. Identification in isolation from 
embodiment is unimaginable (Jenkins 2004:19).  
 
Modern culture places great value on individuality vis-à-vis appearance and clothes. 
Appearance involves physical traits (slim, fat, fit, etc.), tan, bodily adornment (make-up, 
tattoos and body-piercing) and hair-style/colour. All these features are open to cultivation, and 
we can, so to speak, create our own body (Giddens 1991:100). The consumer culture and 
mass production of clothes and accessories for every season, allows people to create their 
individual styles and “express themselves,” while they at the same time follow the dominant 
trends.  
While the aim of modern fashion is to express individuality and emphasise people’s 
most attractive features, women’s Islamic dress seeks to do the opposite. The purpose of hijab 
and wide clothes in neutral colours is to avoid attracting attention to a woman’s physical 
attributes. This, it is reasonable to assume, provides Muslim women with fewer possibilities 
to express their personal identity. In conversation with some of the informants I came to 
realise that Muslim women try to differentiate between personal identity and appearance. 
Medina, who wears clothes that don’t draw attention to her looks, emphasised human beings’ 
dual nature: “We are not only body, a machine, we are spirit as well.” She thinks that her 
dress helps to remind her that her real self is the spirit inside:  
 
My body is me, I need by body as a vehicle, but it is not me. And when I talk to people, with my 
dressing I want to tell them; “my dressing is not important, my body is not important”. 
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Because of the “hijab-fashion” trend, also Muslim women express their individual 
styles and personalities through their dress. However, some Muslims consider this 
inappropriate and see it as a negative result of modernity’s influence on Islam. Instead of 
seeing hijab as a means of expressing individual identity, they regard it as closely linked to a 
collective Islamic identity. This is particularly evident if we consider the black chador which 
Khomeini made obligatory for Iranian women or the pale blue burqa which was forced upon 
all women during the Taliban-regime in Afghanistan. Besides expressing an Islamic identity, 
these clothes symbolise a particular ideology and group identity.  
Women’s appearance, dress and behaviour are often used as symbolic identity-markers 
for the groups they belong to, whether that is family, ethnic and/or religious group and nation. 
This is found in connection with patriarchal societies and is probably connected to women’s 
biology; giving birth and rearing children gives women the main responsibility for socialising 
children into members of the group (Thorbjørnsrud 2004:37). In modern Western societies 
Muslim women have come to symbolise a moral boundary against “Western immorality” 
(Larsen 2004:58). The hijab, which is linked to morality and important Islamic virtues, has 
thus become a key symbol of Islam: Women are considered the “face of Islam”, and their 
dignity is linked to the dignity of the umma. 
Since Islam is the foundation of Bosniak national identity, it is not unlikely that the 
hijab is or can become an important symbol of Bosnian Muslim identity (or, alternatively, the 
fact that most Bosnian Muslim women don’t wear hijab can symbolise Islam in Bosnia). In 
socialist Yugoslavia the image of a girl in a headscarf praying often decorated the walls of 
Muslim households. This picture symbolised the Bosnian Muslims’ Islamic identity. Bringa 
claims that women had a pivotal role in the construction and maintenance of a collective 
Muslim identity anchored in Islam (Bringa 1995:8-10).  
Because Muslim women increasingly are in a position to choose whether to wear hijab 
and how to wear it, their clothes are likely to reflect their understanding of Islam. Through 
their clothes and appearance Bosnian Muslim women can inform others about their values and 
to what extent they identify with the West (by wearing clothes according to fashion); or with 
the community of Bosnian Muslims, or whether they identify with the umma or the 
“Wahhabis”. To associate ourselves with a community implies a degree of reflexivity (Jenkins 
2004:4). This is particularly evident when there are several communities to choose from. 
Because of globalisation this is increasingly the reality everywhere. This draws attention to 
the fact that an Islamic identity is not only a collective identity; it is necessarily also an 
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individual identity which has to be explored and constructed reflexively, deciding between 
different options (Giddens 1991).  
In a minority situation the hijab is likely to be especially significant in the construction 
of self-identity. The hijab does not only stand for a Muslim collective identity, it is also a 
means to express individual religiosity. Since the wearing of hijab is the exception instead of 
the rule in Bosnia, the decision to wear it is usually made after a long period of reflection. The 
moment a woman start to wear hijab becomes a crucial moment in her life story (narrative of 
self-identity). Starting to wear a hijab symbolises increased faith, and shows that the woman 
is a religious person. Those women, who consider wearing hijab a religious obligation, see the 
garment as a fully integrated part of their self-identity: “I would not see myself as a complete 
believer without it” (Medina). For Muslim women the wearing of hijab can be a very personal 
matter which can be seen as an act of devotion as well as a sign of their intimate relationship 
with God.  
 As this discussion of hijab and identity demonstrates; identity is necessarily both 
individual and collective. By wearing hijab a woman associates herself with one or several 
collectives, and distances herself from others. By doing this she constructs her self-identity. 
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Chapter 6: The protected one  
According to Islamic ideals, men and women should not socialise outside the family and 
sexual relations should only take place within the heterosexual marriage. This ideal has 
resulted in the seclusion of women, restricting women to the domestic sphere and the veiling 
of women whenever they come into contact with unrelated men. Today most Bosnian Muslim 
women take active part in society and very few women use the veil. Instead they wear hijab, 
and this chapter will examine how the hijab can regulate male-female relations.  
The Muslim women in Minganti’s study in Sweden (2007) were surrounded by norms 
and regulations concerning their mobility. Ideally, they should not leave home without a male 
protector, a mahram.42 The aim of this practice, an ideal in many Muslim countries, is to 
avoid uncontrolled sexuality, which will result in fitna, chaos: because women are sexually 
desirable to men, they have the power to create sexual disorder (Mernissi 1985:30-31). It is 
the duty of the women's close male relatives to act as protectors and escort them outside the 
home. In return, they demand obedience from the women and that they ask for permission to 
perform activities away from home. Minganti’s study showed that it was not so much the 
threat of sexual transgression that upheld this tradition in the young women’s families; rather, 
it was the fear of being associated with shameful acts, places and persons, guilt by 
association, which could lead to gossip and rumours harmful to the women’s reputation (and 
prospects for marriage) – and by extension, their families’ reputation and honour. The code of 
“honour and shame” prevailed in the women’s families. This refers to a system where the 
man’s honour is dependent on the behaviour of the other family members. The head of the 
family is responsible for protecting/controlling “his” women’s honour, which is defined by 
norms for gender, sexuality and reproduction (Minganti 2007:22-23). 
The “honour and shame” concept is not part of the Bosnian Muslims’ cultural 
tradition. According to Sorabji (1989), the Bosnian word for shame, sramota, is not 
equivalent to Middle-Eastern concepts of shame. Sramota is not linked to a notion of honour 
but to ideals of morality, and it is not more likely to enter the family through girls than boys. 
Families are not thought of in terms of honour; therefore, there is no honour to defend on 
behalf of the family (Sorabji 1989:82-84).  
The practice of mahram as described by Minganti is not a common phenomenon in 
Bosnia. Except for Azra, who told me that she could not meet her boyfriend without being 
                                                 
42 A mahram is one of the male relatives listen in surah 24:31, all men who a woman is not legally in position to 
marry (Minganti 2007:187). 
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accompanied by her father and that she was not allowed to associate with unrelated males, my 
informants did not seem to need anyone’s permission for their actions or to report to family 
members their whereabouts. They are probably familiar with the practice of mahram from 
Arabic countries and they all seemed to recognise that they as women have a greater need for 
protection than men, but the responsibility to avoid inappropriate situations seems to fall on 
the individual woman, not her family. Besides, in Bosnia it is the young and devout, rather 
than the parents’ generation which grew up during communism, who insist on following 
Islamic rules concerning the interaction between unrelated males and females.  
Minganti discovered that the hijab functioned as an extension of or replacement for 
the protection of mahram. It would be nearly impossible for the women in her study to lead a 
normal life in a modern society like Sweden and to perform their dawa-activity if they could 
not leave home without being accompanied by a male relative. Thus, women did move about 
on their own in gender-mixed settings, especially if the male relatives failed to be available as 
escorts. The women in Minganti’s study felt they were capable of controlling the force of 
fitna through self-discipline. By wearing hijab they signalised that they are “untouchable” and 
well aware of the boundaries of decency. Moreover, by wearing hijab and toning down their 
sex appeal, the women did not only protect themselves, but also the men (Minganti 
2007:250). This is also the experience of Muslim women in Sarajevo: by wearing hijab they 
can have an active life and, at the same time, observe Islamic norms for gender relations and 
fulfil important female virtues.  
 
The hijab as a moral boundary 
Since Muslim women who wear hijab in Sarajevo are in minority, they are very noticeable. 
By expressing and displaying their Islamic identity in public they automatically become 
representatives of Islam, showing Islam’s face to the outside world. This gives them a 
distinctive moral responsibility to adjust their behaviour according to Islamic standards and 
norms. Muslim women I spoke to, both with and without hijab, expressed expectations as to 
how a woman with hijab should behave. These norms apply to women in general, but it is 
even more crucial for women who cover themselves to follow them. These expectations 
especially concern the women’s conduct in public places: they should not perform any kind of 
rude behaviour or socialise with males and frequent bars and nightclubs.  
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It is very inappropriate for decent women to sit at some very bad place, smoking cigarettes, laughing 
very loudly, walking like a cowboy. When a woman wears hijab it is a sign of her religion, conscious of 
God (Nermina). 
 
In a conversation I had with Edina, Azra and two other girls (one Muslim and one Christian 
Orthodox), they mentioned a girl at the University who was covered, but who behaved in the 
same manner as she had done before she got covered: she still associated with males and 
frequented places that served alcohol. Apparently she had admitted that she was not “truly” 
covered because she had not said a special prayer the girls understood to be necessary before 
covering. They agreed that it would be best if the girl in question took off her scarf before she 
went to those kinds of places, lest she disgrace Islam. Edina, who was thinking about staring 
to wear a headscarf one day, said that girls like that made her not want to cover, while she 
found Azra, who wears conservative clothes, practices gender segregation and avoids going to 
places where alcohol is served, to be a motivational force.   
I associated these norms and expectations with social control and questioned whether 
the women with hijab really want to be representatives of Islam in the public, with the moral 
responsibility that comes with it. I came to realise that the informants with hijab are conscious 
about these norms and expectations and strive to fulfil them. Enisa put it like this: “Yes it is a 
responsibility, but I don’t mind that responsibility. You are Muslim, you have to watch.” The 
informants don’t consider the moral responsibility as something negative but as something 
which helps them to become better Muslims. This attitude is connected with the conscious 
intention that made them put on hijab in the first place: to fulfil an obligation and strive to be 
better Muslims. 
Raifa is 18 years old and not covered. She said the reason is that she does not feel 
prepared to take on the responsibility: “I thought about that last year, and I was very close to 
wear hijab. I understand that I must be much mature, and I must have some quality which I 
don’t have now.” To explain what she meant, she said that she loves to sing and dance, and if 
she wears hijab she cannot dance with a man, for example. There are certain things she is not 
yet ready to reject. Another reason why she hesitates to cover is because of her vivid 
personality: “I’m very loud, and that makes attraction.” Another of my informants, Amila, 
objected: “What about it?” She did not consider Raifa’s behaviour to be a problem: “Allah 
does not tell to us: you must be serious. No! It is normal. It is normal to joke, to ... , it is 
normal.” Amila said that she used to think like Raifa – that she would put the hijab on her 
head like a “crown” when she had reached a higher level religiously – but after talking to 
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women with hijab, she came to realise that she could cover first and then continue to develop 
religiously. She therefore covered at the age of 18, and she said that she did not find it 
difficult at all.    
Raifa, who is a very outgoing person, talking and laughing a lot and loudly, thinks that 
she is lacking qualities that are required for a woman with hijab. What she seems to be 
missing is one of the most feminine of Islamic virtues: al-haya (shyness, modesty). However, 
shyness and modesty are not something the individual either possesses or not; it can be 
acquired. Mahmood (2005) refers to a woman, Amal, in a women’s piety movement in Cairo. 
She realised that, despite her natural lack of shyness, she could cultivate this virtue. She did 
not understand this to be hypocrisy, because by acting shy she eventually also came to feel 
shy on the inside. Another woman, Nama, drew a parallel to the hijab: women normally feel 
uncomfortable when they start wearing hijab, but by wearing it they learn to feel shy without 
it. The wearing of hijab, which involves both dress code (wearing modest clothes) and 
conduct (acting modest), is therefore not primarily a sign of piety and modesty, but a means to 
accomplish these virtues (Mahmood 2005:155-158) (Minganti 2007:233). Amila could 
encourage Raifa to cover because she believes that she will be able to change more easily 
after she starts to wear hijab. Raifa, on the other hand, is not yet ready to undergo such a 
change, so she decided against it at that point in time.  
The discrepancy between Raifa’s behaviour and what she considers the ideal 
behaviour of a Muslim woman relates to what Susan Starr Sered refers to as the distinction 
between women as agents and Woman as symbol. Women as agents, i.e. real women, can 
demand rights, enter into negotiations and protest unfair treatment. Contrarily, “Woman” is 
the ideal woman as portrayed in religious traditions: 
 
Woman–a symbolic construct conflating gender, sex, sexuality, and comprised of allegory, ideology, 
metaphor, fantasy, and (at least in male-dominated religions) men’s psychological projections. 
Although Woman may have little grounding in the real experiences of women, in religious interactions 
these two ontologically distinct categories tend to be conflated (Sered 1999:194).  
 
Sered argues that the tension between women and Woman is particularly strong in religious 
gender conflicts because these conflicts are ultimately conflicts over symbols. Religious 
symbols are so difficult to change because the divine legitimises them. The religious and 
cultural understanding of Woman has implications for the lives of real women, but women 
can also to some extent shape the image of Woman, according to Sered. Women’s access to 
social and economic resources expands their prospects for agency and influence over cultural 
images of Woman (Sered 1999: 194-196). When Amila so strongly rejected the idea of the 
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Muslim Woman as a timid person who ideally should not be heard or noticed, she sought to 
shape the image of Woman (the Islamic ideal) based on her own opinions and experiences of 
what Muslim women are like. Since Amila addressed her protests more to me than to Raifa 
(because I had asked Raifa if she would have to change her personality to wear hijab), I think 
she also wanted to challenge what she understood to be the Western stereotype of the Muslim 
Woman (as symbol), which differs from the lives of real Muslim women. 
Many Europeans question the usefulness of wearing hijab in Western countries 
because, ironically, the hijab itself draws attention. As a result, hijab-wearing women may 
receive more attention than women who do not wear it. This paradox is probably the reason 
why many Muslim women in the West choose not to cover. Besides, many experience that 
they can be good Muslim women without hijab (cf. Nermina and what she says about the 
importance of having the right intention). However, the experiences of Medina, Dženana and 
Nejra all illustrate that the hijab has a purpose also in Bosnia where women with hijab are a 
minority. Medina told me that she understands her way of dressing to be multifunctional, and 
one of the functions is that it reminds her of her obligations as a woman, mother and wife: 
 
Woman is the pillar or society. If women.. I always say that women are carrying the world on their 
backs, because they are giving birth to children, they are raising children, they are emotionally 
connected to all people in the world, because without women we would not have birth. Somehow, all 
women are connected to all people in the world, emotionally through this kind of relationship. And 
somehow it gives, I’m talking now personally, it gives strength, it reminds us that we have a task to 
fulfil. I don’t know, maybe if I would not be covered, maybe I would come to some path of temptation.  
 
For Medina the scarf works as both protection and guidance. She said that most probably men 
will not make a move on her when they see that she is covered, and neither will she: “I will 
not make a move, because it reminds me of my creator. It will remind me that I’m responsible 
for my children, for my husband, I’m a pillar of society”. 
Dženana said that she has noticed a big difference in the way men behave towards her 
after she started to wear marama. “This kind of dressing is stopping them a little,” she said, 
referring to the possibility that men are afraid to talk to women in hijab since her marital 
status is uncertain and, of course, if she is married, men know she is not allowed to have any 
kind of relationship with another man. Dženana really appreciates how she is being treated as 
a woman with marama, but she also underlined that all women should be treated with respect 
no matter how they dress:  
 
Like my sister in law, she doesn’t wear hijab, she is married, she is faithful to my brother, and in the 
streets it would be very very bad if somebody would make a difference between me and her. That’s 
what we can’t accept also, in Islam, that’s not like, I said before; she is not less worthy than I am. 
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Nejra has also experienced that people are more considerate towards her after she covered. 
She told me that they are a little bit more careful with what they are saying to her. For 
example, they will not make rude jokes and improper comments in her presence. I wondered 
if this behaviour would not make her feel overprotected, but she does not consider it to be 
negative. She was amused as she told me that, when she goes to Belgrade, people ask her 
what cafés they can take her to because they think she cannot go to places where they serve 
alcohol. However, unlike Azra, Nejra does not consider it a problem for her to go to places 
where people drink alcohol.  
To sum up: the hijab functions as a moral boundary because the women who were it 
are aware of the expectations of others. The hijab reminds them of their religious duties as 
Muslim women, and men do not easily approach to flirt with women who are covered.  
 
The threat of rape and individual responsibility 
My informants emphasised that they felt safe and protected wearing hijab. The hijab is an 
important part of their identity as Muslim women, an identity which provides them with 
confidence. But they also believe that the way they dress can actually protect them from 
sexual harassment and rape:  
 
Really I feel that I’m safe like this, because I’m not a reason to anybody to make a problem, I’m not 
reason. At least from my side, he will not be a problem. I will not speak to him with the sentences 
which will attract him, will not look to him like that, will not show to him anything of my body what is 
not allowed to see, and then he will not have a reason. After that, if he still is like that, that means that 
he is sick, and that is his problem (Meliha).     
 
The widespread belief that women can protect themselves by covering their bodies, and the 
Islamic directive to dress modestly, implies that Muslim women are given a moral 
responsibility to dress in a way that will diminish their sexual attractiveness. And if they fail 
to do so, they must take some responsibility for what might happen. While Meliha’s remark 
implies this, Dženana expressed this view more explicitly:  
 
Maybe you will go in miniskirt and ten out of twenty men will not even notice you. But maybe you will 
pass by some lunatic or maniac, people who are not very healthy, you know, and the reason, that’s why 
it is very important, for example in Islam it says: “you are responsible for your actions”. If a person 
goes naked in the street, that person is responsible for what is going to happen. You are responsible for 
that part of you life.   
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When I asked Amila and Raifa whether a woman in a miniskirt is to blame if she is attacked, 
they first sad “yes”, but then they modified their answers: 
 
We only want to say that that (the wearing of miniskirt) was the first step. You know, she was like that, 
and he, he is really, on je pravi krivac (translation: he is the real culprit), we all agree about that 
(Amila). 
 
Men have passion for women and we can’t change that. When God said: everything good that happens 
to us is from God, everything bad is our fault (Raifa).   
 
Amila used the metaphor of a cake to explain the connection between women’s clothing and 
men’s behaviour: when we see a cake we are tempted to eat it. If the cake is covered we don’t 
know what it is like so we are not so easily tempted. 
Ajla, on the other hand, does not recognise that the hijab has the function of protecting 
women. She strongly disagrees with the widespread belief that hijab and decent dress can 
protect women from physical assaults: 
 
And most of times they are giving, here, at least in the Bosnia most of times they are giving reasons 
like: “you see what bad things are happening to the girls on the street, you know, and those things 
would not happen to her if she was wearing hijab and she was dressed properly”, you know, but we 
have a problem with.., how can you explain all rapes for example in Arabic countries, there is a lot of 
raping in Arabic countries, and other countries, how do you explain that? So it’s easier sometimes I 
think, for a man, that it is easier to cover the woman from head to her toes, than to educate men not to 
do what they do. 
 
Ajla considers it a severe problem that women’s behaviour and clothing are connected to 
rape:  
 
What do you have today? You have the same opinions you had a hundred and hundreds of years ago. If 
a woman reports about a rape, what are they going to ask her? Where it happened, what time was it, 
what you were wearing. And they are going to try to make the reason for her rape out of all those things, 
and they are not trying to find the reasons for those things in the man.  
(…) 
You have years and years and years of the holy Quran, yes you do, but you have the same male opinion 
about that.  
 
The view Ajla referred to is found all over the world, and not a particular feature of Bosnian 
society or Muslim culture. However, the impact of feminism, which is strongest in Western 
societies, has contributed to a change of attitude: it is regarded as irrelevant if a woman is 
under the influence of alcohol, half-naked and flirting with a man; he must still respect her 
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boundaries and if he doesn’t, he is solely to blame. If a woman is raped she should not be 
asked about the length of her skirt, because that is considered irrelevant.43  
Minganti noticed that “the threat of rape” was an ever-present warning in the young 
women’s surroundings, not only as an actual danger, which it certainly is, but also as a means 
to suppress women’s agency and “teach” them fear and helplessness. The tradition of mahram 
presupposes that the world is a dangerous place for women. However, Muslim women in 
Sweden had had the chance to move around on their own in society and experience that the 
world out there is, in fact, not so dangerous. Minganti’s point is that a dangerous world 
legitimises a system built on women’s need for protection, but this system also makes women 
think that the world is more dangerous than it really is because the women don’t have the 
chance to experience that they can manage on their own (Minganti 2007:190-192). The threat 
of rape and sexual harassment can also be used to convince women about why it is important 
to wear hijab: “for their own protection”. This was mentioned as an important reason by many 
of my informants when I asked them to explain the benefits of covering.  
I believe there is a risk in encouraging women to dress “decently” in order to avoid 
sexual harassment and rape. First, it provides women with false security. Second, and most 
important, if it is a widely held belief that women can prevent these problems by covering 
their bodies the responsibility is automatically placed on the woman (victim) rather than on 
the aggressor (male). She will more easily be seen as guilty of dressing indecently according 
to Islamic standards, and she might be thought of as encouraging sexual harassment and 
“deserving of it”. An in-depth study about sexual harassment in Egypt conducted by the 
Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights substantiates this view. Over 2000 Egyptian women and 
men and 119 foreign women were interviewed for the survey which concludes that sexual 
harassment is an overwhelming problem in Egypt: 62% of the men reported perpetrating 
harassment, while 98% of foreign women and 83% of Egyptian women reported having been 
sexually harassed. Nearly half of the Egyptian women said this happened on a daily basis 
                                                 
43 In Oslo in the summer 2007, several young women were attacked and raped on their way home from town late 
at night. In the public discourse that followed, some gave women advice like to take taxis home and never walk 
alone late at night. However, the main focus was not on what the women should do; rather, authorities and 
journalists focused on the government’s responsibility to make society safer and target the men in question. A 
torchlight procession was arranged under the parole “Ta natta tilbake” (translated: Reclaim the night). The 
message was that Oslo by night is a legitimate arena for women as it is for men. However, chauvinistic and 
discriminatory attitudes towards women are of course also found in Norway. An article in the Norwegian paper 
“Aftenposten” (2006) cites a study about the attitudes of jury-members in trials where the defendant is accused 
of rape. These trials often lead to acquittal because the members of the jury are prejudiced against the female 
victim. The victim is often met with moral condemnation. Maybe surprisingly; the female members of the jury 
were much more prejudiced against the victim than the male members      
(http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article1578773.ece). 
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(Johnston 2008). Responding to these findings, a parliament member stated that, in order to 
avoid sexual harassment, “Women should dress modestly because there is a big sector of 
youth who has passed the marriage age, and therefore, some harassment is possible” (Abu El-
Komsan 2008: 1st paragraph). The Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights rejects the idea that 
women’s dress or men’s marital status is the cause for sexual harassment. According to the 
survey, there is no correlation between harassment and dress: 72,5% of the women in the 
survey wears hijab and some of the harassed women also wear niqab. The survey did not 
show any correlation between men’s marital status and their inclination to harass women 
(Abu El-Komsan 2008). However, “out of Egyptian women and men interviewed, most 
believe that women who wear tight clothes deserve to be harassed” (Johnston 2008: 10th 
paragraph). 
According to Catherine Bullock, a Canadian convert to Islam and the author of 
“Rethinking Muslim women and the veil” (2007), the widespread negative perception of hijab 
in the West is the result of a secular feminist discourse which depicts Muslim women as 
oppressed and the hijab as a device which facilitates and symbolises that oppression. Bullock 
is convinced that the stereotype of Muslim women wearing hijab is part of a public rhetoric 
that seeks to demonise Islam in order to maintain Western global hegemony (Bullock 2007). 
Recognising that public discourse in the West mostly portrays Islam and the situation for 
Muslim women in a negative light, I will nevertheless argue that the main reason why many 
women in the West don’t approve of the hijab is firstly because it implies uniformation which 
contradicts the Western ideal of individualism, and secondly because the Islamic dress code 
makes a moral distinction between the “Good Woman” and the “Bad Woman” (who 
“deserves” to be sexually harassed).  
 
Because of the precariousness of the link between women and Woman (that is, the threat that women 
will shake off Woman), religious ideologies typically include a fallback position for when symbolism of 
the “good” Woman doesn’t take–for situations in which women do not sufficiently internalize Woman. 
That fallback position is the “bad” Woman–the demonness, the source of original sin, Lilith, the witch 
(Sered 1999:195). 
 
A woman who exposes her body; who interacts freely with the opposite sex and engages in 
sexual relations without being married (a description suitable for the majority of women in the 
West) is, according to Islam, a “Bad Woman”. Yet, when Muslim women reject the Islamic 
ideal of Woman, Muslim fundamentalist discourse does not depict this as only the women’s 
fault, rather, it is a result of Western influence and domination. In this discourse, the West is 
perceived as the real “demonness” (Sered 1999:202). 
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In Muslim countries where the majority wears hijab and the imperative to do so is 
very strong, women who choose not to cover undoubtedly run the risk of being labelled “Bad 
Woman.” In Bosnia, where the majority of women don’t wear hijab, the dichotomy between 
“Good Woman” and “Bad Woman” does not seem to be very prominent. My informants 
emphasised that you cannot tell who is a good Muslim woman based on what she is wearing, 
i.e. the hijab is not a (absolute) sign of “Good Woman”.  
 
Finding a spouse the Islamic way 
There is a strong imperative for marriage in Islam and marriage is regarded as a principal goal 
in the lives of women and men. The Prophet’s tradition contains a prohibition against celibacy 
and the only accepted place for sexual enjoyment is the marriage. Many of the world’s 
Muslims practice what is called arranged marriages44, i.e. the family, the kin group, the cast or 
clan, is decisive for choosing marital partners. This arrangement implies that marriage is not, 
first and foremost a contract between two individuals; rather, it is a contract between two 
groups, which can be families or larger groups. The tradition of arranged marriages is also 
connected to the gender segregation that pervades Muslim countries, since the only way to 
find a spouse is through family and friends. The arranged marriage is in contrast to the 
romantic marriage, a marriage based on the love between two individuals. The romantic 
marriage is the ideal in Western societies where individualism is an important value (Jacobsen 
2002:181-182).  
Arranged marriages are not a tradition among Bosnian Muslims. They are like other 
Europeans and find their marriage partners themselves. Sorabji mentions that in the 1980s, 
when inter-religious marriages were frequent, most young people in Sarajevo found their 
spouse at school, college or place of work, or through mutual friends. The parents were not 
supposed to know about a couple before the marriage was imminent. First cousin marriage 
was illegal in Yugoslavia, and the Muslims also prohibited marriage with more distant kin 
(Sorabji 1989). Bringa who studied rural Bosnia in the late 1980s points out that Bosnian 
Muslims marry within their own ethno-religious group. The norm to only marry other 
Muslims was particularly prevalent in rural areas. The attitude towards mixed marriages was 
more liberal in cities.45 In the village Bringa stayed, there were only three mixed marriages in 
                                                 
44 This is not an exclusively Muslim phenomenon, but a practice that is common among different religious and 
ethnic groups. 
45 Fine claims that 30-40% of urban marriages in Bosnia have been mixed since the Second World War (Donia 
& Fine 1994:9). 
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the late 1980s, all consisting of Muslim men married to non-Muslim women. The fact that it 
was the man who was Muslim is not coincidental since according to Islamic law it is haram 
(forbidden) for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man, while a Muslim man can marry 
a non-Muslim woman who belongs to “the people of the book”, i.e. a Christian or Jewish 
woman46 (Bringa 1995:149-152). For my informants, this rule clearly applies. However, since 
they all are religious, and many of them very devout, this is not merely a question of 
following rules; it also concerns their desire to spend their life and raise their children with 
someone who shares their faith and values.  
Since Bosnian Muslims don’t have arranged marriages and many of my informants 
uphold the ideal of gender segregation, a relevant question is: How do they find a spouse?  
Roald claims it is almost taboo for Muslim teenagers to have a boyfriend/girlfriend 
(Roald 2005:121). In Bosnia the situation is different, and in Sarajevo you can see young 
couples where the girl wears hijab. Typically they are going for a walk, drinking coffee or 
sitting on the many benches by the river and in the parks.47 The general norm seems to be that 
when a girl is wearing hijab the couple cannot be intimate with each other – not even hold 
hands. How strict a couple chooses to practice this ideal will naturally vary. However, when a 
girl decides to put on hijab she is aware of the existing norms and expectations to how a 
woman with hijab should behave. So, even if it is her choice whether to be intimate with her 
boyfriend or not, people will most certainly raise an eyebrow if a girl with hijab is seen 
flirting openly or, worse, kissing in public.  
Amra is not married, and she pointed out to me that this is somewhat atypical 
considering her age (late twenties) and the fact that she is devoutly religious. However, 
because two women in her close family are divorced, Amra wishes to be particularly cautious 
in her choice of husband. The problem is that there is no way of knowing if a potential 
husband is a good Muslim just because he “prays five times a day and has a beard and looks 
serious ... life taught me that that is just an appearance and you never know who that person 
might be”. Therefore, she tries to find out as much as possible about the potential husbands 
                                                 
46 Roald draws attention to the fact that while it is written in the Quran that Muslim women cannot marry pagans, 
it is not explicitly mentioned that Muslim women cannot marry men from “people of the book”. Roald’s point is 
that because most Quranic verses are directed towards men, only a few mention women, verse 5:5 which allows 
Muslim men to marry women from “people of the book”, can also be understood as relating to women, just like 
the verses concerning food, drink, prayer and the fast, which are directed to men but are nevertheless also 
understood to be valid for women (Roald 2005:127). IC has taken a stand against all mixed marriages, regardless 
of whether it is the man or the woman who belong to the “people of the book”. 
47 Ajla told me, to demonstrate how out of the place Wahhabi-ideology is in Bosnia, that a “Wahhabi” had 
suggested that the benches in the parks should be removed, because young couples are often seen on the benches 
locked in an embrace kissing.  
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she meets, like their opinions about polygamy, raising children, the fact that she has a job, her 
role in society and other things that are important to her. Amra also prays to God in order to 
find the right husband; she asks him to give her a sign or to lead her in the right direction. And 
if God has chosen the wrong partner: “I ask him to please change his mind”, she joked.  
Before Amra covered, she went to nightclubs and had a boyfriend. That would be 
unthinkable for her today; she now meets potential husbands through family and friends and 
has “formal dates,” an arrangement she is very pleased with: 
 
I really love it, because it saves my dignity, and tomorrow I can, for example if I get married, even if I 
met many men who came to ask, or even if I talk to them about marriage, I can look at them and there is 
nothing that I am ashamed of. 
 
Amra thinks the best solution is if the young man can visit the girl and meet her parents, so 
that the date takes place in a family atmosphere (without the parents constantly listening in on 
them). However, she is also practically inclined: if there is no other possibility, she finds it 
acceptable to date in public – to meet in a café during daytime, for example. When she was a 
student and didn’t have her family with her, she had to do that, she said. When I interviewed 
Jasmina she told me she was going on a blind date that same evening. She had arranged to 
meet a man outside the mosque after prayer. She told me they would probably go for a walk 
or something. She didn’t know much about the man but had been put into contact with him 
through friends.  
Enisa, who decided to put on the scarf on her 17th birthday, recalled how she had 
related to her husband before they got married:  
 
We were in some relationship, but in, with sharia-orders, you know. (…) The first time I touched my 
husband was after marriage. It’s beautiful way of life, you know. You have your obligation; you have 
your conscience about Allah all the time, every time, every second. Allah is seeing what are you doing. 
And I love Allah. I cannot do that because Allah doesn’t allow it and he hates to do that. I don’t want to 
do that. It’s way of life. (…) Because of that I married so early, it was my 21st year of life. I don’t think 
that I’ve lost something in my life.  
 
This arrangement was Enisa’s own decision. It was based on her religious conviction and not 
imposed on her by her family or religious group. In Sarajevo she and other women who 
practice a form of gender segregation based on Islam, could easily have chosen to associate 
with men more freely, to go to pubs and nightclubs and to be intimate with a partner before 
marriage. In Sarajevo many people do so, but they still see themselves as Muslims and are 
accepted as such (at least by the majority).  
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Amra was among this group before she chose a strict Muslim life style. She went to 
nightclubs and had a boyfriend, so she knows what she is talking about. The same is true for 
Dženana, who went to nightclubs and dressed in miniskirts before she became a practicing 
Muslim. Minganti (2007) also writes about many of her informants who had a period in their 
life, often before puberty and before they became practising Muslims, when they dressed in 
short dresses, listened to hip-hop music and went to the disco with their classmates. Unlike 
Bosnian Muslims, these girls’ socialisation hardly presented this behaviour as an actual 
possibility, at least not if they were to maintain good relations with their families and ethnic 
groups. Minganti therefore questions how autonomous their choices really were (Minganti 
2007:188-189). I will claim that the choices my informants have made have a high degree of 
autonomy; they could choose whether to be practicing Muslims or not, and what this should 
involve. It would be fair to say that most of them have chosen, not the easiest path, but the 
one with most obstacles. 
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Chapter 7: The combative one  
So far I have approached the wearing of hijab as a sign of the Islamic virtues of modesty and 
decency, and I have discussed how wearing hijab is intertwined with a Muslim female 
identity and used as a means to regulate male-female relations as well as a way to avoid 
illegitimate sex. This chapter will focus on hijab-wearing as a courageous act of devout 
women, who are ready to face stigmatisation to accomplish what they see as a religious duty. 
I will also present the experience of a woman with niqab, Lejla, who defies the widespread 
prejudices and dislike of the niqab in Bosnia. Lejla uses the niqab in order to develop her 
piousness and reach a higher religious level. While many in the West assume that the niqab is 
most likely forced upon women, Lejla’s story demonstrates that it can be a conscious choice 
made by the woman herself, even in disagreement with her husband and family. Also, the 
hijab is viewed with scepticism by many non-Muslims, who believe that Muslim women 
often have no choice but to cover. There is no doubt that many Muslim women are exposed to 
hijab pressure. This was the experience of some of Minganti’s informants: when they reached 
puberty, they were expected to put on hijab even if they did not want to (Minganti 2007). By 
contrast, my informants have not experienced pressure of this kind, rather the opposite. For 
Bosnian Muslim women, wearing the hijab is a means to reclaim their personhood and avoid 
men regarding them as sexual objects. In this way, wearing hijab can be linked to a feminist 
project, though very few of my informants associated themselves with feminism.  
 
Ambassadors for Islam 
Many Muslims in Europe find it difficult to live according to Islam in a secular environment, 
one which is often sceptical and, sometimes, even hostile towards the visible practice of 
Islam, of which hijab is the most noticeable feature. It is women who are burdened with being 
visibly recognised as Muslims.48 Minganti (2007) quotes a young man in an Islamic youth 
association in Sweden, who calls the women with hijab “ambassadors for Islam.” He 
acknowledges that they endure significant discrimination for being Muslim and admits that it 
is easier for the men because nobody can see that they are Muslims.49 The young Swedish 
                                                 
48 Enisa drew my attention to the fact that you can also notice Muslim men if you look closely. She told me that 
her husband has a small, nice beard, but added that this was not necessary. The men referred to as “Wahhabis” 
are an exception; they are very noticeable with their short trousers and unfashionable bushy beards.  
49 In an article in the Islamic newspaper Salaam (1992) a Swedish Muslim convert addresses the question of why 
Muslim men in general don’t dress in an “Islamic way”. The men she had talked to argued that it was not good 
for dawa if they looked to different (from the rest of the Swedish population), and that they already faced enough 
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women understood their ambassadorship for Islam as part of their dawa-activity. Dawa is 
often associated with text and speech, not clothing and behaviour, which, in fact, is an 
important part of women’s religious contribution (Minganti 2007:231). 
At some point in their lives, Bosnian women with hijab have made a decision to cover. 
Many of the women I talked to started wearing hijab during the communist regime, a time 
when this custom was “completely not recognised in Bosnian society at all” according to 
Meliha, who covered in 1989. Sorabji (1989) writes that Sarajevo’s elderly women covered 
their heads, arms and legs at all times, whereas most young women dressed as “Western” as 
possible. Looking attractive was highly valued (as it also is today), and wearing the headscarf 
was not considered attractive for young women. The exception was the women who Sorabij 
describes as “the new mystics,” who had taken to dress in long skirts, long sleeved blouses 
and headscarves covering all but the face (Sorabji 1989:115). 
Meliha, Enisa, Nejra and Nermina all covered in the last part of the 1980s, at the ages 
of 16 to 19-years. They were young women enrolled in the medresa (Islamic high-school) and 
determined to fulfil their religious duties, even if this meant facing negative reactions from 
society and, worse, putting their future careers at risk. Nermina told me that even the medresa 
director recommended that the students did not wear hijab in those days50: 
 
The director, a very nice lady, recommended not to wear hijab. When I started to wear hijab, I was in 
fourth degree, and once I went out with hijab, a man told me something very bad about Khomeini. It 
was his way of expressing his disapproval. In these days there were few women who wore hijab.   
 
Meliha, who comes from a small town, moved to Sarajevo to attend the medresa, 
where she started to wear hijab in her second year. Only four out of thirty students in her class 
were covered. She described it as very difficult to go outside with hijab in Sarajevo in the 
1980s because people would stare at her and wonder where she came from. Meliha said that 
in Sarajevo you could always see some younger women with hijab. They were connected to 
the medresa or the Islamic faculty and she would often see them walking by in the old part of 
town, Bašćaršia, but outside of Sarajevo, only older women wore the headscarf. She recalled 
that, because it was easier to stay in Sarajevo, she only visited home one time each summer 
and once in the winter. 
                                                                                                                                                        
discrimination as foreigners if they were not to look like desert-sheikhs as well. The author of the article 
criticises this attitude because it expresses contempt for the Muslim women, who indeed look different from the 
majority. She thinks it is only fair that also Muslim men dress in Islamic clothes, and refers to the danger of 
imitating non-Muslim people to support her opinion from an Islamic point of view (Roald 2005:191-192). 
50 Today it is obligatory for students and teachers at the Gazi husrev-beg medresa to wear hijab. Teachers who 
normally don’t wear hijab still have to use it at work.  
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Some of the parents were sceptical and feared that their daughters would experience 
negative consequences because of their choice to wear hijab. Enisa remembered that she had 
been very resolute and would not listen to her parents:  
 
 I put my scarf on in 1989 and my parents were against that, very much, and tried to persuade me not to 
do that: “Maybe later, maybe some more years when you find job, because it is so hard to find job with 
scarf on your head”.  
   
However, today Enisa’s mother also wears hijab. This is the experience of several of the 
informants: Their mothers were initially negative about their choice, but now, they too are 
covered. This indicates that the daughters have transferred their religious knowledge to their 
family. Meliha described it like this: 
 
My family was very traditional family and they really kept with many things from Islam, but like 
traditionally. They didn’t know why and they didn’t ask themselves, they lived like that. After we 
(were) brought up, me, my sister and my brother, we somehow made them think more, and we brought 
books more and we begin to speak and discuss about Islam.     
 
The fact that these mothers followed their daughters’ example must, of course, also be seen in 
connection to the fact that the mothers grew up during communism. Selma, who is seventy 
years-old and has lived the most part of her adult life under communism, does not cover her 
hair. She said that if she were young today, she probably would cover, but when she was 
young it was difficult, even dangerous to do so. Because she has lived so long without scarf 
on her head she said it would feel strange to suddenly put it on now. Besides, at her age, it is 
not considered to be equally necessary, she explained.  
  Most of the women – both those who wear hijab and those who don’t – mentioned that 
it can be much harder to find work for covered women. They consider this to be an important 
reason why most Muslim women in Bosnia do not cover. Meliha said that young women who 
start to wear hijab first have to struggle with their own families, claiming that 90% of the 
families in Bosnia are against hijab; then they struggle to be recognised at the University and 
finally they must fight to get a job: “Even if you get the same chances you always have to be 
better than others, to prove yourself.”  
Amra, who is a journalist and speaks English fluently, said her scarf would prevent her 
from being employed as a news reader on television – irrespective of her qualifications. This 
really irritated her: “They seem to think I will start to praise Allah or something.” But for 
Amra, it is in any case more important to follow God’s law than to give in to prejudices and 
negative circumstances.  
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Elvira also works as a journalist, but her experience is different from Amra’s. Elvira 
works in radio and television, and emphasised that she has excellent communication with 
people and has not had any negative experiences because of her marama. She acknowledged 
that this might be connected to the way she dresses: “This is of course not proper/correct 
hijab, this is more symbolic”51, she said. Compared to Amra, who wears wide, single-
coloured garments in an attempt to look unattractive, Elvira dresses in modern clothes 
combined with hijab. For her it is important to be practical and combine what is traditional 
(from Islam) and modern everyday life with all its chores.   
The women who cover actually view their hijab more as a source of strength than a 
barrier; by wearing hijab they fulfil a religious obligation, so they are certain that God will 
reward their effort and help them. Enisa, who acknowledges that it can be hard to find a job 
with hijab, said she would still recommend her own daughter to cover: “If you are pleasing 
God, he will help you to find job, it is very simple.”   
While the Muslim immigrants in Europe can experience discrimination based on their 
religion, culture, ethnicity and skin-colour, the Bosnian Muslims are at home. Their identity 
as Muslims is closely linked to their national identity (though not everyone emphasised this 
tie). However, because Bosnia is a multi-religious country inhabited by three major 
national/religious groups, the Bosnian Muslims do not necessarily have to travel far to 
experience “Islamophobia”. Because of the recent war, tensions exist between the different 
national groups, and the Muslims with hijab are especially vulnerable. Amra told me about 
two incidents in which she had experienced harassment because she wears hijab: in a town in 
Montenegro, two women had raised their voices and exclaimed that they did not understand 
how some people could dress “like cavemen”. Amra realised the statement was directed at her 
and replied that cavemen didn’t wear much, if any clothing; if they were looking for cavemen 
they would have to look around them, not at her. When Amra was a student she lived in 
Dobrinja, an area close to Sarajevo airport and the border to Republika Srpska. When she 
wanted to call her family in Montenegro, it was cheaper to cross the border to Republika 
Srpska and use a phone booth there (because then she would not have to pay for a long-
distance call). The first time she made this trip whilst covered, she was met with unpleasant 
reactions. People banged on the windows to a café she visited and a Muslim man exclaimed, 
“What are you doing here?” (implying that it was not safe). Amra said a male friend had 
refused to accompany her because he thought it was “like going with a terror bomb.”  Both 
                                                 
51 My translation from Bosnian: Ovo naravno nije pravi hijab, ovo je više simbolika. 
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incidents illustrate that women with hijab can be met with negative reactions, but the women I 
interviewed were prepared to pay the consequences.  
 
Niqab, -an un-Islamic practice or the utmost act of devotion? 
While the hijab has become a common sight in European cities, women wearing niqab are 
likely to cause negative reactions. Niqab is not considered obligatory by any of my 
informants. They all find it very impractical, except for Lejla, who covers her face in public. 
Many stressed that niqab prevents you from being useful in society, which they consider to be 
a very important Islamic duty. In that sense, then, some of my informants have a negative 
view on niqab, some deem it even to be un-Islamic.  
Those informants who consider the most important function of the hijab is “to avoid 
being attractive to men other than your husband” can see some utility in the niqab. When 
Amra and I reflected over how the hijab attracts attention to a woman’s eyes, which can often 
be her most beautiful feature, Amra said that this is the reason why some women cover their 
face; they are so beautiful that it is “not enough” to only hide their hair and body. 
Most of my informants were careful not to judge or disdain women with niqab. A 
common attitude was tolerance: if they who are pious women could not accept that someone 
chooses to be different from the Muslim majority, how can they expect non-Muslims to 
tolerate their use of marama? Even those who consider niqab to be something negative for 
women and society as a whole could still admire the strong faith of the women who are 
willing to become “nobody” in order to please God. The Swedish women Minganti (2007) 
interviewed also admired women with niqab and looked at them as women who fight their 
egos by submitting totally to God’s will. They themselves did not want to wear niqab because 
they considered it more important to be a part of society and perform dawa (Minganti 
2007:258-263). 
Since Lejla is the only woman I have interviewed who wears niqab, I will attempt to 
communicate her experience here: Lejla has been wearing niqab for ten years. Before she 
made the decision to wear it, she had been wearing hijab for three years. For Lejla, it is 
obvious that niqab has an important function in Islam, both spiritually and socially. However, 
she does not consider it to be a religious duty. She described niqab as “the top of a pyramid”: 
while hijab is obligatory for all Muslim women, the covering of the face is for those who wish 
to do something extra, to go further, and “be closer to God”. In this way, the niqab has a 
spiritual meaning for those who wear it. Lejla said it was difficult when she first started to 
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cover her face. It was the right thing to do in a personal sense, but she worried about negative 
reactions from others. In the beginning, her husband was also sceptical, but Lejla’s neighbour, 
who had studied in Saudi-Arabia, inspired her. Her neighbour said she felt more free with her 
face covered, and this is also Lejla’s experience. She does not like it when men stare at 
women and make improper remarks; as a woman with niqab, she is never exposed to that kind 
of attention. She also finds niqab (and hijab) to be very practical when men and women work 
together since men are often jealous. The niqab makes it possible for women to work and be 
useful in society and at the same time protects their marriage, Lejla explained. At the time I 
interviewed her, she was running two businesses and opening a third. “I just want to tell 
people that woman in niqab is not only in the house, and that niqab is not prison.”52 
As one of relatively few women in Bosnia with niqab, Lejla is particularly noticeable 
in public. She said that a few years ago, people looked at her “as if she had fallen from the 
sky”. But Lejla does not mind being different. Her idea of freedom is that we can all choose 
what to wear, whether that choice is to wear marama and niqab or to not wear it. Lejla's 
point-of-view is that God never intended for us to be the same. He made us different in order 
to test us; to see if we can all live together and respect each other. As she put it: “I respect 
your choice, because I respect my choice.”   
Several of the informants stressed that niqab is a part of Arabic tradition – not a part of 
Islam. Because niqab was not common in Bosnia before the 1992-1995 war, it is clear to 
many that this is a recent phenomenon resulting from Wahhabi-influence. Those critical of the 
“Wahhabis” also have a negative attitude to niqab-wearing. However, several informants 
pointed out that in Ottoman Bosnia, women did cover their faces; consequently, niqab is not a 
completely new phenomenon. They said that people today are not used to it because it was 
forbidden during communism, but it is actually a part of their own tradition. Some of them 
recalled that their great-grandmothers wore niqab. Fadila said that her great-grandmother did 
not wear it all the time, but put it on when she went to the market or into the city. This agrees 
with what Sorabji writes about the use of niqab in Ottoman Bosnia: its primary function was 
not to segregate women; rather, it helped segregate different ethnic groups (Sorabji 1989: 34, 
115). 
                                                 
52 My translation from Bosnian: Samo hoću da kažem ljudima da žena pod nikabom nije samo u kući, i da nikab 
nije zatvor. 
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Refusing to be sexual objects (feminism) 
Feminism is concerned with the problem of objectification of women. Despite the Sexual 
Revolution and laws which secure formal equality between men and women, the problem has 
not diminished in modern society. In fact, capitalism and Western consumerism contribute to 
this problem: when the female body is used in advertising, art, film, pornography, and so on, 
it is presented in such a way as to satisfy the (heterosexual) male gaze and desire (Bullock 
2007). The argument is that women internalise men’s desire and judge themselves and each 
other according to male standards; therefore, the male gaze is decisive for how women 
perceive themselves. The fashion and beauty industry provide women with an ideal of beauty 
which only few can live up to, resulting in low self-esteem and devaluation of themselves. In 
this connection, Bullock (2007) observes that wearing hijab is a way for women to reclaim 
their personhood because, when women wear hijab, they no longer satisfy the male gaze – 
that is, they are no longer sexual objects. Hijab and modest clothing also help women to 
escape the destructive pressure to be fashionable, skinny and beautiful. When women cover, 
they can no longer be judged by their looks, so covering is a way for women to empower 
themselves and Bullock concludes that the hijab is liberating for women (Bullock 2007:183-
187) 
That the wearing of hijab can transform women from objects to subjects was also the 
experience of some of my informants:  
 
If I talk with someone, he cannot look at my breasts, first because I cover my breast, and he has to look 
at my face and think what I’m talking about. He looks at you like person, not like body. (…) I think that 
it is very common situation that men look at women just like body (Enisa). 
 
Nowadays, especially nowadays, the girls and women they are so cheap to me. Very very low and 
cheap, because it is like they are selling themselves, like they are objects. And if you are not beautiful 
like Kate Moss or if you don’t have that figure, you are not worthy. And that are values which I don’t 
like. And when you recognise that God created everybody, and that everybody is special.., you can find 
that in religion, you can’t find that in everyday life and what they call fashion or whatever (Dženana).  
 
Until Dženana was 23, she dressed in miniskirts and went to nightclubs. She told me that she 
disliked it when men looked at her and gave her comments like “sexy legs.” After she started 
to wear hijab and cover her body, she receives comments like “you are beautiful,” a 
compliment she can appreciate. When I said that in my opinion, women who dress sexy and 
women who cover their hair and body might be part of the same problem – both ways of 
dressing make women into sexual objects the only difference being that one is an object on 
display while the other is an object which must be concealed – Dženana reminded me of the 
difference between men and women: men are generally more passionate than women, she 
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said. She thinks that this may be the reason why the Prophet told women to cover; men looked 
at women without respect. But according to Dženana, a true believer should not stare at any 
woman, regardless of how she is dressed. This would mean that if everybody were true 
believers, women would not need to wear the headscarf. Dzenana’s way of dressing - with 
hijab combined with make-up, jewellery and beautiful clothes - may be a good compromise 
between extremes: ”I call myself the middle, in middle, because you will not find a woman 
from, like I said, the East, who will wear the way I do.”          
Few of my informants call themselves feminists.53 The reason may be that they don’t 
agree with the goals of feminism. Instead of seeing man and woman as equals who deserve 
identical rights and opportunities, they understand man and woman to have different and 
complementary roles in this life: they are equal only before God (Bullock 2007:58-59). 
According to Medina, Amra and Dženana this view is supported by modern psychology and 
science, which inform us about the inborn differences between men and women; e.g., that 
men and women use different sides of the brain, and that men and women have unequal 
distribution of hormones. For them this explains why men, and not women, are natural leaders 
according to Islam. This corresponds with Minganti’s (2007) informants who also hesitated to 
associate themselves with feminism. In the Muslim women’s circles, a feminist was 
considered to be a Muslim woman’s complete opposite and a threat to Islamic core values, 
including sexual morals, family, motherhood and “natural” femininity (Minganti 2007:81-82).  
Many Muslims understand feminism to be “Western” and therefore against Islam. 
Labelling feminism Western, serves to distance Muslim women from feminist ideas. Given 
that many Western feminists view the combination of Islam and feminism as an anathema, it 
is not surprising that feminism is an unattractive ideology for Muslims. However, Margot 
Badran argues that feminism is not a Western phenomenon. The term stems from France in 
the late 1880s, but since then, feminist ideology has found various expressions in various 
places around the world. The term “Islamic feminism” appeared in the 1990s and conveys a 
feminist discourse and practice articulated within an Islamic paradigm. The advocates of 
Islamic feminism believe that the Quran guarantees the equality of women and men, but 
because patriarchal ideas and practices have impeded or subverted the original message, it is 
necessary to re-read the Quran from a feminine point-of-view (Badran 2007).  
                                                 
53 It is my impression that it is not so common for women to call themselves feminists in Bosnia, as it is in 
Norway, for example. Feminists seem to be somewhat ridiculed as women who reject their femininity by 
imitating men. Nirman Moranjik Bamburac is a feminist who teaches feminist literary criticism at the University 
of Sarajevo. She says that although feminist books came to Bosnia more than two decades ago, feminism 
remains controversial in the academy as well as the broader society (Badran 2007:93).   
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Emira is very concerned with the position of Muslim women and criticises the 
prevalent Islamic understanding of woman, but she will still not call herself a feminist:   
 
Evelyn: But would you call yourself a feminist, a Muslim feminist, or neither? 
Emira: I don’t think on that way, but I think that place of woman in Islamic world today, in Islamic 
understanding of woman, isn’t good, isn’t true. I think Muslims must think a lot about that question. 
Muslim woman must be the same to man, to have enough school, to be educated, to have the same 
chance, to have job, must have chance to have freedom, to go for a walk, but I think that she must have 
in her mind, always to be honest, to be Muslim, to be Muslim woman, to be Muslim wife, to be a good 
mother. But she must have freedom. (…) She is a person; she is God’s person. 
 
Emira is clearly dissatisfied with the role of woman in Islam and recognises that there is a 
need for change and new interpretations, but she also stressed that it is important for a Muslim 
woman to be a good mother, wife and a Muslim woman (as opposed to a secular woman).   
Ajla and Nejra both declared themselves to be feminists. Interestingly, however, Ajla 
simply calls herself feminist while Nejra identifies herself a Muslim feminist. Nejra told me 
that this is because she believes that the human rights can be realised within an Islamic 
framework. She said that while religious and secular feminists in Bosnia cooperate and have 
common goals, many secular feminists elsewhere in the world have no room for religion 
within their feminist project. According to Nejra, in Muslim countries, there is an especially 
great distance between Muslim women and secular feminists. She gave me an example of 
what it means to be a Muslim feminist in practice: it means that due to her religious 
conviction, she cannot engage in the fight for the rights of homosexuals. 
Ajla had thought about whether or not to call herself a Muslim feminist, but she had 
come to the conclusion that it is sufficient to apply the term feminist: “Yes I do call myself a 
feminist, and yes I do call myself a Muslim, but if I call myself Muslim feminist? I don’t 
know if there is need for that.” For Ajla there is no contradiction in being Muslim and to fight 
for equal rights of men and women. Additionally, she added, if someone talks to her, they will 
soon enough realise that she is a feminist because of her opinions, and that she is a Muslim 
because she has a typical Muslim name.  
Most Western feminists disapprove of the hijab, and so do many Muslim feminists 
(Bullock 2002). Neither Ajla nor Nejra criticise the hijab from a feminist point-of-view. The 
reason seems to be that they disregard certain aspects of this custom: they both stressed that 
wearing hijab only concerns a woman’s relationship with God, and that women are not 
responsible for men’s reaction to the way they look. As mentioned previously, Ajla considers 
wearing hijab to be a voluntary religious practice while Nejra understands it as obligatory, 
though not an Islamic core value. 
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Conclusion 
To be a Bosnian Muslim woman involves different things for different women. My 
informants put unequal emphasis on the European/Bosnian and the Islamic dimension of their 
identities. While some informants identify with the Bosnian Muslim community, others find 
their source of identity and belonging in the umma, the worldwide Muslim community. Some 
Bosnian Muslims also find inspiration in the Arab world and a particular interpretation of 
Islam (“Wahhabis”) while others, again, relate to Islam in a secular manner 
(“secularised/cultural Muslims”). This plurality within the Islamic scene in Bosnia can be 
seen as a direct result of the Bosnian war, which resulted in foreign Islamic influence in the 
form of mujahedin, Muslim aid-workers, charities and NGO’s. However, it is also a result of 
globalisation (connecting the local with the global), which has led to the presence of multiple 
sources of Islamic authority in Bosnia. This indicates that it is not given what it means to be a 
Bosnian Muslim; Bosnian Muslims must reflexively construct their identity, choosing 
between different options. 
 Concerning the relationship between Europe and Islam, a distinction can be made 
between those informants I identify with “Bosnian Islam” and those I categorise as belonging 
to “global Islam”: while the “Bosnian Muslims” think that the European context necessarily 
must influence how they practice their religion, resulting in a symbiosis of Islam and modern 
society, the “umma-Muslims” distinguish between Islam and modern society, which they 
think should have as little impact as possible on Islam (though they too adjust to the Bosnian 
reality). However, due to Western-European countries’ passivity during the Bosnian war, the 
“war on terror” and dominant Western meta-narratives about Islam, (which tend to depict 
Muslims as adherents of a foreign religion and as enemies to the West), both “Bosnian 
Muslims” and “umma-Muslims” have a somewhat restrained relationship towards Europe and 
the West. This is especially because the “war on terror” does not distinguish between different 
Muslims (different ways of being Muslims) and because the universal labelling of Muslims as 
terrorists affect all Muslims. 
 By relating my informants to the Islamic female ideal roles – that is, “the modest one,” 
“the protective one” and “the combative one” – concrete differences between the categories 
“Bosnian Islam” and “global Islam” become visible. While the “umma-Muslims” see wearing 
hijab as an Islamic core-value and a religious duty for Muslim women everywhere, there are a 
plurality of opinions among those in favour of “Bosnian Islam”: many see it as obligatory; 
some consider it a religious duty, but underline that wearing hijab is not essential for Islam; 
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and still others think that wearing hijab has lost its original meaning and function in modern 
society. The conventional Islamic understanding is that Muslim women should wear hijab to 
regulate male-female relations and protect themselves, men and society as a whole. Because 
the hijab makes women less attractive, wearing hijab is a means to hinder illegitimate sexual 
relations. The “umma-Muslims” agree with this understanding and consequently they wear 
hijab and clothes which don’t attract attention to their physical attributes. Several of the 
“Bosnian Muslims” also hold this view, while others emphasise that women are not 
responsible for the response their looks might cause in men. While some of these women 
don’t wear hijab, many wear hijab in combination with fashionable modern clothes. They 
think it is positive to combine Islam and modern society in their manner of dress because they 
wear hijab and are nevertheless identifiable as Muslim women.  
 Concerning the hijab as a means to protect women, all the informants who wear hijab 
consider their clothing to be a moral boundary. On the one hand, the hijab reminds them of 
their duties as Muslim women, but it also functions as a visible boundary for non-related men, 
who often treat conservatively dressed women more respectfully than women in modern 
attire. Because of what the hijab symbolises and because their physical attributes are not 
visible for everyone to see, many women believe that wearing hijab can protect women from 
harassment and physical assaults. However, not all informants hold this view. The informants 
inspired by feminism underlined that there is no correlation between a woman’s dress and the 
probability that she might be exposed to physical assaults.  
 The informants who wear hijab, regardless of whether they wear it combined with 
modern or conservative clothing, are likely to experience stigmatisation and negative 
reactions because of their headgear. This is because they are visible identified as Muslims and 
because of widespread prejudices against Muslims and the hijab in Europe. While Western 
feminists understand the hijab to be a device which distinguishes between “Good Woman” 
(the woman who wears hijab) and “Bad Woman” (the woman who wears modern clothes), 
my informants consider wearing hijab to be liberating. This is because they cannot be judged 
by their looks when they wear hijab, and they escape the “male gaze” by covering their 
physical attributes. However, none of the informants directly connect the hijab with a feminist 
project. I think this is because wearing hijab is, first of all, considered as an act of devotion. 
While the “umma-Muslims” think that men and women should have different and 
complementary roles because of their different natures, several of the “Bosnian Muslims” 
underlined the need for new interpretations concerning Islam and the role of woman.  
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Although some of those in favour of “Bosnian Islam” are clearly inspired by feminist ideas, 
feminism did not appeal to the majority of the informants.  
 The “umma-Muslims” have a lot in common with the Swedish Muslim women in 
Muslima (Minganti 2007) in the sense that they all focus on a global Muslim identity, 
independent of culture, ethnicity and nationality. However, regarding style of dress, Swedish 
women dressed similarly to some of the women I identify as “Bosnian Muslims”; i.e., in 
matching outfits in beautiful colours. Minganti argues that the concept of “honour and shame” 
was prominent in the Swedish Muslim women’s families and ethnic groups, and that the 
women never detached the hijab and their manner of dressing from patriarchal honour ethics 
(2007:265). None of my informants, whether they identify with “Bosnian Islam” or “global 
Islam”, connect their hijab with patriarchal honour-ethics. In Bosnia wearing hijab is an 
autonomous choice, made by the woman alone – often even in disagreement with her family.  
The younger generation has reintroduced a custom which many of their parents' generation 
consider to be unnecessary for Bosnian Muslims. 
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Glossary 
The glossary contains non-English words that appear in the text, whether these are of 
Bosnian, Arabic or Turkish/Ottoman origin. It is based on the glossaries found in some of the 
literature I use, such as Malcolm (1996), Bringa (1995) and Roald (2004), and my own 
knowledge of the Bosnian language and Islamic terms. Most of the Islamic terms have the 
same pronunciation in Bosnian, but are then written with Bosnian letters (for example hijab – 
hidžab). The Turkish words are for the most part integrated into the Bosnian language.    
 
 
abaya: a long coat worn by women on the Arabian Peninsula 
alahemanet: Muslim greeting when leaving, from Ottoman time 
al-haya: shyness, modesty 
al-mujahida: a woman who is fighting for the Islamic cause 
al-salaf al-salih: the three first Muslim generations 
beg: lord or landowner 
beglerbeg: the highest category of pasha, the vizier or governor of Bosnia 
bezistan: cloth-market 
bida: religious innovation, heresy 
bosanac: Bosnian (male) 
bosanka: Bosnian (female) 
bošnjak: Bosniak (national name for male Bosnian of the Islamic faith) 
bošnjakinja: Bosniak (national name for female Bosnian of the Islamic faith) 
bošnjaštvo: “Bosnianism” 
burqa: a piece of cloth that covers the whole woman (only a lattice in the fabric provides her 
with minimal eyesight). Women in Afghanistan were forced to wear this garment during the 
Taliban regime.   
chador: a piece of cloth which hangs from the head and is draped around the body, worn by 
Iranian women 
Četnik: member of the Second World War Serb resistance movement  
Dar al-harb: the abode of war, area where the Islamic law doesn’t apply 
Dar al-Islam: the abode of Islam, area where the Islamic law applies 
dawa: Islamic missionary work 
dobar dan: good day 
do viñenja: good bye  
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džamija: mosque 
fard: obligatory, religious duty 
fatwa: juridical declaration based on interpretation of Islamic law  
Federacija: The Croat-Bosniak Federation 
fitna: chaos linked to female sexuality 
hadith: story about the prophet Muhammed, his sunna (tradition) 
hajaba: to hide 
Hanbali: the official school of law in Saudi-Arabia 
Hanafi: one of the Sunni schools of law, the one followed by the Bosnian Muslims  
haram: forbidden according to Islam, what is ritually impure  
hijab: the female headscarf, original meaning: curtain 
hijra: migration 
hodža: imam 
ibadat: the ritual duties 
ijtihad: interpretation of the Islamic sources based on text and tradition 
jihad: holy war 
jilbab: a long coat with a hood, often embroidered 
Jurjevdan: Orthodox celebration of spring and fertility on 6 May 
khimar: a piece of cloth that covers a woman’s head 
mahala: residential area 
mahram: any of a woman’s male relatives 
marama: headscarf 
medresa: Islamic high school 
mekteb: Islamic school for children 
merhaba: welcome, common greeting in Ottoman time  
millet: religious group, term for the non-Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire  
Mladi Muslimani: The Young Muslims, a lay Muslim organisation  
mufti: Islamic scholar who can issue a fatwa (juridical declaration) 
mujahedin: holy warrior, someone fighting for the Islamic cause 
musliman: Muslim 
Musliman: Muslim in the national sense, designation of Yugoslav communists 
nacija: ethnic-religious community (nation) 
narod: nation (narodi pl.) 
narodnost: nationality 
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niqab: facial veil 
niya: intention 
pasha: general term for territorial governor  
pokrivene žene: covered women 
preporod: “rebirth”, Islamic newspaper 
Reis ul-ulema: Head of the Islamic scholars 
Republika Srpska: The Serb Entity 
salafi: a term employed for both Muslim modernist reformists, and a culturally defensive and 
anti-modernist Islamic movement 
Sandžak: district (literally), and name of the border-area between Serbia and Montenegro  
shaikh al-Islam: the highest religious authority in the Ottoman empire 
shalwar-khamis: an outfit consisting of trousers, a long shirt that reaches down to the knees   
and a shawl which hangs loosely over the head or the shoulders (Pakistan’s national dress) 
sharia: Islamic law 
sramota: shame 
sunna: the Prophet’s tradition, expressed in the hadiths   
šal: shawl 
surah: chapter in the Quran 
Ustaša: Croatian Fascist movement from the Second World War 
takvim: Islamic almanac 
tekija: dervish lodge 
ulema: Islamic scholars (alim sg.)  
umma: Islamic community of the faithful 
vakuf: religious-charitable foundation  
Vehabija: Wahhabi, the official religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia 
vizier: the highest rank of administrator in the Ottoman Empire 
Wahhabi: the official religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia  
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Abbreviations 
AIY: Active Islamic Youth 
HSC: The High Saudi Committee for Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina  
IC: Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica, IZ) 
JNA: Jugoslavenska narodna armija, the Yugoslav national army 
KPJ: Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, the Communist party of Yugoslavia, 
LCY: League of Communists of Yugoslavia  
NDH: Nezavizimaja država Hrvatska, the Independent state of Croatia  
SDA: Stranka demokratske akcije, the Democratic action party 
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Appendix: Informants 
In the following I give a brief presentation of my informants. All informants are given 
pseudonyms, and information that might reveal their identities is left out. The information 
given is valid for the period of the fieldwork: fall 2005 and spring 2006. How many times I 
have interviewed different informants, length of interview and whether the interview was 
recorded, are also accounted for. 
 
Enisa is in her mid-thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 17. She 
works and is married, with children. Enisa is critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia, 
but is open for different ways of practising Islam. -One recorded interview, two hours. 
 
Emira is in her late thirties. She does not wear hijab and considers it unnecessary for women 
in Europe. She has a job and is writing her Ph.D. She is married, with children. Emira is very 
critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -One recorded interview, one hour. 
 
Ajla is in her mid-twenties. She does not wear hijab and considers it not to be obligatory for 
Muslim women anywhere. She is doing her Diploma at the University and working as a 
volunteer in a non-Muslim NGO. Ajla is very critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia.   
-Two interviews, partly recorded, and three more meetings. 
 
Nermina is in her late thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 19 
when she was a student at the medresa. She works and is married, with children. Nermina is 
very critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -One recorded interview, two hours. 
 
Dženana is in her mid-thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair after the war, 
when she returned to Sarajevo from her exile in a Western-European country. She works and 
is married, with children. Dženana is neither positive nor negative towards Wahhabi-influence 
in Bosnia. -One recorded interview, two hours. 
 
Nejra is in her late thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 18. She 
works at a non-Muslim NGO and is doing a Ph.D. She is married, with children. Neira is 
critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -Two interviews, not recorded. 
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Fadila is in her late twenties. She does not cover her hair, but thinks it is obligatory and that 
she therefore should do it. Fadila is married and works. She has a University-degree. Fadila is 
neither negative nor positive towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -One recorded interview, 
two and a half hour. 
 
Raifa is 18. She does not cover her hair, but considers it obligatory for all Muslim women. 
She is in her last year of High School. She is also undergoing religious education at a Muslim 
NGO. -One group interview, one and a half hour. 
 
Amila is in her mid-twenties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 18. 
She is studying at the University. She has undergone religious education at a Muslim NGO.    
-One group interview, one and a half hour. 
 
Elvira is in her late thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 33. She 
has studied for a period in a Muslim country and is now working. -One recorded interview, 
one hour. 
 
Selma is 70 years old. She does not cover her hair, but considers it obligatory for all Muslim 
women. Selma is critical towards Wahhabi-influence. -One interview, thirty minutes, not 
recorded. 
 
Edina is in her mid-twenties. She does not cover her hair. She studies the University. She 
neither expresses a critical nor a positive attitude towards Wahhabi-Islam. -Two informal 
interviews/conversations in a group-setting, not recorded. 
 
Jasmina is in her late twenties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 18. 
She has studied at the University for two years and is now considering her future plans. 
Jasmina is neither positive nor negative towards Wahhabi-influence. -One recorded interview, 
one hour and fifteen minutes. 
 
Meliha is in her early thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 16 
when she was a student at the medresa. She works in a Muslim NGO and has undergone 
Islamic studies in an Arab country. She is married, with children. Meliha is quite critical 
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towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -Two recorded interviews, two hours and forty 
minutes. 
 
Lejla is in her late twenties. She wears hijab and niqab, and started to cover her hair at the 
age of 15 and her face three years later when she was 18. She runs her own businesses and is 
married, with children. Lejla is not critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -One 
recorded interview, two hours. 
 
Medina is in her early thirties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 25. 
She has lived in a Western-European country and has a University-degree from a Muslim 
country. She is working voluntarily, giving lectures. She is married, with children. Medina is 
not critical towards Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -One group interview/conversation and one 
recorded interview lasting one and a half hour. 
 
Amra is in her late twenties. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair at the age of 23. 
She has a University degree and is working. Amra is positive towards Wahhabi-influence in 
Bosnia. -One group interview/conversation, one interview, partly recorded (two hours), one 
informal interview and one more meeting. 
 
Azra is 19 years old. She wears hijab and started to cover her hair when she was attending 
school in a Muslim country. She now studies at the University. She is positive towards 
Wahhabi-influence in Bosnia. -One informal group interview/conversation, not recorded. 
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